FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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JANUARY 1947

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

HENRY L. STIMSON, Secretary of State, 1929–1933; Secretary of War, 1911–1913, and 1940–1945; Chairman of the U. S. Delegation to the London Naval Conference, 1930, and to the Disarmament Conference, 1932 * * * *HAROLD NICOLSON*, former member of the British diplomatic service and Member of Parliament; author of "Peacemaking 1919," "Diplomacy," "The Congress of Vienna" and other works * * * *ALLEN W. DULLES*, American member of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference in 1926, and legal adviser to the American delegation at the Three Power Naval Conference in 1927 and at the Disarmament Conference in 1932 and 1933; representative of OSS in Central Europe, 1942–1945, and Chief of the OSS Mission to Germany after V-E Day * * * *HERBERT FEIS*, former Adviser on International Economic Affairs in the Department of State; recently Special Adviser to the Secretary of War; author of "The Changing Pattern of International Economic Affairs" and "The Sinews of Peace" * * * *KARL GRUBER*, Foreign Minister of Austria * * * *RAYMOND BLACKBURN*, Labor Party Member of Parliament * * * *HANS W. WEIGERT*, of Antioch College, formerly on the faculties of Trinity College and the University of Pittsburgh; author of "Compass of the World" (with Vilhjalmur Stefansson) and other volumes in the field of political geography * * * *LOUIS H. PINK*, former Adviser to President Osmeña of the Philippine Commonwealth * * * *S. R. DENNISON*, Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, and University Lecturer in Economics; served in the Economic Section of the War Cabinet Secretariat, 1940–1946 * * * *AHMED SÜKRÜ ESMER*, Foreign Editor of *Ulus*, Ankara; member of the Turkish Parliament, 1939–1946, and of the Turkish Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, 1946 * * * *WILLIAM P. MADDOX*, Chief of the Division of Training Services, Office of the Foreign Service, Department of State; formerly on the faculties of Harvard, Princeton and Pennsylvania Universities * * * *WILLIAM IRVINE*, Professor of English, Stanford University * * * *J. BARENTS*, Assistant Editor, *De Nieuwe Nederlander*, The Hague.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE NUREMBERG TRIAL: LANDMARK IN LAW

By Henry L. Stimson

IN THE confusion and disquiet of the war's first aftermath, there has been at least one great event from which we may properly take hope. The surviving leaders of the Nazi conspiracy against mankind have been indicted, tried, and judged in a proceeding whose magnitude and quality make it a landmark in the history of international law. The great undertaking at Nuremberg can live and grow in meaning, however, only if its principles are rightly understood and accepted. It is therefore disturbing to find that its work is criticized and even challenged as lawless by many who should know better. In the deep conviction that this trial deserves to be known and valued as a long step ahead on the only upward road, I venture to set down my general view of its nature and accomplishment.

The defendants at Nuremberg were leaders of the most highly organized and extensive wickedness in history. It was not a trick of the law which brought them to the bar; it was the "massed angered forces of common humanity." There were three different courses open to us when the Nazi leaders were captured: release, summary punishment, or trial. Release was unthinkable; it would have been taken as an admission that there was here no crime. Summary punishment was widely recommended. It would have satisfied the immediate requirement of the emotions, and in its own roughhewn way it would have been fair enough, for this was precisely the type of justice that the Nazis themselves had so often used. But this fact was in reality the best reason for rejecting such a solution. The whole moral position of the victorious Powers must collapse if their judgments could be enforced only by Nazi methods. Our anger, as righteous anger, must be subject to the law. We therefore took the third course and tried the

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captive criminals by a judicial proceeding. We gave to the Nazis what they had denied their own opponents — the protection of the Law. The Nuremberg Tribunal was thus in no sense an instrument of vengeance but the reverse. It was, as Mr. Justice Jackson said in opening the case for the prosecution, "one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason."

The function of the law here, as everywhere, has been to insure fair judgment. By preventing abuse and minimizing error, proceedings under law give dignity and method to the ordinary conscience of mankind. For this purpose the law demands three things: that the defendant be charged with a punishable crime; that he have full opportunity for defense; and that he be judged fairly on the evidence by a proper judicial authority. Should it fail to meet any one of these three requirements, a trial would not be justice. Against these standards, therefore, the judgment of Nuremberg must itself be judged.

I. PUNISHABLE CRIMES

In our modern domestic law, a man can be penalized only when he has done something which was authoritatively recognized as punishable when he did it. This is the well-known principle that forbids *ex post facto* law, and it accords entirely with our standards of fair play. A mistaken appeal to this principle has been the cause of much confusion about the Nuremberg trial. It is argued that parts of the Tribunal's Charter, written in 1945, make crimes out of what before were activities beyond the scope of national and international law. Were this an exact statement of the situation we might well be concerned, but it is not. It rests on a misconception of the whole nature of the law of nations. International law is not a body of authoritative codes or statutes; it is the gradual expression, case by case, of the moral judgments of the civilized world. As such, it corresponds precisely to the common law of Anglo-American tradition. We can understand the law of Nuremberg only if we see it for what it is — a great new case in the book of international law, and not a formal enforcement of codified statutes. A look at the charges will show what I mean.

The Charter of the Tribunal recognizes three kinds of crime, all of which were charged in the indictment: crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. There was a fourth charge, of conspiracy to commit one or all of these crimes. To

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me personally this fourth charge is the most realistic of them all, for the Nazi crime is in the end indivisible. Each of the myriad transgressions was an interlocking part of the whole gigantic barbarity. But basically it is the first three that we must consider. The fourth is built on them.

Of the three charges, only one has been seriously criticized. War crimes have not greatly concerned the Tribunal's critics; these are offenses well understood and long generally recognized in the law or rules of war. The charge of crimes against humanity has not aroused much comment in this country, perhaps because this part of the indictment was not of central concern to the American prosecutor. The Tribunal's findings on this charge are significant, but not such as to raise much question of their legal validity, so I defer my comment to a later section of this article.

There remains the charge of crimes against peace, which has been the chief target of most of the honest critics of Nuremberg. It is under this charge that a penalty has been asked, for the first time, against the individual leaders in a war of aggression. It is this that well-intentioned critics have called "*ex post facto* law."

It is clear that until quite recently any legal judgment against a war-maker would have been absurd. Throughout the centuries, until after World War I, the choice between war and peace remained entirely in the hands of each sovereign state, and neither the law nor the ordinary conscience of humanity ventured to deny that right. The concept of just and unjust wars is of course as old at least as Plato. But in the anarchy of individual sovereignties, the right to fight was denied to no people and the right to start a fight was denied to no ruler. For the loser in a war, punishment was certain. But this was not a matter of law; it was simply a matter of course. At the best it was like the early law of the blood feud, in which the punishment of a murderer was the responsibility of the victim's family alone and not of the whole community. Even in 1914 the German violation of Belgian neutrality was regarded as a matter for action only by those nations directly concerned in the Treaties of 1839. So far indeed was this sovereign right of war-making accepted that it was frequently extended to include the barbarous notion that a sovereign ruler is not subject to the law.

In the face of this acceptance of war as a proper instrument of sovereign national policy, the only field for the early development of international law lay in restricting so far as possible the bru-

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talities of warfare. In obedience to age-long instincts of chivalry and magnanimity, there were gradually developed international standards for the conduct of war. Civilians and neutrals were given protecting rights and privileges, the treatment of prisoners was prescribed, and certain weapons were outlawed. It is these long established and universally accepted standards, most of them formally included in the internal law of Germany, that are covered by the charge of war crimes in the Nuremberg indictment.

The attempt to moderate the excesses of war without controlling war itself was doomed to failure by the extraordinary scientific and industrial developments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By 1914 the world had been intertwined into a single unit and weapons had been so far developed that a major war could shake the whole structure of civilization. No rules of warfare were sufficient to limit the vast new destructive powers of belligerents, and the First World War made it clear that old notions must be abandoned; the world must attack the problem at its root. Thus after 1918 repeated efforts were made to eliminate aggressive war as a legal national undertaking. These efforts reached their climax in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, in which 63 nations, including Germany, Japan and Italy, renounced aggressive warfare. This pact was not an isolated incident of the postwar era. During that period the whole world was at one in its opinion of aggressive war. In repeated resolutions in the League of Nations and elsewhere, aggression was roundly denounced as criminal. In the judgment of the peoples of the world the once proud title of "conqueror" was replaced by the criminal epithet "aggressor."

The progress made from 1918 to 1931 was halting and incomplete, but its direction was clear; the mandate for peace was overwhelming. Most tragically, the peoples who had renounced war were not sufficiently alert to their danger when in the following years the ruling groups of three great nations, in wanton denial of every principle of peace and civilization, launched a conspiracy against the rest of the world. Thus it happened that in the ten years which began with the invasion of Manchuria the principles of the Kellogg Pact were steadily under attack, and only as the danger came slowly home to each one of them individually did the peace-loving nations take action against aggression. In early 1945, as it became apparent that the long delayed

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victory was at hand, the question posed itself directly: Has there been a war of aggression and are its leaders punishable? There were many then, as there are some now, who argued that there was no law for this offense, and they found their justification in the feebleness and acquiescence of other nations in the early aggression of the Axis. Other counsels prevailed, however, and by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal the responsible leaders of aggressive war were subjected to trial and conviction on the charge of crimes against peace.

Here we come to the heart of the matter. Able lawyers and honest men have cried out that this aggressive war was not a crime. They have argued that the Nuremberg defendants were not properly forewarned when they made war that what they did was criminal.

Now in one sense the concept of *ex post facto* law is a strange one to apply here, because this concept relates to a state of mind on the part of the defendants that in this case was wholly absent. That concept is based on the assumption that if the defendant had known that the proposed act was criminal he would have refrained from committing it. Nothing in the attitude of the Nazi leaders corresponds to this assumption; their minds were wholly untroubled by the question of their guilt or innocence. Not in their aggression only but in their whole philosophy, they excluded the very concept of law. They deliberately put themselves below such a concept. To international law — as to the law of Germany — they paid only such respect as they found politic, and in the end they had smashed its every rule. Their attitude toward aggressive war was exactly like their attitude toward murder — both were useful instruments in a great design. It is therefore impossible to get any light on the validity of this charge of aggressive war by inspecting the Nazi mind. We must study rather the minds of the rest of the world, which is at once a less revolting and a more fruitful labor.

What did the rest of us think about aggressive war at the time of the Nazi attacks? This question is complex, but to that part of it which affects the legality of the Nuremberg trial we can give a simple answer. That we considered aggressive war wicked is clear; that we considered the leaders of an aggressive war wicked is equally clear. These opinions, in large part formally embodied in the Kellogg Pact, are the basis for the law of Nuremberg. With the detailed reasoning by which the prosecution has sup-

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ported the law set forth in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, we cannot here concern ourselves. The proposition sustained by the Tribunal is simple: if a man plans aggression when aggression has been formally renounced by his nation, he is a criminal. Those who are concerned with the law of this proposition cannot do better than to read the pertinent passages in the opening address of Mr. Justice Jackson, the closing address of Sir Hartley Shawcross, and the opinion of the Tribunal itself.

What really troubles the critics of Nuremberg is that they see no evidence that before 1945 we considered the capture and conviction of such aggressors to be our legal duty. In this view they are in the main correct, but it is vitally important to remember that a legal right is not lost merely because temporarily it is not used. What happened before World War II was that we lacked the courage to enforce the authoritative decision of the international world. We agreed with the Kellogg Pact that aggressive war must end. We renounced it, and we condemned those who might use it. But it was a moral condemnation only. We thus did not reach the second half of the question: What will you do to an aggressor when you catch him? If we *had* reached it, we should easily have found the right answer. But that answer escaped us, for it implied a duty to catch the criminal, and such a chase meant war. It was the Nazi confidence that we would never chase and catch them, and not a misunderstanding of our opinion of them, that led them to commit their crimes. Our offense was thus that of the man who passed by on the other side. That we have finally recognized our negligence and named the criminals for what they are is a piece of righteousness too long delayed by fear.

We did not ask ourselves, in 1939 or 1940, or even in 1941, what punishment, if any, Hitler and his chief assistants deserved. We asked simply two questions: How do we avoid war, and how do we keep this wickedness from overwhelming us? These seemed larger questions to us than the guilt or innocence of individuals. In the end we found an answer to the second question, but none to the first. The crime of the Nazis, against *us*, lay in this very fact: that their making of aggressive war made peace here impossible. We have now seen again, in hard and deadly terms, what had been proved in 1917 — that "peace is indivisible." The man who makes aggressive war at all makes war against mankind. That is an exact, not a rhetorical, description of the crime of aggressive war.

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Thus the Second World War brought it home to us that our repugnance to aggressive war was incomplete without a judgment of its leaders. What we had called a crime demanded punishment; we must bring our law in balance with the universal moral judgment of mankind. The wickedness of aggression must be punished by a trial and judgment. This is what has been done at Nuremberg.

Now this is a new judicial process, but it is not *ex post facto* law. It is the enforcement of a moral judgment which dates back a generation. It is a growth in the application of law that any student of our common law should recognize as natural and proper, for it is in just this manner that the common law grew up. There was, somewhere in our distant past, a first case of murder, a first case where the tribe replaced the victim's family as judge of the offender. The tribe had learned that the deliberate and malicious killing of any human being was, and must be treated as, an offense against the whole community. The analogy is exact. All case law grows by new decisions, and where those new decisions match the conscience of the community, they are law as truly as the law of murder. They do not become *ex post facto* law merely because until the first decision and punishment comes, a man's only warning that he offends is in the general sense and feeling of his fellow men.

The charge of aggressive war is unsound, therefore, only if the community of nations did not believe in 1939 that aggressive war was an offense. Merely to make such a suggestion, however, is to discard it. Aggression is an offense, and we all know it; we have known it for a generation. It is an offense so deep and heinous that we cannot endure its repetition.

The law made effective by the trial at Nuremberg is righteous law long overdue. It is in just such cases as this one that the law becomes more nearly what Mr. Justice Holmes called it: "the witness and external deposit of our moral life."

With the Judgment of Nuremberg we at last reach to the very core of international strife, and we set a penalty not merely for war crimes, but for the very act of war itself, except in self-defense. If a man will argue that this is bad law, untrue to our ideals, I will listen. But I feel only pity for the casuist who would dismiss the Nazi leaders because "they were not warned it was a crime." They were warned, and they sneered contempt. Our shame is that their contempt was so nearly justified, not that we have in the end made good our warning.

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II. FAIR TRIAL

Next after its assertion of the criminality of aggressive war, the triumph of Nuremberg rests in the manner and degree to which it has discharged with honor the true functions of a legal instrument. The crimes charged were punishable as we have seen — so clearly punishable that the only important suggested alternative to a trial was summary execution of the accused. It is in its pursuit of a different course that the Nuremberg Tribunal has demonstrated at once the dignity and the value of the law, and students of law everywhere will find inspiration and enlightenment in close study of its work. In its skilful development of a procedure satisfying every traditional and material safeguard of the varying legal forms of the prosecuting nations, it represents a signal success in the field of international negotiation, and in its rigid fidelity to the fundamental principles of fair play it has insured the lasting value of its work.

In their insistence on fairness to the defendants, the Charter and the Tribunal leaned over backwards. Each defendant was allowed to testify for himself, a right denied by Continental law. At the conclusion of the trial, each defendant was allowed to address the Tribunal, at great length, a right denied by Anglo-American law. The difference between Continental and Anglo-American law was thus adjusted by allowing to the defendant his rights under both. Counsel for the defendants were leading German lawyers and professors from the German universities, some of them ardent and unrepentant Nazis. Counsel were paid, fed, sheltered and transported at the expense of the Allies, and were furnished offices and secretarial help. The defense had full access to all documents. Every attempt was made to produce desired witnesses when the Tribunal believed that they had any relevant evidence to offer. In the summation of the trial the defense had 20 days and the prosecution three, and the defense case as a whole occupied considerably more time than the prosecution.

The record of the Nuremberg trial thus becomes one of the foundation stones of the peace. Under the most rigid safeguards of jurisprudence, subject to challenge, denial and disproof by men on trial for their lives and assisted by counsel of their own choosing, the great conspiracy has been unmasked. In documents unchallenged by the defense and often in the words of the defendants themselves, there is recorded the whole black history

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of murder, enslavement and aggression. This record, so established, will stand as a demonstration, on a wholly new level of validity and strength, of the true character of the Nazi régime. And this is so not in spite of our insistence upon law, but because of it.

In this connection it is worth noting that the trial has totally exploded many of the strange notions that seem to lurk in the minds of some who have expressed their doubts about Nuremberg. Some of the doubters are not basically concerned with "*ex post facto* law" or with "vengeance." Their real trouble is that they did not think the Nazis could be proved guilty. To these gentlemen I earnestly commend a reading of the record. If after reading it they do not think there was in fact aggressive war, in its most naked form, then I shall be constrained to believe that they do not think any such thing exists or can exist.

III. FAIR JUDGMENT

Not having made a study of the evidence presented in the case with special reference to each defendant, I am not qualified to pass judgment on the verdicts and sentences of the Tribunal against individuals and criminal groups. I have, however, heard no claim that these sentences were too severe. The Tribunal's findings as to the law are on the whole encouraging. The charge of aggressive war was accepted and ably explained. The charge of war crimes was sustained almost without comment. The charge of crimes against humanity was limited by the Tribunal to include only activities pursued in connection with the crime of war. The Tribunal eliminated from its jurisdiction the question of the criminal accountability of those responsible for wholesale persecution before the outbreak of the war in 1939. With this decision I do not here venture to quarrel, but its effect appears to me to involve a reduction of the meaning of crimes against humanity to a point where they become practically synonymous with war crimes.

If there is a weakness in the Tribunal's findings, I believe it lies in its very limited construction of the legal concept of conspiracy. That only eight of the 22 defendants should have been found guilty on the count of conspiracy to commit the various crimes involved in the indictment seems to me surprising. I believe that the Tribunal would have been justified in a broader construction of the law of conspiracy, and under such a construction it might

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well have found a different verdict in a case like that of Schacht.

In this first great international trial, however, it is perhaps as well that the Tribunal has very rigidly interpreted both the law and the evidence. In this connection we may observe that only in the case of Rudolf Hess, sentenced to life imprisonment, does the punishment of any of the defendants depend solely on the count of aggressive war. All of those who have been hanged were convicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity, and all but one were convicted of both. Certainly, then, the charge of aggressive war has not been established in international law at the expense of any innocent lives.

The judgment of the Tribunal is thus, in its findings of guilt, beyond challenge. We may regret that some of the charges were not regarded as proven and some of the defendants not found clearly guilty. But we may take pride in the restraint of a tribunal which has so clearly insisted upon certain proof of guilt. It is far better that a Schacht should go free than that a judge should compromise his conscience.

IV. THE MEANING OF NUREMBERG

A single landmark of justice and honor does not make a world of peace. The Nazi leaders are not the only ones who have renounced and denied the principles of western civilization. They are unique only in the degree and violence of their offenses. In every nation which acquiesced even for a time in their offense, there were offenders. There have been still more culpable offenders in nations which joined before or after in the brutal business of aggression. If we claimed for Nuremberg that it was final justice, or that only these criminals were guilty, we might well be criticized as being swayed by vengeance and not justice. But this is not the claim. The American prosecutor has explicitly stated that he looks uneasily and with great regret upon certain brutalities that have occurred since the ending of the war. He speaks for us all when he says that there has been enough bloodletting in Europe. But the sins of others do not make the Nazi leaders less guilty, and the importance of Nuremberg lies not in any claim that by itself it clears the board, but rather in the pattern it has set. The four nations prosecuting, and the 19 others subscribing to the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, have firmly bound themselves to the principle that aggressive war is a personal and punishable crime.

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It is this principle upon which we must henceforth rely for our legal protection against the horrors of war. We must never forget that under modern conditions of life, science and technology, all war has become greatly brutalized, and that no one who joins in it, even in self-defense, can escape becoming also in a measure brutalized. Modern war cannot be limited in its destructive methods and in the inevitable debasement of all participants. A fair scrutiny of the last two World Wars makes clear the steady intensification in the inhumanity of the weapons and methods employed by both the aggressors and the victors. In order to defeat Japanese aggression, we were forced, as Admiral Nimitz has stated, to employ a technique of unrestricted submarine warfare not unlike that which 25 years ago was the proximate cause of our entry into World War I. In the use of strategic air power, the Allies took the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Germany, and in Japan the destruction of civilian life wreaked by our B-29s, even before the final blow of the atomic bombs, was at least proportionately great. It is true that our use of this destructive power, particularly of the atomic bomb, was for the purpose of winning a quick victory over aggressors, so as to minimize the loss of life, not only of our troops but of the civilian populations of our enemies as well, and that this purpose in the case of Japan was clearly effected. But even so, we as well as our enemies have contributed to the proof that the central moral problem is war and not its methods, and that a continuance of war will in all probability end with the destruction of our civilization.

International law is still limited by international politics, and we must not pretend that either can live and grow without the other. But in the judgment of Nuremberg there is affirmed the central principle of peace — that the man who makes or plans to make aggressive war is a criminal. A standard has been raised to which Americans, at least, must repair; for it is only as this standard is accepted, supported and enforced that we can move onward to a world of law and peace.

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PEACEMAKING AT PARIS: SUCCESS, FAILURE OR FARCE?

By Harold Nicolson

THE Conference of Paris dissolved on October 15. "*La Conférence de Paris,*" rasped M. Bidault, "*est close.*" For 79 days had the representatives of 21 nations been discussing the terms of peace to be imposed upon their five minor enemies — Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. It is the way of every conference to begin like a tortoise and to end like a greyhound. But no conference that I have ever attended showed a greater disparity of progress between the commencement and the finish. During the first six weeks the Conference dragged itself along painfully at the rate of an inch an hour; during the last four weeks there was a breathless scramble to conclude. In frantic haste the delegates rattled off their final speeches, the concluding votes were registered in an indecent rush, and so anxious were the statesmen not to miss the *Queen Elizabeth* that there was no time at the end for the customary courtesies and farewells. After all those days and nights of tension and clamor a sudden silence descended upon the Palace of the Luxembourg: the microphones and the loud-speakers were dismantled; the hundreds of small gilt chairs were returned to the basement; and in the courtyard of the palace, which had been the scene of so many arrivals and departures, five army lorries were loaded with the tons of paper which remained unconsumed. The inhabitants of the Luxembourg quarter, who night after night had been kept awake by the loud-speakers calling the delegation cars from their parking places, resumed their accustomed somnolence. The police were withdrawn; the flags were taken down; and the galleries and saloons of the palace, which for ten weeks had echoed to the sound of many languages, heard only the voices of children playing in the gardens below.

In the last days of the Conference, an unofficial poll was taken among the journalists of 27 countries who had followed the proceedings. They were asked three questions. Did they regard the Conference as having been, (a) a success; (b) a failure; or (c) a farce? Of these journalists, 31 replied that it had been a success, 56 that it had been a failure, and 33 that it had been a farce. The proportion of criticism as against approval was therefore more

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than two to one. What were the reasons for this adverse opinion, and upon what considerations was it based? On October 23, in the House of Commons, Mr. Winston Churchill expressed the opinion that the Conference of Paris had been "bad diplomacy but valuable education." The implication of this cryptic remark was that the Conference had accomplished nothing but had taught us many lessons. What are these lessons? As one who was present throughout the Paris Conference, and who has devoted his life to the study and practice of diplomacy, I may perhaps be permitted to record my considered opinion. Was it a success? No, it was not a success. Was it a failure? No, it was not entirely a failure. Was it a farce? Only if the lessons which it taught us are in future disregarded.

II

Much of the disappointment which the Conference engendered was due, of course, to a general ignorance of the purposes for which it was summoned. The discussions which took place at the Luxembourg Palace were, so to speak, contained in a bag tied at each end. The Council of Foreign Ministers had for more than a year been discussing these five treaties among themselves. They had already reached agreement upon a large number of clauses and there were only some 26 points left over upon which the Council, or the "Big Four" as they were called, had not been in accord. The terms of reference of the Conference of 21 Powers were thus strictly limited. They were not supposed to change those clauses on which the Big Four had already agreed; they were not supposed even to suggest a solution of the 26 points on which the Council of Foreign Ministers had failed to reach an agreement. All they were supposed to do was to make "recommendations" which the Big Four would consider among themselves at some subsequent private meeting. It is reasonable to ask whether there was any point in holding a public conference on matters which had either been agreed to already, or which could only finally be decided by private negotiation between the four Foreign Ministers. But it is not reasonable to reproach the Paris Conference for having failed to decide on issues which, under its terms of reference, it was never expected to decide. Yet the initial question remains: "What was the point of holding any conference at all?"

The Anglo-Saxon group, and notably Mr. Byrnes, felt that it

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would not be in accordance with western democratic theory for the Big Four to draw up the final terms of these treaties without the smaller Powers being at least permitted to state their opinion. It was felt also that, if this peace settlement were to be differentiated from the dictated settlements imposed in 1919, opportunity should be given to the five enemy Powers publicly to state their case. There may also have been some idea in the mind of Mr. Byrnes and his associates that it would be a useful thing to confront the Slav group with an expression of joint allied opinion and to suggest to them that their own conception of a peace settlement was not at every point in accord with "the conscience of mankind." The lesser allies were certainly given every occasion to voice their opinion; the five enemy Powers were certainly given a courteous opportunity to plead their cause. But it is doubtful whether the Soviet delegation interpreted the votes which were so constantly given against them as an expression of human conscience; they interpreted them as evidence of an organized opposition bloc. Being convinced of the righteousness of their own dogma, they were unable to credit the capitalist world with any ethical purposes whatsoever. For them the conscience of the heretic world was nothing more impressive than bourgeois inhibitions and diplomatic manœuvre. It cannot be said, therefore, that the attempt to confront Soviet realism with liberal-democratic principles was a success; it did not arouse a sense of guilt; it merely confirmed previous suspicions.

The Soviet Government for their part, formed as they are in the authoritarian conception of human governance, had never desired a public conference at which the smaller Powers might wish to criticize their betters. They agreed to a conference unwillingly, and hoped only to render it a platform for anti-capitalist propaganda. They and their associates took every occasion to demonstrate at great length, and often in exaggerated language, the hypocrisy and malignity of the western Powers. Yet they also failed to achieve their objective. The Conference listened with bored indifference to their tirades; their adversaries did not even bother to reply; and the constant reiteration of stock Communist epithets had no other effect than to inflate the currency of Soviet polemics.

In so far, therefore, as the purposes of the Conference were concerned, it may be said that it did afford the smaller Powers and the enemy Powers a free opportunity to state their views.

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But so far from shaking the faith of the west in the liberal-democratic theory, or the faith of the east in the Marxist dialectic, the 10 weeks of discussion and oratory merely emphasized the gulf between them. The Conference failed either to diminish Russia's contempt for our intentions or our perplexity in regard to their fanaticism; it did not increase either the existing distrust or the existing perplexity; it merely gave to each a sharper outline. We came to understand that the Russians not only spoke a different language, but possessed dissimilar minds. And that, perhaps, was a valuable lesson.

III

The avowed purposes of the Conference may therefore have been achieved; the unavowed purposes were not achieved either by one side or the other. But there are other, and more immediately important, lessons which this Paris Conference should have taught us. I propose to examine the actual functioning of the Conference under two headings, method and principle.

It is a frequent experience that coalitions which have been formed to resist a common danger tend to dissolve once that danger has been removed. The Quadruple Alliance, which had secured the defeat of Napoleon in 1814, very nearly dissolved in 1815 into a war between Great Britain and France on the one hand and Russia and Prussia on the other. The United Front which had been formed during the First World War became sadly disunited during the Peace Conference of 1919. It is because of this danger that the partners to any coalition tend, when victory has been assured, to deal very tentatively with the problems which victory has created. The academic critic of the present peace proposals may argue that it was unwise not to recognize from the outset that the essential problem was not so much to impose peace upon our defeated enemies as to reach a solid basis of agreement between the Allies themselves. Obviously, if the making of the present peace had rested solely in the hands of the United States, Great Britain and France, an agreed peace, not only with our minor enemies, but also with Germany and Japan, would have presented no extreme diplomatic difficulty. The reason why the present settlement is one of such immense complexity is that Russia's territorial, political, economic and social objectives are in complete variance with those of her allies.

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The academic critic might argue therefore, and with some justice, that we should from the outset have recognized squarely that the central problem was that of reaching agreement with the Soviet Government; that for this purpose it was a mistake to deal with separate items separately; and that it would have been preferable to examine the whole range of Russian objectives at the same time. Such a critic would contend that we should have said to Russia: "Now tell us exactly what you want everywhere. What do you want in Germany, in Austria, on the Baltic, in the Adriatic, in the Danube Basin, in the Straits, in the Middle East, in China, in the Pacific?" By grouping all Russia's claims together, it might have been possible, by a system of give and take, to reach a sensible, if not wholly acceptable, agreement. But by separating the various problems into different categories, by beginning with those which appeared the easiest and by postponing those which were known to be acutely difficult, you restricted your own bargaining capacity and exposed yourself to the danger that in each separate category Russia starts, as it were, with a fresh hand. To approach this central problem tentatively, and from the easiest end, was to be stung by each of the nettles without firmly grasping a single one.

I have referred to this line of criticism as an "academic" criticism, since, although justifiable in theory, it does not take sufficient account of the practical impossibilities involved. A minor, and more pertinent, version of this criticism is that it was a mistake to risk a head-on collision with Russia over our five minor enemies so long as the central problem of Germany remained unsolved. Even those who realize that it would in practice have been impossible to bunch all Russia's claims, whether in Europe, Asia or even Africa, into a single discussion, might contend that to take the five minor treaties first, before the German and Austrian problems had been tackled, was to adopt a wrong order. If this be a correct criticism (and I am not saying that it is incorrect), then the fundamental error in method was to hold the Luxembourg Conference before the Big Four had been able to establish at least the principles of a German settlement.

Let us assume none the less that the Big Four were justified in summoning the Conference at the time it was summoned and let us examine whether the procedure then adopted was suitable or unsuitable. There are three main criticisms to be made. The first bears upon the lack of coördination, which seems to be a

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defect inherent in all conferences. The other two bear upon two remarkable innovations in diplomatic practice, namely the system of recording votes and the publicity given to the discussions. I shall deal first with the lack of coördination.

It is the custom, and the inevitable custom, of all conferences to split up into commissions. The advantages of this custom are obvious; its disadvantages are repeatedly forgotten. At the Peace Conference of 1919 the mistake was made of nominating commissions to deal, not with the several enemy countries (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and so on), but with the claims made against these countries by what were known as "the Successor States" (Jugoslav claims, Greek claims, Rumanian claims, Czech claims, and so on). The problems, for instance, created by the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were examined, not in terms of what that Empire would lose, but in terms of what the Successor States would gain. The commissions, working in water-tight compartments, each recommended certain cessions of territory, but it was only when these cessions were added together that it was found that, although the parts were justified, the whole was not. Similarly, at the recent Conference, each commission made recommendations which, although justified in themselves, were less justifiable when added to the other recommendations made by the other commissions. A General, or Coördinating, Commission had in fact been provided for, in the hope that it would be able to see that the several parts did not add up into a bad whole. But this Commission was for some strange cause regarded with disfavor by the Slav group, and it failed to function. The recommendations of the Conference were, as a result, not properly coördinated; this was a serious defect in method which ought to have been avoided.

More interesting and more important were the two innovations in established diplomatic practice which were introduced. The first was the system of voting. In previous conferences the theory had obtained that all decisions should be taken unanimously. Long and confidential negotiations were entailed before a compromise could be agreed to, or a settlement reached to which every party was prepared to give its consent. The advantage of the established system was that in the end you had a unanimous decision to which all parties had voluntarily acceded; the disadvantage was that those who felt the decision to be disadvantageous or unjust had no other means open to them of

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making known their disapproval than the extreme measure of refusing at the last moment to sign. It was believed that, since the Paris Conference had been summoned, not for the purpose of reaching decisions, but only for the purpose of making "recommendations," it would be a good idea if the views of the several delegations were recorded by vote. Innumerable votes were therefore taken on the several clauses of the five treaties. Had these votes been in fact "free votes," in the sense that the several delegations recorded on each occasion their true opinion upon the issues involved, this system would have provided the Big Four with a valuable indication of what the 17 minor allies really thought. But the fact that on almost every issue of any importance the votes fell in the proportion of 14 to 6, with one abstention, convinced all unbiassed observers that the delegations were voting, not upon the merits of each case, but according to the group to which they belonged. For although some variations occurred in the votes recorded by the non-Slav group, "the Soviet Six" (Russia, White Russia, the Ukraine, Jugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia) almost invariably voted as one man. Thus the effect of the voting system was to emphasize the division between the two groups, rather than to furnish any true indication of majority opinion.

This innovation, which to my mind was unfortunate in its inception and farcical in its result, created further suspicion in the Soviet mind. I am convinced that Mr. Byrnes really did believe that by this method the Conference would be able to register the views of the smaller allies. He and Mr. Bevin had in fact made it clear in the Council of Foreign Ministers that the Conference when it assembed would be free to adopt its own rules of procedure. But Mr. Molotov, with equal sincerity, was convinced that the Anglo-Saxon Powers had inserted this device in a spirit of cunning for the purpose of "ganging up" against the Soviet Union and its associates, and even with the ultimate and most nefarious purpose of using these voting figures for the purpose of evading pledges already entered into as between the Big Four. It must be confessed that neither the British nor the United States delegations did much to disabuse the Soviet Government of these suspicions; and Mr. Byrnes' frequent statements of his purposes and intentions in regard to the relation between Big Four agreements and majority recommendations were not always either tactful, lucid or consistent. Thus the

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voting system, which might have proved a useful innovation, became a hindrance and not a help.

The second innovation in established diplomatic practice was that of complete publicity. I am a firm believer in open covenants, but I am quite sure that they cannot be openly arrived at: it is not possible to negotiate in front of the microphone. It is no exaggeration at all to say that the introduction of "open diplomacy" into the Paris Conference meant that there was no negotiation, almost no discussion, at all. Each delegate was aware that his words would be broadcast throughout the world and that his every sentence would be scrutinized by political supporters or opponents in his home country. As a result, delegate after delegate would ascend the tribune, or rise in his place in a commission, for the purpose of addressing his public opinion at home and not for the purpose of addressing his colleagues at the Conference. We had a succession of propaganda speeches which took no account of the merits of the issue under discussion, which committed the several delegations to positions from which it would be difficult to retreat, which aroused some resentment, and which filled the assembled delegates with weariness and despair.

I cherish the hope that the patent failure of the Paris Peace Conference to conduct discussions in public will furnish a salutary lesson to future negotiators. It is possible even that it will have indicated the lines of a reasonable compromise between open policy and confidential negotiation. People may learn that when national interests or ideological passions are involved it is best to lay down the principles of agreement in confidential conclave; and that thereafter it is wise to explain those principles publicly and before all the world. I am far from regretting the publicity under which the Paris Conference suffered, since the impossibility of such methods has thereby been demonstrated without much serious harm having resulted. But if the educative value of this experiment is ignored, and if the future discussions on Germany are exposed to similar stultifications, then indeed it will be difficult to reach the agreed settlement which the world so ardently desires.

IV

And what about principle? It would of course be foolish to underestimate the effect upon the whole tone and course of the Conference of the ideological contrast between the Communist

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and the liberal Powers. It impeded understanding, it bred often groundless suspicions, it hampered all personal intimacy or even confidence, it created incompatibilities of temper. The rigid doctrinal orthodoxy of the Russian delegation, and their immediate associates, rendered them dogmatic in the assertion of their own opinions and impervious to the opinions of others. Their mechanical repetition of the same catchwords and phrases, the fixity of their vocabulary, precluded that elasticity of intercourse through which alone conflicting national interests can be brought within the area of compromise. There were moments, as during the final sessions of the Italian political commission, when it seemed as if this rigid tension might relax: but on the morrow would come fresh instructions from the Politburo in Moscow and the ice would form again. There were moments, as when Marshal Stalin made his conciliatory statement to a British journalist, when it seemed that a fresh start might be made: but always the same polemics would begin again in plenary session or in commission, and the flow of anti-American and anti-British propaganda upon the Soviet wireless was not for one moment modified or deflected. At the Paris Conference of 1919, in spite of the many differences which arose between the Allied and Associated Powers, there did exist a certain uniformity of principle, in that all the participants at that date desired to create the same sort of world. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1946 there was no such uniformity of desire; the worlds which the two groups wished to create were not different only, but inimical. It was this conflict of principle which underlay and which embittered the divergences that arose.

Yet it was not only a difference in economic and social theory which sundered the western from the eastern group; there was also a fundamental, if unexpressed, divergence between the two conceptions of the proper use of power. The Russians tended to regard the two world wars as one, and to assume that their victory in 1945 gave them the right not merely to regain the old Tsarist frontiers but also to require such extensions of territory or influence as Russia could have claimed from her allies had she shared with them the victory of 1918. Nor was this all. Again and again did one derive the impression that the Russians interpreted the many polite assurances given to them during the course of the war as definite recognitions on the part of the western Powers of a wide Russian zone of influence in central and

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southeastern Europe. Under this imaginary partition each side was to have a free hand within its own allotted zone and no questions asked. It appeared to many Russians that the attitude of the western Powers in regard to such subjects as the free navigation of the Danube, the status of Trieste, reparations in Russian-occupied countries, or the composition of the Bulgarian, Polish or Rumanian Governments, indicated a desire to evade this supposed agreement. Even as birds mark out their feeding territories and resort to threat-displays when other birds encroach upon them, so also did the Russians react to any attempt on our part to open a chink in the iron curtain by making counter allegations and by fomenting trouble in the western zones.

The two streams of Soviet expansion — the Communist stream and the Pan-Slav stream — showed at moments a formidable congruity. Albania, being under a Communist dictatorship, became "the first victim of Fascist aggression." Bulgaria, who owed so much to Russia but who betrayed her thrice, was absolved from all iniquity; a Polish delegate on one occasion went so far as to refer to the "epic struggle" of Bulgaria against Nazi oppression. On the other hand, Greece, being neither a Communist nor a Slav country, was exposed to constant vilification; nor did the Russians for one instant remember that, had it not been for those six weeks of Greek resistance, Hitler would assuredly have captured Moscow. The violence of Soviet enmity or partisanship made it appear as if our support of our own friends was of a lukewarm nature. The Russians certainly sought to use the Conference to convey the impression that they could be a formidable enemy and a potent friend; the Americans and the British, being mild men on the whole, conveyed no such impression.

I am not of those who hold that it takes two to make a quarrel; it takes only one to make a quarrel; but it certainly takes two to make friends. I do not believe that even if the western Powers had possessed the most gifted and powerful negotiators they could ever, at the Paris Conference, have reached a solid agreement with Soviet Russia. The publicity with which the proceedings were conducted, and the Russian fear of losing face, would in themselves have prevented so desirable a result. I am convinced that Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin were right in adopting an attitude which, while firm on all essentials, combined patience with forbearance. Yet it is to be regretted that no statesman from the western group displayed the same burning conviction in the

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liberal theory as the Russians and their associates displayed in the Communist theory.

Mr. Byrnes conveyed the impression that he was uncertain about the whole business and that he agreed with Mr. Bohlen that to argue with a Russian was a waste of time; Mr. Bevin was not in good health during the whole course of the Conference and was unable to manifest that vigor which renders him so forceful an orator; and M. Bidault was hampered throughout by the Communist members of his own Cabinet. Some of the minor delegates of course delivered useful speeches; Senator Vandenberg made good speeches; Senator Connally made quite good speeches; General Smuts made a speech which recalled the delegates to the nature of their responsibilities; much quiet but excellent work was done by M. Spaak of Belgium and by Baron van Boetzelaer of the Netherlands. Yet one was conscious throughout of the absence of any compelling personality. There was no man who could recall the Conference to the principles even of the Atlantic Charter; no man who could lift the Conference out of the ruts into which it so soon became embedded; and as a result, the Conference, from first to last, failed to become air-borne.

I am never impressed by people who, in their later age, contend that the methods and personalities of the present are inferior to those of the past. The expression, "They were giants in those days," always suggests to me that the user of that expression, in those days, must have been both young and small. In many ways I believe that Mr. Ernest Bevin, given the circumstances, is a more effective British Foreign Minister than Lord Balfour or Lord Curzon. Yet it was with dismay that I contrasted the United States delegation in Paris with that which accompanied President Wilson to the Conference of 1919. It would be foolish, of course, to compare the aura of prestige which surrounded President Wilson with the haze of vague benevolence which enshrouded, and at times bemused, Mr. Byrnes. I am not talking about that. What I mean is that the American delegation in 1919, the members of Colonel House's "Inquiry," represented all that was best in American scholarship, and therefore, if I may permit myself so odious a remark, all that is best in the American idea. There were men like Bowman, Seymour, Day, Coolidge, Haskins and Lord. To this day I look back with gratitude to the good fortune which brought me, as a member of the British delegation in 1919, into contact with such fine minds.

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One did not have the impression, at this Conference, that the American delegation were equally equipped. One did not have the impression that they were guided by the same quality of expert knowledge or warned by similar powers of prescience. One had the impression that they were animated by some vague conception of righteousness and benevolence, striped with bands of improvisation. Yet their direct responsibility for and at this Conference was even greater than that which gave such seriousness to the splendid delegation of 1919. Am I being a *laudator temporis acti*? I do not think so. It was not a contrast only between trained and untrained minds: it was a contrast in intellectual authority: it was a contrast in seriousness.

V

So the scene shifts from the Luxembourg Palace. At Flushing Meadows and elsewhere will continue to be enacted the struggle between the liberal and the totalitarian conception of the good life, the old controversy between the state and the individual, the principle of compulsion and the principle of consent.

Of the many lessons which I learnt from the Paris Conference there are some which I shall find permanently useful. I do not now believe that we can understand the Russians: I believe that we can strive not to misunderstand them. I do not now believe (if I ever believed) that we can induce them to appreciate (still less to share) our liberal point of view: but I do believe that if we are clear, and firm, and consistent, and united, we can lead them to realize that there are certain rights and principles on which we shall make a stand. I do not believe that war is either inevitable or even probable: but I do believe that the liberal Powers, while being fair and generous to Russia and her associates, must maintain united vigilance and strength. I certainly do not believe that any arguments can shake the rigid Russian faith in their own dogma: but I do believe that, if we are very wise, we can in practice show the world that the Marxist dialectic is not scientific, that capitalism can in fact avoid the dread cycle of boom and slump and war, and that the liberal world can offer a way of life which is infinitely more humane and agreeable, while no less certain, than the way of life which Communism preaches. And above all I believe (as I have always believed) in the impossibility of finding any single or sudden solution of the present uncertainty. There is no patent medicine,

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no special course of treatment, which can cure these ills; all we can hope to do is to render our own bodies sufficiently healthy to resist these maladies. No sane man would predict what will have happened to the world in 10 years from now. Things may be better, and they may be worse. All we can do at present is to preserve our common principles, to follow the immediate course with vigilance and caution, to avoid the twin pitfalls of provocation and weakness, and to make quite certain that if disaster comes we shall not have to reproach ourselves, or each other, with lack of patience or intelligence. I believe that by so walking, we shall walk in safety. But we must walk together.

Together? That is a provocative word to apply to Anglo-American relations. In each country there are people whose minds are clouded by memories of the past and misinterpretations of the present. America has not yet fully realized what it means to be the greatest Power in the world; Great Britain has not yet fully realized that she has lost her old almost effortless superiority. The British will be slow to see that they cannot, and need not, any longer seek to attain nineteenth century aims by nineteenth century means. It will take the Americans some time before they take for granted the immensity of their own stature. In America we may well witness the hesitations, and perhaps even the intemperance, of people who assume unaccustomed responsibilities; in Great Britain we shall have to be careful that our pride does not become too sensitive. Over there, in the east, is a giant with a single idea; it would be unfortunate if our own ideas became too dislocated.

The British have a remarkable gift for adjusting themselves to altered conditions and for finding comforting formulas whereby to render such changes less disagreeable. It is already a political necessity for us to conform our foreign policy to that of the United States. That will not always be easy. Our principles may be the same and our ultimate purpose may be identical; but we have no instinctive confidence in the wisdom or experience of American diplomacy, and at the back of our minds there lies a haunting doubt. For if we follow the United States in all its chivalrous adventures, if we allow the missionary spirit of the Americans to lead us into arduous paths, what happens if a wave of isolationism returns? We have slight faith in the continuity of American policy, knowing full well the sudden tides of popular emotion by which it can be deflected. It is not only righteous, it

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is even profitable, to maintain the open door in central and eastern Europe; but supposing that America becomes bored by the open door? We know the form which the reaction will take; it will be said that American boys are sent to Europe for the benefit of British imperialism. And we shall be left there alone, holding five fat babies in our aged arms.

I do not say that this also is a lesson which the Paris Conference has taught me. I say only that the conflict between the east and west which the Conference disclosed is a dangerous and I fear rather lasting conflict; that if trouble is to be avoided we must remain united and consistent; and that if unity and consistency are to be maintained Great Britain must be more cautious about her commitments, America more aware of her responsibilities.

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DISARMAMENT IN THE ATOMIC AGE

By Allen W. Dulles

THE Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations finds today that it has caught up with and must face in all their complex difficulty the two central problems of the age-old disarmament question: How can the world limit production of weapons of destruction? How can it insure effective control of that limitation? As these weapons become increasingly more devastating, the challenge to man's ingenuity and vision becomes correspondingly more impelling. But in essence the issues are the same as those debated for years at Geneva between the two world wars.

For over ten years, from the early 1920's until 1934, the League of Nations wrestled with the problem of limiting armaments. The failure to get results at that time has rather obscured the fact that some useful work in this field was done at Geneva, and that this work bears on many of the problems now faced by the Atomic Energy Commission.

At Geneva it was necessary to decide what weapons to limit or ban; what should be the nature of the limitations; how to make certain that the limitations would be carried out; and, finally, how to impose effective sanctions if they were not carried out. Today we do not need to discuss what we want to ban in the field of atomic weapons. The great issues now turn on the methods to be adopted with regard to supervision and sanctions.

Paradoxically enough, the League Disarmament Conference failed just *because* it was approaching the point of achievement, not because of its futility. This paradox is explainable by the attitude of Germany. Hitler could not afford to let the Conference succeed. It would block his plans for rearmament. He was safe in playing along while the conferees at Geneva dawdled and debated. But when, late in 1933, real progress was made on a concrete program, Hitler broke up the Conference. The agreement which was being drafted was to be a treaty with teeth; there was a definite program to limit and reduce armaments, and it was to be subject to control on the spot. It would have been next to impossible for Hitler to have signed such a treaty and agreed to the measures of supervision, and at the same time to have carried out a program of secret rearmament.

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Now that we have the documents revealed at the Nuremberg trial it no longer is necessary to speculate about Hitler's ideas on the subject. The notes of his cabinet conferences of October 13 and October 14, 1933, disclose his decision to sabotage the Disarmament Conference. The secret record shows that Hitler described the control regulations as "particularly intolerable," and he added that "the necessity arose to defeat these proposals [*i.e.* arms limitation and control proposals] and thereby cause the disarmament conference to be dissolved." Hitler could not accept any scrutiny of his military establishment.[1]

II

We may draw some encouragement from the fact that while in the past Soviet Russia and the United States have not always seen eye to eye on the subject of armament limitation, there nevertheless have been certain elements in their respective positions which brought them closer together on this subject than has been the case with most other countries. Throughout the period between the two world wars Soviet Russia held a consistent and a clear-cut position. On every possible occasion, from the Genoa Conference in 1922 to the Geneva Conference in 1932–34, the Soviet Union energetically pressed for total disarmament; and when she found that no states were prepared to follow her in such a radical step, she advocated a proportionate reduction of armaments.

The far-reaching Soviet proposal for "immediate, complete and general disarmament" was submitted to the Geneva Preparatory Commission on November 30, 1927. This was a meeting called to prepare the groundwork for the full-dress conference. The Soviet proposal went the limit. All armed forces were to be abolished, as well as war, navy and air ministries; military budgets were outlawed; and scientific research in the field of armaments was to be forbidden. Only small weapons for domestic police needs and small craft for sea patrols would be allowed. *This program was to be controlled by a permanent international commission, with local commissions of control in every contracting state.* Trade unions and workingmen's organizations were to join with the represent-

[1] The golden opportunity to bring Germany into line had been lost more than a year earlier. The promising negotiations carried on in the spring of 1932 by Messrs. Stimson, MacDonald, Tardieu and Bruening had dragged out too long, due to the upset of the French Government; an agreement that was on the point of being concluded with pre-Hitler Germany was lost when Bruening's Government fell. In six months the world had Hitler to deal with.

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atives of the legislative bodies of the contracting Powers (rather than with government officials) in carrying out the controls. The international control commission was to be entrusted with "bringing pressure by non-military measures upon any state which disturbed the normal progress of disarmament." The decisions of the international control commission were to be *reached by majority vote* and were to be binding on all states. These Soviet proposals were among the most far-reaching in respect of the limitation of sovereign authority that any country has ever suggested.

When the Soviet Delegation saw that proposals for total disarmament were not likely to be successful, they submitted a program based on the principle of proportionate reduction. The more heavily armed states were to reduce their land forces by 50 percent and the less heavily armed a third or a fourth, following a graduated scale. The control measures for this partial disarmament scheme were to be no less rigid than those proposed under the total disarmament plan.

Article 43 of the Soviet Draft Convention stated:

> With a view to ensuring genuine control, the Permanent International Commission of Control shall be entitled to carry out investigations on the spot in the event of reasonable suspicion of a breach of the present Convention and of the subsequent supplementary Agreements on the reduction and limitation of armaments, and to appoint for this purpose special commissions of enquiry.

Both the Conventions proposed by the Soviets, that for total as well as that for proportionate disarmament, first introduced into the preparatory work at Geneva, were again pressed when the plenary Conference met in 1932. At this Conference, Mr. Litvinov pointed out that a new conflict was impending, which, "owing to modern improvements in the weapons of destruction threatens humanity with incredible disaster, unprecedented devastation." He added that "in these circumstances the task of the hour is not the repetition of any attempts to achieve some reduction of armament or war budgets . . . but the actual prevention of war with the creation of effective security against war. This task can only be carried out by means of total and general disarmament."

Without attempting to detract in any way from the value of the Soviet contribution to the disarmament discussion of those days, we may usefully put the Soviet disarmament program into the

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perspective of over-all Soviet policy. Total universal disarmament, if it could be realized and controlled, would, of course, be particularly appealing to a state like Soviet Russia — or, for that matter, to the United States. The geographic position of these nations, their great expanse of territory, large populations and industrial possibilities, give them an inherent defensive strength and a war potential far exceeding those of most other states. In a totally disarmed world, no countries would be stronger or more secure than the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

The policy on armaments adopted by Soviet Russia in those years, combining as it did the idea of total disarmament (or at least a radical reduction of armaments) with rigid control, also fitted into the general Communist ideology. According to Lenin, the modern state was an instrument of the capitalist class, and the organs of that state existed to maintain the capitalist class. The future Socialist state, according to Lenin, would need no armies, navies or similar state organs, which existed only to suppress the proletariat.

The Sixth Congress of the Communist International, which met in the summer of 1928, set forth this position with complete frankness in describing the aim and purpose of the proposals which Soviet Russia had submitted to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission in Geneva and which she later submitted to the General Conference:

> The aim of the Soviet proposals was not to spread pacifist illusions, but to destroy them; not to support Capitalism by ignoring or toning down its shady sides, but to propagate the fundamental Marxian postulate, that disarmament and the abolition of war are possible only with the fall of Capitalism . . . it goes without saying, that not a single Communist thought for a moment that the imperialist world would accept the Soviet disarmament proposals . . . after the Soviet proposals for complete disarmament were rejected, the Soviet Delegation in March 1928 submitted a second scheme which provided for partial disarmament and for a gradual reduction of land and naval forces. This was not a concession to pacifism; on the contrary, it served to expose more completely the attitude of the Great Powers toward the small and oppressed nations. The Soviet Government's position on the question of disarmament is a continuation of Lenin's policy and a consistent application of his precepts.

The Communist position in those days before World War II was certainly influenced by the philosophy that disarmament can be achieved only in a Socialist world; that capitalist states make war inevitable; and that disarmament proposals emanating from

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the capitalist world are gestures designed to satisfy the proletariat in those states and are, in effect, manœuvres in preparation for war. Hence the Soviet Government felt that its suggestions regarding disarmament were calculated to expose the hypocrisy of the capitalist states, even though it considered as a foregone conclusion that they would not be accepted.

Even granting that this was the underlying motivation for the Soviet position, the fact nevertheless remains that the spokesmen for the U.S.S.R. consistently declared at Geneva their willingness to accept any real measures for the reduction of armaments, even though these did not approximate the drastic suggestions they themselves sponsored. There is no reason to doubt that they would have participated in the plans which were in process of being worked out when the Nazis sabotaged the Geneva Conference.

III

The United States sponsored proposals at the Geneva Conference which had certain characteristics in common with those put forward by the Soviets. President Hoover's plan, submitted on June 22, 1932, included an overall reduction of one-third in the strength of land armies over and above the so-called police component. Naval forces were to be reduced in various categories by a third or a quarter. Mr. Litvinov welcomed these proposals "the more because to some extent they proceed along the same lines as the Soviet proposals which were not accepted." They included, he said, "some of the important principles which the Soviet delegation put forward in the Preparatory Commission and at the Conference — namely, the objective method of proportional reduction. . . ." The Hoover proposal, as well as the Draft Convention submitted to the Conference by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald on behalf of the British Government, looked to a drastic overall cut in the armed forces of the world. Progress was really being made.

On one important point over a long period of years prior to 1933 the American Delegation had been at odds with many of the continental European Delegations. The United States had not favored the principle of supervising and controlling disarmament measures on the spot, that is to say, on the various national territories. This attitude reflected our nationalistic and isolationist tendencies of that day. We did not propose to have foreign

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commissions of control prying around in our countryside. Our position was stated to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission by Mr. Hugh Gibson on September 27, 1926:

> The American Delegation has opposed the proposition to establish supervision and control of national armaments by an international agency, since it has felt that any limitation agreements must rest primarily upon international good faith and respect for treaties.

It took considerable education and a long period of evolution to bring about a change in the American attitude. The debates at Geneva, including the position of the Soviet Delegation as set forth in the Draft Conventions which they submitted, undoubtedly had their influence. The point to note is that the Soviets then were favoring arms control on the spot; the United States was maintaining a position against it. The rôles were just the reverse of what they became later.

As time went by and the weight of the arguments in favor of control on the spot accumulated, the Government of the United States reversed its position. The states of Europe quite obviously were not disposed to reduce their armaments solely on the basis of mutual promises. Each had to be sure that its good faith would be met by equal good faith on the part of the others. Hitler was looming large on the European scene. In the face of that situation, the United States agreed to the principle of effective supervision of arms limitation. Mr. Norman Davis announced this decision to the Conference on May 22, 1933, in the following terms:

> Finally, we believe that a system of adequate supervision should be formulated, to ensure the effective and faithful carrying-out of any measures of disarmament. We are prepared to assist in this formulation and to participate in this supervision. We are heartily in sympathy with the idea that means of effective, automatic and continuous supervision should be found whereby nations will be able to rest assured that as long as they respect their obligations with regard to armaments the corresponding obligations of their neighbors will be carried out in the same scrupulous manner.

And a few days later, on June 1, Mr. Davis stated that "adequate measures of supervision are an essential part of any effective system of disarmament" and that "controlled disarmament is the safest road to peace."

It was not Soviet Russia that was blocking progress; it was only Hitler's Germany that would not hear of a "controlled disarmament."

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IV

On November 15, 1945, the heads of government of the three states which had worked together on the atomic bomb project during the war issued a statement known as the "Truman-Attlee-King Declaration." This initiated the program for dealing with atomic energy. The three governments proposed that for the purpose of "eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes and promoting its widest use for industrial and humanitarian purposes" a commission should be set up by the United Nations. This commission was to make proposals for the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends, for the control of atomic energy to insure its use only for peaceful ends, for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and, finally, "*for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.*"

When the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States met in Moscow in December 1945, they approved the proposals concerning the establishment of a United Nations commission. Specifically, in joining the United States and the United Kingdom in this action, the Soviet Government approved the principle of effective safeguards included in the Truman-Attlee-King Declaration. And when on January 24, 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution establishing the Atomic Energy Commission, it gave the Commission terms of reference which included the program outlined in the Declaration.

In the United States, meanwhile, a committee on atomic energy was set up in the Department of State under the chairmanship of Mr. Dean Acheson, assisted by a board of consultants headed by Mr. David E. Lilienthal, for the purpose of giving some form and substance to the Truman-Attlee-King Declaration, the Moscow Decisions and the resolution of the General Assembly constituting the Atomic Energy Commission. The committee reported that there was no hope for security without an international enforcement system. They further concluded that inspection and similar policing methods would not by themselves be sufficient: the technical problem was such that a measure of control was needed at every stage of the activity in dealing

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with the raw materials. The only hope of attaining effective control of atomic energy, according to the report, lay in the creation of an organization with positive functions in the field of development and management of all intrinsically dangerous nuclear operations. For this purpose a special Authority would be necessary, the control powers of which would start with raw materials and include production plans and research activities.

When the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission took up its assigned task, Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, the United States representative, put forward a series of proposals built on the findings of the Acheson-Lilienthal Committee. There was to be created an international Atomic Development Authority having broad powers of control, supervision and management, beginning with the raw materials as they came from the ground and extending through all phases of atomic energy development. The Authority would be established by stages. These, while bringing the Authority into full operation as quickly as possible, would be so devised that the security of no nation would be jeopardized in the event that a breakdown occurred in the transition period. It was proposed that the Authority should possess a great measure of autonomy and should not have its hands tied by any system requiring unanimity in voting. It was further proposed that certain specified acts, such as the production and use of an atomic bomb, seizure of the Authority's facilities, or any willful interference with the activities of the Authority, should be stigmatized as international crimes and appropriate punishment should be provided in the event of violation. All of these proposals were to be embodied in a specific treaty to which all nations would be invited to subscribe. Once the nations had adhered, no nation would be permitted to commit any breach of the treaty without facing appropriate sanctions.

The counterproposals put forward by the U.S.S.R. envisaged a convention outlawing the production and use of atomic weapons and stigmatizing certain acts as international crimes, but made no provision for the punishment of persons committing such crimes except by the nations of which those individuals were citizens. No provision was made for inspection or supervision or for any international machinery of control, beyond the Security Council operating under its present responsibilities as laid down in the United Nations Charter.

The ensuing discussions in the Atomic Energy Commission

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soon revealed that the other delegations, excepting that of Poland, had grave doubts concerning the effectiveness of the Soviet proposals. The Mexican and the French delegates pointed out, for example, that if all that was required was a statement of intent not to use atomic weapons, no further action was necessary inasmuch as all states belonging to the United Nations had in signing the United Nations Charter agreed not to go to war. Clearly, therefore, if the nations of the world had renounced war as an instrument of national policy, then under the Soviet conception there was no need to be concerned about the control of any particular weapon of war. Other delegates emphasized the lesson of all previous history that mere declarations not to use particular weapons had been dismal failures.

Informed support of the United States proposals increased very markedly among most of the delegates as the discussions proceeded. As they became more fully aware of the wide implications of the problem, they could find no alternative to a thoroughgoing international control system which would entrust to an international Authority positive powers for the development of atomic energy coupled with rights of inspection to the extent necessary to forestall any attempts at violation and evasion.

With the general views of the delegates elaborated in some degree, the Commission then turned to its Scientific and Technical Committee for a study of the technological feasibility of control. In a series of some 20 informal meetings, the Scientific and Technical Committee arrived at a unanimous report. The report concluded that on the basis of the available scientific facts there was no reason for supposing that effective control was not technologically feasible. No attempt was made to evaluate the political feasibility of any system or systems by which effective control might be achieved. The report was a presentation of the basic scientific and technical facts demonstrating that the same atomic energy activities might lead either to peaceful or destructive ends and that these peaceful and destructive possibilities were so intimately interrelated as to be almost inseparable. It analyzed the principal activities involved in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and described the points of danger and the character of the dangers which would exist at each stage unless appropriate safeguards were established against the use of atomic energy for destructive ends.

Since this report represents the unanimous factual findings of

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the scientific members of the delegations of the 12 countries represented on the Atomic Energy Commission (including, of course, Soviet Russia), it is of considerable importance. By indicating that there is no technological obstacle to establishing an effective system of control, it clearly implied that whatever difficulties might stand in the way would be primarily political.

V

When the General Assembly of the United Nations met on October 29, 1946, Mr. Molotov laid the whole question of the reduction of armaments on its doorstep. He proposed a resolution to the effect that in the interest of consolidating international peace and security a general reduction of armaments was necessary; and that this should include the banning of the manufacture and use of atomic energy for military purposes. The Molotov resolution said nothing about machinery for supervising or controlling either any general measures of disarmament or the specific prohibitions in the field of atomic energy. These prohibitions appeared to rest, under the terms of the resolution, on a simple declaration of intent, without any means being specified for insuring compliance or control. Almost simultaneously, however, Generalissimo Stalin, in reply to a series of questions put to him by Mr. Hugh Baillie of the United Press, is quoted as having stated that as far as atomic energy was concerned "a strong international control is needed."

The American position has been that it would be the height of futility to start out once again over the weary and winding trail pursued by the League of Nations. This preliminary work has been done once; it does not need to be done all over again. To sign a treaty banning atomic warfare would be simple enough, but it would not give the world the assurance of security for which it longs. A mere declaratory treaty would be unlikely to prove effective either in preventing war or in preventing the use of atomic weapons should war come. What is needed is to find out at the very outset: (1) what effective measures of control are technically feasible (the progress here has been gratifying); and (2) whether these are politically realizable. It was on the second point that the United Nations seemed to be stalemated. Mr. Molotov's resolution of October 29 read exactly like scores of resolutions introduced into the Geneva discussions, from the early 1920's on, by almost every delegation except that of Soviet

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Russia. In those days no delegation was more caustic in attacking the futility of such resolutions than the Soviet.

The appeals made by Mr. Litvinov to the Disarmament Conference in 1934 were prophetic in pointing out the consequences of failure. In a last effort to save something out of the wreckage, he proposed "that the Conference be transformed into a permanent and regularly assembling Conference of Peace." The Conference which he had in mind "should sit for the prevention of war and its terrible consequences. It should work out, extend and perfect the measures for strengthening security, it should give a timely response to warnings of impending danger of war and to appeals for aid, to SOS's from threatened states, and it should afford the latter timely aid within its power, whether such be moral, economic, financial or otherwise." Mr. Litvinov concluded by stating "the coöperation of the Soviet Government in an international cause, or with any international organisation, brought with it the tremendous moral force of an increasingly powerful State of 170 millions, which had finally broken with the common past — of military conquest, plunder and annexation — and during the sixteen years of its new existence had given abundant proof of its sincere devotion to peace." In one of his final statements to the conference Mr. Litvinov proposed that the continuing peace conference which he had suggested "could concern itself with questions of security and disarmament, with control of the execution of undertakings entered into in connection with chemical warfare, and likewise with every other preventive means for the preservation of peace."

VI

The position taken by Mr. Litvinov in those days, and reaffirmed during his absence by other Soviet delegates, including Mr. Dovgalevsky, did not represent a personal policy. It was a policy consistently followed by Soviet Russia in all the disarmament discussions over a dozen years or more. Even though this policy, as the proceedings of the Comintern of 1928 indicate, may have been put forward in part to expose the attitude of the capitalist states, this is not by any means the whole story. Those who heard Mr. Litvinov — and I was among them — could not but be impressed with the fact that he was interpreting to us the striving of the Russian people to find an assurance of peace in face of the terrible menace which was looming before them.

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What Mr. Litvinov predicted came true. Many of us who were in Geneva at the time came away deeply influenced by his declarations. The evolution in American policy, particularly as regards the necessity for on-the-spot supervision of measures of disarmament, was due in no small part to the common sense and logic of what the continental European states, including Soviet Russia, had to say in favor of a program of rigorous control of the instruments of destruction.

Mr. Molotov's speech of November 28 brings an indication that some progress is being made toward breaking the deadlock on this point of supervision and control. He has proposed that two commissions be established within the framework of the Security Council: one to control the measures for the reduction of armaments, the second to control the execution of decisions regarding the prohibition of the military use of atomic energy. As he stated, many technical problems remain, and his suggestion falls short of the Baruch plan for an Atomic Development Authority. There is also the question whether the action of the commissions might be nullified by a veto in the Security Council. But now that there is agreement that supervision must be a part of any plan, we are justified in hoping that as the Soviets become better acquainted with our program for dealing with the dangerous stages of atomic energy they will share our own conviction both as to its necessity and its practicability. As the foregoing pages have shown, it was Soviet Russia that before the Second World War stood in the forefront of those pressing for practical disarmament measures as opposed to pious resolutions or mere treaty prohibitions.

Just as we can draw encouragement from this historical review of the Soviet position, we can also take some comfort from the evolution of the American position. Over the years, the United States has come to realize that it can safely accept certain limitations on its national sovereignty by participating in a universal system of real armaments controls. As an earnest of its sincerity, it has put forward the most drastic program ever offered for the elimination of a weapon of mass destruction.

In this analysis I have made no mention of the veto, since this was not a problem in the days of the Geneva disarmament discussions. The agreement on which we were then working was viewed in the same light as any other contractual arrangement. If any party failed to live up to its terms the other parties thereto

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were free to take action to repair the damage or to meet the danger. Today it would seem logical to expect that if we could once get a treaty precise in its terms as to the elimination of atomic weapons and the supervision of all dangerous activities in the field of atomic energy, the problem of the veto would tend to disappear. It is encouraging to be told by the experts that we can be quite specific; that we can agree in advance and precisely define the violations. Obviously, it would be futile to conclude a treaty providing for supervision and control in the field of atomic energy and then to permit action to be blocked by a single state in the event that the controls break down. It would be even more futile to accept the theory that the state which had broken the law could prevent the states which had not done so from enforcing it.

Measures to control any weapon, whether an atom bomb or some other, are, after all, only means to an end and not an end in themselves. The end, of course, is security and peace. Once the peace is broken, any weapon may be used; mere prohibitions are futile. It is true that poison gas was not employed in the last war, but I doubt whether anyone today believes that Hitler refrained from resorting to it for any moral or legal reasons. Germany was badly situated strategically to use it; retaliation would have been too swift and overwhelming.

The measure of our success in providing effective controls against atomic warfare will be the test of our ability to impose limitations or controls on weapons of any type. If we fail here, it will be a waste of time to try to limit the use of guns, rockets, ships, bacteria or gases. We are engaged in a pilot operation. That the operation is in the atomic field makes it of the utmost urgency but does not change the factors which condition the success of every effort toward disarmament. We can be sure of enlisting the great scientists of the world to help solve the technical problems of the present operation. What is needed first is an agreement by the political leaders. Then the technicians can set to work effectively, not only to master the most destructive weapon ever to threaten civilization but also to tame and direct to the beneficent uses of peace the incalculable powers of atomic energy.

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THE CONFLICT OVER TRADE IDEOLOGIES

By Herbert Feis

WHEN a dispute erupts in the realms of action and of doctrine at the same time it is ominous. An eruption of this type is occurring now over commercial policy. The lava of argument is pouring over the surfaces where national wills clash and shooting into the skies where doctrines spend their angry eternity. I will begin with the dispute over doctrine as the better way of defining the issues uncomplicated by particular local circumstances.

I

The American Government is sponsoring at an international conference now meeting in London a suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization. This proposal is the outcome of sustained searching by American and foreign experts for an agreed statement of principles to govern the trade policy of nations. Its terms express a stubborn will to draw countries into a joint program for the reduction of trade restrictions; and they reflect a dogged judgment that the most satisfactory basis for trade is world-wide and unmanaged competition.

It is impossible to condense the detailed prescriptions of the many articles of this Charter satisfactorily. But the basic economic conceptions which shaped them all are easily identified. They are: (1) that governments should reduce all types of restriction imposed on imports and exports; (2) that each should abstain from actions which would cause products produced within their territories to be offered in foreign markets at prices out of correspondence with domestic prices; (3) that each should permit products from every foreign land to compete within its markets on equal terms, and thereby leave the origin of imports to be settled by universal competition; (4) that each should accord all foreign buyers equal opportunity to secure its products on the same terms; (5) that each should abstain from bilateral agreements for the exchange of goods that would or might lessen the opportunity of others to compete for the trade. This is a broad but, I believe, correct interpretation of the conceptions embodied in the many articles of the Charter.

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I will not try to trace the intricate ways in which the attempt is made to apply these rules to the medley of restrictions and forms of trading systems — private, part-private and part state, wholly state. For one thing, the technical details are voluminous; and to omit some is to distort the rest. For another, there seems to be an unsettled difference of judgment even among officials who composed the Charter as to whether or how some of the provisions apply to countries that conduct *all* their trade through a state monopoly.

But the foregoing recitation of governing standards is enough to indicate that the proposed rules of behavior are less natural for Socialist or managed systems than for private competitive ones. Still, if they are given a common-sense interpretation they might not prove too confining a garment of principle even for the former. It would be by no means easy for competitive private economies to observe them either. Freedom to be arbitrary is a great convenience to them as well. It should be possible to shape most of the provisions by further discussion into a mutually acceptable program. But only if good will exists; and only if the way is left open for exceptions that can be well justified. There are, and there will be, countries that cannot get along satisfactorily without the benefit of some favored trade relationships. We have recently recognized this in the case of the Philippines. These rules, if they are to be tolerable, must not stubbornly block bilateral arrangements that promise healthy growth without plain and needless injury to others.

The specific provisions in the Charter having to do with the conduct of a complete state trading monopoly, such as that maintained by the U.S.S.R., is apt to prove the most stubborn cause of dispute. They seemed designed to assure that the behavior of such monopolies will be akin to that of private trade and to establish a parity of advantage between the two types of systems. I believe the authors have been too much swayed by the judgment that this could be done only by having all trade open to uncircumscribed competition.

Let me illustrate. Article 26 specifies that state trading enterprises should be operated on a non-discriminatory basis; that is, that in their buying and selling they should accord the commerce of all other countries most-favored-nation advantages. The U.S.S.R. has customarily been ready so to pledge itself in general terms. A promise of this kind was contained in the trade agree-

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ments negotiated with the United States before the war. It is to be found also, for example, in the commercial agreement recently negotiated with France. But in the Charter this idea is given a more precise and confining interpretation than the U.S.S.R. has ever been asked to observe. It is provided that in order to give effect to a non-discriminatory policy any state trading enterprise "shall, in making its external purchases or sales of any product or service, be influenced solely by commercial considerations, such as price, quality, marketability, transportation and terms of purchase or sale."

The reasons for seeking agreement upon the rules of behavior for state trading organizations are grave. For if this method of trading is used ruthlessly and greedily it can disturb the economic life of other countries greatly. It can be more easily directed than private trading arrangements to dispossess established trade, to acquire a monopoly of resources, and to extort unfair advantage in the exchange of goods. It can also, as German behavior before the war so bitterly illustrated, be intently directed towards the accomplishment of an aggressive political purpose. These are reasons for seeking assurance against the abuse of state systems.

But it is best not to insist upon formulas which seem too deeply dyed by the values of private competitive practice such as the one cited. And in this instance the impulse to evade might be bolstered by knowledge that privately conducted trade is not entirely determined by commercial considerations. It is sometimes affected by governmental measures taken for political reasons — domestic or foreign. Thus, for example, our foreign loan program and the trade resulting therefrom is subject to reckonings that are not wholly commercial. And the impulse to treat such a formula cynically may be encouraged by the knowledge that private trade is not always competitive; that private monopolies sometimes discriminate. There are in fact students of the Charter who argue that this provision will be accepted without question, because it can be twisted to mean anything.

I do not know, and it is not necessary now to guess, what position the U.S.S.R. and countries closely allied to it or under its control will ultimately take towards the Charter proposals. They may be much modified before a decision is required. The U.S.S.R. alone of all countries did not respond to American invitations to confer about measures to make effective Article VII

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of the Lend-Lease Agreements; it is supposed, in fact, not even to have acknowledged the invitation. After an earlier show of willingness to become a member of the International Fund and the International Bank, it has remained outside. The fact that the text of these agreements contained provisions having to do with trade policy may well have been one of the reasons. And now the U.S.S.R. is absent from the discussions being conducted in London. In short, its responses in the recent past do not encourage the belief that it will join.

This possibility gives more than theoretical importance to the provisions of the Charter proposals having to do with the relations between the members of the International Trade Organizations and non-members. I will state them in full despite their cumbrous clauses. The proposed text (Article 31) stipulates first that no member shall seek exclusive or preferential advantages for its trade in the territory of any non-member which would result, directly or indirectly, in discrimination against the trade of any other member. Construed by standards defined in other sections of the text, this stipulation would mean that members could not enter into agreement with the U.S.S.R. which provided for specific exchanges of goods unless the exchanges fitted into quotas allotted by reference to a previous representative period. This would require modification of most, if not all, the agreements to which the U.S.S.R. is now a party. It was quite possibly this provision of the Charter that the Deputy Minister of Finance of Czechoslovakia had in mind when he remarked that the chief obstacle to a new trade understanding with the United States was our desire to include a clause providing for membership in a world trade body. He explained that Czechoslovakia could not pledge itself to join a trade arrangement that might in effect exclude the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc of states with which Czechoslovakia is closely linked economically.[1] Article 31 of the Charter further provides that no member shall be a party to any agreement with a non-member under which the latter becomes contractually entitled to *any* of the benefits under this Charter. And also that members shall not, except with the concurrence of the Organization, apply tariff reductions made in pursuance of the Charter to the trade of non-members.

This group of provisions should be reconsidered, if they already have not been by the time this article appears. It is probable

[1] *The New York Times*, November 1, 1946.

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they are intended merely to provide a basis of joint defense against any member that threatened the unity of the organization or took advantage of its weaker members. But they may be construed as a threat. A serious attempt to apply them would result either in the demoralization of the International Trade Organization, or open economic warfare between members on the one side and the U.S.S.R. and its allies on the other. Either would be a sorry outcome of a good impulse, valiantly pursued, to restore and bring order into international trade relations.

II

This conclusion is not meant as a dismissal of the need of obtaining proofs and promises of reasonable behavior from the U.S.S.R. — whether or not it joins the International Trade Organization. These should be definite enough to testify to its willingness to abstain from using its trading system unfairly, or as a means of forcing other countries to join it in a bloc, separated from, if not actively hostile to, the rest of the world. That the U.S.S.R. may now be attempting to do just that is suggested by the agreements negotiated with the former satellites of Germany and other neighboring countries. The agreements with Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary in particular have caused anxiety and resentment on the part of the American Government. They were completed in secrecy. Unless I am mistaken, their texts have not been published. The Soviet Government is reported to have refused to supply even foreign governments with copies. So any account of their contents is subject to error in detail.

The agreements seem to fall into two groups. One may be called trade agreements; these contain arrangements for the exchange of products, specifying quantity, prices, payment methods and other related matters. The others have become known as economic collaboration agreements; these provide for 50 percent participation by the Soviet Government in various branches of the economic life of the former satellite countries. Any appraisal of the significance of these two sets of agreements must take into account as well the claims on production acquired by the U.S.S.R. as restitution and reparations.

The student of the history of these agreements gets the impression that the U.S.S.R. first sought to put itself in a position to claim control of all the trade and production of these smaller

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countries that desperate need or grasping desire could identify. After all, these countries were defeated enemies which had taken part in an attempt to destroy the Soviet Union; and most of the former directors of their industrial life had close ties with Berlin. Then, the general claim having been established, the U.S.S.R. seems to have proceeded to adjust its demands to actual possibilities and to the protests encountered.

The first trade agreement with Rumania (May 1945) contemplated an exchange of goods to the value of $20,000,000 in each direction. The total scheduled Rumanian deliveries were in excess of the country's immediate capacity. This is proven by the fact that during the first year of the agreement's operation Rumanian exports to the U.S.S.R. were only 33 percent of the scheduled total; and, contrary to intention, less than Soviet deliveries to Rumania. Under the economic collaboration agreement negotiated simultaneously, joint Soviet-Rumanian companies were to be established for the development of Rumanian resources. It is reported that such joint companies have been created for oil production, navigation, civil aviation, banking and lumber. Whether or not these are as yet on a full operating basis is not known. The capital of these joint companies is divided equally between the appropriate Soviet state enterprises and private Rumanian companies. The Soviet contribution has consisted mainly of former German assets acquired by the U.S.S.R. under the Potsdam Agreement, or under the war booty clause (Article VII) of the Armistice agreement. In each of the fields in which these joint companies are to operate they appear to have been accorded a preferential or almost monopolistic position — in fact, if not in form. Rumania is also obligated under the Armistice arrangements to make extensive deliveries as restitution and reparations. The expected result of a perpetuation of these arrangements, in combination, would be that Rumania would not be in a position to trade on a satisfactory scale with other countries.

The Bulgarian trade agreements (March 1945 and April 1946) are similarly comprehensive. It is reported that the cash value of the trade arrangement included within its scope about one-half of the total value of Bulgarian trade in 1939. But here again the actual trade up to the present has been less than the specified amounts. The only economic collaboration agreement known to have been concluded between the two countries is in the mining

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field; under the nationalization program it was apparently planned that this joint company would acquire control of all important mining enterprises in Bulgaria.

The trade agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Hungary (August 1945) provided for an exchange of goods of $30,000,000 in each direction. This would be only about 19 percent of Hungarian trade in 1939, and much less than the prewar trade between Germany and Hungary. It is reported that the agreement operated unsatisfactorily and that deliveries were much smaller than those set forth in its text. There is reason to believe it is in process of re-negotiation. The economic collaboration agreement with Hungary (August 1945) has been carried out by the formation of joint companies for aviation, navigation, oil and bauxite production. The navigation and aviation companies would be placed in dominant, if not exclusive, positions. The bauxite company would possess a preferential position, and the oil company a favored one in regard to future opportunity. It is understood that these agreements do not seriously jeopardize the operation of existing American properties in Hungary; but they would curtail the possibility of expansion or of entry into new fields.

It is unsafe to draw final conclusions regarding the economic consequences of these arrangements, for the actual outcome thus far seems to have been quite different from that scheduled. But it is easy to appreciate why the American and other governments have suspected that these arrangements might result in bringing the economic life of the small countries in question under Russian domination. It has been estimated that the value of imports into the U.S.S.R. specified in the trade agreements concluded in 1945 with Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland was approximately $60,000,000, while reparations deliveries from the same countries were scheduled at about $130,000,000. This, combined with the arrangements for joint control of basic branches of economic activity in the case of Rumania and Hungary, might well have left the smaller countries unable to resume outside trade relationships on a satisfactory scale. Or at least they would have made that possibility subject to Russian tolerance. Thus our opposition up to the present has been justified. This opposition has been more directly addressed to the economic collaboration accords than to the trade agreements. And our criticism of the latter has not been unique; it is part of

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our general show of dislike for all bilateral agreements of this kind. But we have not usually pushed our protests so vigorously and dramatically. Or is it that the press and radio have selected them for noisy demonstration?

But a basic question of policy remains to be settled. How far shall we carry our objections? Shall we merely try to satisfy some broad purposes by rough compromise, sufficient to assure that these arrangements do not deprive us of our main natural opportunities to trade with these countries and do not ban American enterprises from fields like oil production and aviation in which they are competitively well qualified? Or shall we go further? Shall we insist that these countries and the U.S.S.R. abstain from any accord that may supplant previous trade flows, and might interfere with the full operation of international competition? Shall we contend against any arrangements which may result in granting the U.S.S.R. a greater or more privileged place in the trade and economic life of these countries than it would obtain if all opportunity was left open to competition? It is the latter course that the American Government seems now inclined to take — if I interpret correctly the meaning of some of the contentions we have advanced. Inclined to take, let me make clear again, not only in connection with this set of accords, but whenever two countries arrange for an exchange of products in channels not clearly etched by past competition or bounded by future competition.

The American Government had made several direct attempts to halt and bring about a revision of the agreements to which objection has been taken. As early as July 1945 it informed the U.S.S.R. that it judged the economic collaboration agreements with Rumania, particularly those concerned with oil, were discriminatory. It repeatedly presented objections to both the Soviet and Hungarian Governments regarding their agreements. In both cases it urged that all such arrangements be deferred until the peace treaties had been concluded; and it asserted that the only satisfactory and fair approach to the problem of economic reconstruction in these countries was a comprehensive, tripartite arrangement that would provide a framework for the reintegration of their economies with the general economy of Europe. It advanced the same view in the course of discussions of a possible loan from the United States to the U.S.S.R., proposing joint negotiations for the establishment of concerted

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policies to assist former Axis satellite states to solve their economic difficulties. All these American proposals were denied and the suggestions for joint discussions have been evaded. The Soviet Government has refused to accede to the American conception of equality in its trade agreements; and it has claimed that the arrangements for economic collaboration were not discriminatory. It has cited the dominant place obtained by private American enterprise in some of the countries of this hemisphere; and it has noted the fact that American private enterprise abroad has sometimes acquired exclusive opportunity.

And now this issue has become the subject of a harsh public quarrel in the Council of Foreign Ministers, engaged in framing peace treaties with Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Italy. The American and other Governments proposed that the following clauses be put in the treaties:

1. Pending the conclusion of commercial treaties or agreements between ..... and the United Nations, the ..... Government shall, during the ..... months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, grant the following treatment to each of the United Nations, which, in fact, reciprocally grants similar treatment in like matters to .....:

(a) In all that concerns duties and charges on importation and exportation, the internal taxation of imported goods and all regulations pertaining thereto, the United Nations shall be granted unconditional most favoured treatment.

(b) In all other respects, to make no arbitrary discrimination against goods originating in or destined for any territory of any of the United Nations as compared with like goods originating in or destined for any other territory of the United Nations or any other foreign country.

(c) Natural and legal persons who are nationals of any of the United Nations shall be granted national and most-favoured-nation treatment in all matters pertaining to commerce, industry, shipping and other forms of business activity within .....

The U.S.S.R. has denied both the necessity and the equity of these provisions; and it has sought to destroy their clinching meaning by various amendments. Their representatives have asserted in bitter phrases the opinion that the United States and other countries were trying to force abandonment of their type of state trading arrangement. They have said particularly that we were doing this in order to keep the economies of the smaller states of central Europe subject to capitalist control. Thus Molotov avowed before the Peace Conference in Paris, on August 15, that "Nobody can say that the unlimited application of 'equality of opportunity' is equally suitable for powerful and

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for weak states, for great and small Powers. Nobody could prove this. . . . It is obvious that the unlimited application of this principle is something which is convenient for those who have the power and the wealth, for those who are trying to use their capital to subjugate those who are weaker."

It is not likely that either side will completely yield on this question. It may be necessary to exclude any economic provisions from these treaties to avoid indefinite postponement of their signature. That the U.S.S.R. is determined to secure a greatly extended, if not dominant, place in the economies of these countries is clear. That it intends to supervise their political and social development seems no less clear. And in this matter the United States cannot compromise happily or too far. For it is not striving merely to obtain a few extra million dollars of trade or profit. It is seeking to assure that these small countries have a genuine chance to follow their independent judgment in economic and political spheres. And it is seeking to protect American trade relations throughout the world against a possible assault of a combined bloc of countries under the leadership of the U.S.S.R.

The line of settlement — if any is to be reached — would appear to be a loosening of the formulas we have been propounding. We can accept arrangements between the U.S.S.R. and these countries that permit them to develop trade and economic relations not confined by theoretical calculations of competitive opportunity. But these should be well defined and so limited as to enable the smaller countries to take advantage of opportunities to deal with the outside world. For we cannot freely consent to arbitrary exclusion from their economic life or to have our entry decisively subject to the will of the U.S.S.R.

The dilemma we face over the matter of how strictly to insist upon application of a theoretical principle of equality of opportunity will not be restricted to the geographical area that is the present field of dispute. It is almost certain to arise, and with great tension, in connection with the German peace settlement. Here both the rights and the interests of the United States would justify insistence on terms that place no country in an advantageous position as compared with others. If foreign governments are to join with a central German Government in the administration of any branch or enterprise in that country, the participation should be joint and equal, or in accord with agreed principles. But if the American Government intends to obtain

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and retain an equal place in the economy of Germany, it must be prepared to have more positive instruments of policy than formulas. It will have to be willing to undertake or underwrite trading operations.

And what if the same issue spreads even further? What if the Soviet Government should negotiate economic collaboration agreements with the countries of western Europe or of this hemisphere of the kind it has with Hungary and Rumania? The chief source of trade and financial advantages for most foreign countries is clearly outside of the U.S.S.R. They will be hesitant to risk these — as they would be doing — for fulfillment of any very objectionable accord with the U.S.S.R. The accord with Sweden was a warning incident. This was a combined loan and "goods delivery" agreement, not an economic collaboration accord. American refusal to countenance the very form of these agreements is not likely to prevent their negotiation. And American attempts to confine them by rigid formula are likely to be evaded. All that we can successfully hope to do, I think, is to insist that they remain within the realm of easy justification on economic grounds; and if they do not, withhold the advantages that we have the power to bestow.

The most promising safeguard against harsh train of argument would be universal participation in the International Trade Organization. Within its web of mutual obligations, equities could be debated and defined, rivalries adjusted, compromises conceived and benefits exchanged. If this cannot be realized, a direct understanding should be sought with the U.S.S.R. Failing either, the question may prove to be one of the most troublesome in the realm of Great Power politics. The sponsors of the Charter effort should be given the utmost of support — and be "aided" by criticism.

III

The various lines of compromise I have suggested may be ridiculed as pointless. For it may be argued that the positions of nations in this field represent only strategic steps in a long struggle regarding the political and social destinies of central Europe, and perhaps of the whole world. But it would be desperate defeatism now to be deterred by this conjecture from making the utmost effort to find out whether reconciliation in the trade field — as in others — is not possible. If it can be

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achieved, other phases of the struggle for power may be somewhat softened, suspicions somewhat lessened, the points of conflict made fewer. In time, even the fury of doctrinal dispute might wane — though of this possibility there seems not the slightest gleam at the present time.

I believe it to be the wish of the two peoples that their trading operations be adjusted without warlike friction. I believe it is in the power of their leaders to find the terms of adjustment. I am sure that the American leaders are eager to do so. Hence, if — and this is the decisive if — the U.S.S.R. will make it possible to believe that its trade policies are not directed to secure political domination or social revolution, we will not frustrate compromise by inflexible economic conceptions.

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AUSTRIA INFELIX

By Karl Gruber

THE tremendous events which have taken place since 1939 make what happened before the war seem dim and faraway The spread of the terrorist Nazi power until it became a world menace; the downfall of that power; the Armistice and the ensuing conferences; and now the difficult explorations of a new world policy — these pages of history fill our minds. In comparison, the details of earlier events seem obscure and relatively unimportant. Many people have come to accept the idea that Austria is just a small appendage to the so-called "Greater Reich," forgetting their own indignation when the Nazis first asserted that idea. If, somehow, the defeat of Hitler had occurred in 1940, how eager the world would have been to separate Austria from Germany, how widely her claim to sympathy would have been recognized!

It is possible to understand the fate of Austria only if we look back to the days preceding the armed invasion of the Nazis. As soon as Hitler could consider his military power well established, he issued the command to attack Austria. Determined on a war of aggression to extend German power over Europe, he knew that the conquest of Austria must be his first goal. His objectives were strategic — to lean on the Alpine ridge for support in protecting his flanks, and to encircle Czechoslovakia.

Hitler had made a concealed attack on Austria as early as the winter of 1933–34. Numerous disguised packages were sent across the border containing explosives, hand grenades and illegal Nazi leaflets. All over the country Nazi emissaries dynamited high-tension wires, water mains and telephone cables. That first attack was thwarted by the alertness of the Austrian authorities. But the danger made it necessary for the Austrian Government to assume emergency powers and temporarily to limit certain civil rights. To justify such measures, the two large political parties in Austria (the Christian-Social Party and the Social-Democratic Party) should have united. That would have placed the procedure on a democratic basis. Only so could Austria have hoped to hold out until the day when a coalition of free nations might be prepared to meet Hitler fully armed. Unfortunately, such a common front in Austria could not be achieved.

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In the summer of 1934, with the aid of the Germans, the Austrian Nazis made an armed attack. They were put down with casualties; and there were many victims, too, on the loyal Austrian side. A little later, Germany started her policy of economic aggression. At the same time, Hitler sent the conciliatory Herr von Papen as emissary to Austria in order to delude the Austrian people regarding his real objectives. In spite of all this pressure, Austria managed to hold out for four years. On March 11, 1938, an ultimatum forced her to surrender. At the eleventh hour she tried to obtain the intervention of the Great Powers. It was in vain, as was Czechoslovakia's effort to secure military aid a year later.

These summary notes on prewar history are not set down to try to give the impression that there were no Nazis in Austria. Today, on the basis of membership cards of the so-called "illegal" Nazis (*i.e.* registered Nazis prior to the Austrian annexation), we are fairly certain that there were about 80,000 of them. The Austrian Nazis were characterized by exceptional fanaticism, the root of which probably lay in the fact that up to the time when Hitler seized power they were a dwindling and despised minority. Besides these active Nazis, there were also a certain number of sympathizers who, as in any country, manage to adjust their political convictions in accordance with what they regard as the probable trend of events. This fifth column agitated against Austria. The vast majority of Austrians, however, were loyal. They abhorred the imperialist, warmongering intentions and machinations of the Nazis, and wished for nothing more fervently than to be allowed to live in peace and quiet in their beautiful alpine country.

Austrians are often accused of not having prolonged their resistance with sufficient vigor after Hitler's invasion. Those who bring the charge should think back to 1938. Today everyone knows the weaknesses as well as the terrors of the Nazi régime. But in those days, when a mighty lawless Power was rising amidst a disorganized world; when it began to spread havoc and terror in ruthless ways never witnessed before; when the doors of the jails were opened wide and crowds of radical desperadoes were let loose; when an utterly unprepared people found themselves subjected to the methodical cruelty of the Gestapo; under such conditions, it is understandable that many tried to save themselves in sheer panic. Civil servants for years had remained loyal and had coöperated in resisting the Nazi minority. Suddenly, they

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saw those Nazis possessed of unlimited power. Many a bread-winner, foreseeing starvation for himself and his family, chose as an alternative to become a Nazi on paper. That may be counted against his moral fortitude, but it can scarcely be considered a crime.

To recall the tragic nature of the situation into which the Austrian state was plunged is not, of course, to suggest for a moment that the Austrian people should cease their present clean-up of Nazi gangsters and profiteers. This is not easy, since the principles of a rule of law must be upheld; guilt must be proven by orderly legal procedure, if the world is to hope eventually to eradicate the Nazi poison. The process of purification is being carried through despite the dearth of trained administrative personnel. This or that individual may so far have managed to elude the authorities; but in time he will surely be apprehended.

The courage shown by Chancellor Schuschnigg in March 1938 is, ironically enough, responsible in part for the criticism levelled against Austria on the ground that she did not organize a sufficiently strenuous resistance movement. Schuschnigg, resolved to share the bitter fate awaiting the Austrian people, and especially the members of the anti-Nazi organizations, simply waited in his office for the arrival of the Gestapo officers. As a result, the opportunity to form an Austrian Government-in-Exile was missed.

There was an Austrian resistance movement. Unfortunately, it lacked a mouthpiece abroad, and the fact of its existence is little known. The beginnings of the movement date back to 1938, when the dissolved Austrian Catholic and labor organizations went underground, though still maintaining their contacts. With the outbreak of war, and all through the war, the activities of this resistance group increased. As early as 1938, more than 70,000 Austrians were in concentration camps, and thousands went to the scaffold for their opposition to the Nazis. It must be borne in mind, moreover, that it was particularly difficult to build up an organized resistance movement in a country where the language was the same as that of the Nazi conquerors, where there were native spies, and where basic training was being given to many German military divisions. I was among those who organized the resistance movement, and I could tell a long and sorry tale of how difficult it was to counteract Gestapo activities. Our greatest handicap was that Austrian youth was missing from our ranks. Hitler had no scruple about pressing Austrian young men into service in his armies,

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where they were subjected to the Prussian drill system and transformed into military automatons.

Austria's geographic position meant that she was the last country reached by the liberating armies. The instant that open fighting was possible, however, the Austrian resistance movement took up arms. In the province of Tyrol, the resisters overpowered the German military command, captured two generals, and gave every possible assistance to the 7th United States Army when it marched in. The official report of the 103rd Infantry Division praised these accomplishments of the resistance group. It noted that not since the liberation of Paris had American troops received such a rousing welcome as they did at Innsbruck, the first of the larger Austrian cities which they entered.

II

Considering these historical facts, any decision placing on Austria joint responsibility for Hitler's war would surely be contrary to justice. And not only would it be unjust; it would prove to be a great practical mistake. The events of the past ten years should have made clear that the desire of the Austrian people for liberty and independence is an element that can be used for the stabilization of Europe. To weaken their spirit of independence by lumping their country with Germany would handicap the effort to establish a new order in Europe by peaceful means.

The will to independence of little Austria is deeply rooted in the past. Students of history know that as early as the fourteenth century free peasants were living in the Alpine countries; they had a right to name representatives to the Diet. On the other hand, the *de facto* abolition of slavery did not occur in many parts of Germany until the nineteenth century. Under the leadership of Prussia, Germany became a militarist state, sealed off against other countries. Many of Germany's liberty-loving elements emigrated year after year, to escape German police rule. In the year 1848, especially, a stream of Germans, determined to seek their freedom, turned their backs on their fatherland and settled in the United States. In Austria, on the other hand, militarism never played a leading rôle. The officers of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire were recruited from 13 nationalities, most of them spoke a number of languages, and their training was directed toward promoting understanding among these several peoples. The amalgamation of many nationalities in one state developed a spirit of national

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tolerance and led to the rejection of racial theories. It was not mere chance that Hitler was unable to assert himself in Austria. The Austrian mentality filled him with hatred, as his book "Mein Kampf" made plain.

Proponents of a peaceful new order should utilize these elements of the Austrian mind. Stable conditions cannot be created in Central Europe without strengthening Austrian democracy. So far, however, Allied policy has not always been calculated to do this. At Moscow, the Great Powers decided to reëstablish Austria as a free and independent country. But the treatment actually meted out to her varies considerably from that accorded such really free countries as Belgium, Holland or Czechoslovakia, and more nearly resembles that given vanquished Germany. Indeed, the economic consequences of the occupation are more oppressive in Austria than in Germany.

There is nothing more demoralizing for a nation than uncertainty concerning its future. The fact that Austria's internal political troubles threaten to become worse serves only the ends of extremist elements. These troubles are rooted in the four-Power occupation which drags on from month to month.

Austria's special position cannot have been understood at Potsdam when it was decided that German property in Austria should serve indiscriminately as reparations. After all, there are two distinct categories of German property in Austria; there is bona fide German property, owned by Germans before the Nazis seized the country; and there is the property which was forcibly Germanized during the Nazi rule. Surely the Austrian Government has the right to decide whether agreements entered into during the Nazi tenure are legally binding. Are we to assume that it was the intent of the Potsdam Agreement to perpetuate the injustices perpetrated by Hitler?

Perhaps it is not clear to everyone just how important this question is for the future of Austria. It must be remembered that the Nazis destroyed every vestige of an independent Austrian administration and forced almost every sizable Austrian enterprise into some German concern. This was a political as well as an economic objective of the Nazis. Attempts are now being made to give such a sweeping interpretation to the Potsdam Agreement that a considerable part of former Austrian properties would be taken over by foreign Powers. If that came to pass, little would be felt of an independent Austrian nation. The

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simple and obvious solution is a joint declaration by the four Powers defining German property. Austrian property seized by the Nazis must be restored before reparations payments are made. We Austrians are sorry that, up to the present, one of the four Powers has refused to coöperate in reaching this solution.

The question of German property in Austria has been further complicated by the Austrian nationalization law. Based upon the election platforms of the three political parties, the Austrian Parliament passed a law nationalizing 71 major enterprises. The Soviet High Command protested this law, though the Allied Control Council as such did not join in the protest. The Soviet view is based on the assertion that, in accordance with the terms of the Control Agreement, the property which the Soviet Union claims as her due cannot be made the subject of Austrian governmental measures, and that such measures can be enacted only with the consent of the Allied Control Council. Since Austria is divided into zones administered by the four Powers (as in Germany), the Austrian nationalization law cannot be executed because a zone commander prohibits it. Some Austrian Government commissioners have been sentenced to several years' imprisonment at forced labor for disobeying the Soviet veto.

Government by zones may have merits in a large country, where each zone can function after a fashion as an economic unit. For Austria, however, such government spells complete paralysis. Zonal government was established in Austria on the assumption that a central authority for the whole country would be created. But, in practice, each of the four zones is treated in a different manner. The disagreement of the Powers on important matters, the almost complete freedom of the zone commanders from control by the Allied Council, and the veto power which each zone commander can exercise, have together destroyed the original assumption and have started the disintegration of Austria.

If irreparable damage is to be avoided, the whole Austrian territory must be consolidated. For more than two years now Austria has been waiting patiently and hopefully for her new political status. It is not surprising that the people are beginning to doubt the world's good will. At times, rumors are heard that the Great Powers intend to dismember the country. The rumors have received little credence in authoritative circles, for if there were any truth in them it would mean that the U.S.S.R. and

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the western Powers had given up any hope of reaching a peaceful solution to their differences. In that event, which God forbid, the zones in Austria would take on military importance indeed. The division would be the signal for increased armaments everywhere and a death sentence to world peace.

III

Termination of the occupation will free dormant Austrian energy. Once external restraints no longer prevent Austria from organizing her production and arranging for normal exchanges with other nations, it will quickly become apparent that she may be counted upon as a reliable member of the international peace-loving community.

There are sufficient grounds for believing that Austria can look forward with confidence to a satisfactory economic future. She has many assets. For one thing, she has natural beauties and a people who are friendly and hospitable toward visitors and who easily make them feel at home. This means an excellent basis exists for an extensive tourist traffic in Austria. The country also has important water power, its own steel industry, great lumber reserves and considerable sources of oil. We therefore do not worry about our economic future. This represents a considerable change since the period after the last war. The Austrian people are now firmly convinced that they possess the bases for real economic stability. This is the more the case since they do not have any aspirations to become a Great Power and do not want to undertake to build up an expensive military machine. All they want is to live a peaceful life.

The Austrian export statistics of 1937 furnish proof of the assertion that it is necessary for Austria to have an opportunity to trade with many countries. In that year, she sent 27.7 percent of her exports to the Balkans; 7.2 percent to Czechoslovakia; 36.1 percent to the west, to the Near East and overseas; 14.8 percent to Germany; and 14.2 percent to Italy. These figures prove that one of the basic conditions for a sound Austrian economy is that she shall be able to trade freely with all countries.

Austria has no imperialist tendencies. There can be no better proof of this than the Austro-Italian agreement reached during the Paris Conference. It showed that the Austrian people are prepared to make considerable sacrifices for the maintenance of harmony with their neighbors. The regulation of the status of

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the South Tyroleans which was worked out at Paris is intended to give them an assured existence, appropriate to their ethnic individuality, within the Italian state. The resulting increase in mutual confidence between Italy and Austria ought to promote their exchange of goods, which for so long has been artificially prevented.

As for the question of the so-called southern demarcation line of Carinthia — this is not a territorial problem. The Carinthians have already, in a free election held under international supervision, signified their wish to remain a part of Austria.

Of Germany we ask nothing more than that she leave us in peace to our free and independent development. Even the brief sketch of our experience which I have given above will make clear to everyone, I hope, that the Austrian people, like all the other peoples of the world, are interested in preventing any resurgence of German imperialism. Should that force ever again be unleashed, its first goal would be the conquest of Austria. Austria cannot possibly achieve security through attaching this or that mountain ridge to her domain; her safety depends upon the establishment in Germany of a system that will prevent preparations for aggression, and an international guarantee that this system will be enforced.

IV

Austria's most important problem is the internal one of organization, and the creation of conditions which will make organization possible. The first precondition is, of course, the ending of the occupation. The second is that the title to all Austrian economic resources on which doubt has been cast by the Potsdam resolutions concerning so-called German property shall be clarified by an international agreement. In June 1946 there was published a new Control Council agreement which, it was hoped, would overcome the zonal divisions. These hopes were not fulfilled because — as should have been foreseen — the power of the zone commanders remains unlimited. Everything still depends upon a real agreement among the Powers. Any attempt to overcome the present difficulties by further improvements in the technique of the Control Council would be useless. Unification of the territory of Austria will not be possible until the occupation is ended.

Austria always felt that the significance of her particular

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problem was realized too late. In the settlement made in regard to Austria lies the answer to whether or not the Powers are prepared to relinquish their special positions in favor of the common goals of peace. It was proclaimed at Moscow that Austria was to be a free country; but the reality proved to be something very different. What really was established was an occupied country, equipped with a government exercising only sham sovereignty. Such confused conditions are a source of endless international friction, especially because of the important geographical position occupied by Austria. The truth is that Austria today is even worse off than the former German satellites. And if Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania are evacuated, and new life begins to course through their veins as a result of the peace treaties, while Austria is still caught fast in the ice of foreign control, the Austrian people will indeed feel that they have been dealt with unjustly. The consequence might be an internal upheaval.

It is therefore urgent that the necessary measures be taken before an internal political overturn further confuses the situation. It is said by some critics of Austria that so-called "progressive" factions do not have sufficient influence in the operation of the Austrian state. But nothing bars the access which these elements possess to the Austrian voter. No restraints are placed upon their often very radical propaganda. In spite of a troubled past, the parties representing the large masses of the country, especially the People's Party and the Socialists, are coöperating closely. They represent more than 90 percent of the Austrian population. They respect each other, and both stand unequivocally for a democratic constitution and a democratic order. Under the leadership of Leopold Figl, the People's Party has shown its confidence in the Socialists by entrusting to their representatives the important posts of President of Austria and Minister for the Interior, the latter post so vital for the country's security.

One last word concerning the integration of Austria into a peaceful European order. The thought of closer coöperation between the Danubian states is attractive and deserves the closest attention; but there are many prerequisites to such integration. A compact among the Danubian countries would bring strongly armed nations into close contact with countries which are disarmed. Completely nationalized systems would

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compete with free economies. And it must be noted also that some of the Danubian states have alliances, while others do not. It is quite clear that the United Nations will have to provide for mutual security among the Danubian nations before the way is open for any system of especially close coöperation among them. But the absence of this will not prevent Austria from seeking the best trade relations possible with all countries. It must be her aim to find the proper balance between diverse export trade theories.

Unconditional support of the United Nations will be the basic principle of Austrian policy. Austria regards this universal system as the sole guarantee of her existence as a state. Strength for the new order in this part of Europe will not come from alliances between Austria and neighboring states; in the critical period ahead, they will lack the inner strength to make a positive contribution to the peace of the world. The necessary strength must be found in the United Nations.

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BEVIN AND HIS CRITICS

By Raymond Blackburn

IT IS often said by extreme left-wing critics that the British Labor Government is pursuing a Socialist policy at home and a Tory policy abroad. In evidence of this they point to the fact that the Tories applaud the Government's foreign policy and denounce its domestic policy. They allege that the Labor Government has wholly failed to make a new and friendly approach to the Soviet Union. They assert that the foreign policy of the British Government is dictated by Washington and Wall Street. They declaim that the Foreign Secretary has restored King George of the Hellenes and has done all in his power to protect Franco in Spain. Finally, they accuse the Foreign Secretary of being pathologically hostile to Communism in any form and of having thereby alienated the sympathies of the resistance movements and progressive forces throughout Europe. Underlying all this criticism is the implication that America and Britain are forming a bloc directed against the Soviet Union.

These attacks are concentrated on the person of Ernest Bevin, Britain's wartime Minister of Labor and present Foreign Secretary. At first sight, the accusers must recognize in Bevin a redoubtable adversary. He did not want to be Foreign Secretary. He wanted to be Chancellor of the Exchequer, but the Prime Minister asked him to undertake what has turned out to be the more formidable task. Bevin has fulfilled in his lifetime Job's dictum, "Man is born unto trouble, as the sparks fly upward." He has spent 36 years of his life in "combat and trouble and contention of one kind and another." Always he has fought for the industrial and political rights of the working class from which he is sprung. Today his accent is as broad as ever and his method of speech direct. "It is forgotten in this age," he said recently, "but when the Soviet did not have a friend I got dockers and other people to assist in forming the Council of Action and stop Lloyd George attacking them. I fought the Arcos Raid and I called it silly. I fought Churchill's interventionist policy for which we are paying now. I fought every attempt to break off relations. . . . The thanks that I got for it was an attempt by the Communists to break up the Union that I built. I said to Maisky on one occasion, 'You have built the Soviet Union and you have a

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right to defend it. I have built the Transport Union and if you seek to break it I will fight you. . . .' After that there was a slightly greater respect for my view. I think that is fair."

This passage from a speech by Bevin is doubly interesting. First, it reflects his great strength of character, which is expressed in simplicity of thought and expression. The speech was addressed to this year's Labor Party Conference at Bournemouth. He was about to justify his policy with regard to the Soviet Union, but he first desired to create a favorable emotional response from his audience. These words went far to creating it. As he spoke, his audience could see the burly figure of the man who had been the first to denounce MacDonald and Snowden as would-be traitors to the Labor movement. They could hear him recall Labor's fight for the Soviet Union in its hour of need, which he himself had helped to lead. They would ask themselves what possible motive Bevin could have for betraying as Foreign Secretary the cause for which he made sacrifices as a union leader.

Secondly, the passage reflects Bevin's apparent weaknesses. The egotism is inescapable. Moreover, he seems to admit the accusation that he identifies the activities of the Communists with Moscow. But so do many observers of foreign affairs. Even Mr. Henry Wallace speaks of the Communists in America as following faithfully every twist and turn of Soviet policy. The opinion of Bevin on this subject is of great value. It is true that he played a huge part in building the Transport and General Workers Union. It is true that he has been for 20 years probably the ablest and most powerful trade union leader. If he states that the Communists and crypto-Communists are agents of Moscow, he should be a more reliable witness than some of the intellectuals who deny it.

These are essentially superficial considerations. But they condition the emotional approach of members of the Labor Party, young and old, towards Bevin and his foreign policy. Only once in recent years has Bevin failed to receive tumultuous applause from an important Labor gathering when assailed by his critics. That was in December 1944 when as a member of the Coalition Government he tried to defend the Coalition policy in Greece. He was faced with an impossible task, but even then the affection which he commanded from a majority of those present was apparent.

It seems certain that Bevin's position in the Labor Party is un-

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challengeable and that he will always be supported by a considerable majority of Labor Members of Parliament and of other leading personalities, such as trade-union leaders, in the Labor movement. One reason for which his position is so unchallengeable is the vehemence of his more extreme critics. Labor Members of Parliament such as Platts-Mills and Zilliacus show the greatest courage in their attacks on the Foreign Secretary, but their criticism is often indistinguishable from that of the Communists and of Moscow. Zilliacus is the best informed of the tiny group of Labor members who consistently attack the motives as well as the policy of Bevin. Yet he said at the Labor Party Conference at Bournemouth, "Everybody agrees that at the present moment our foreign policy is unhappily making us the white hope of the black international, and it consists in an under-the-counter coalition with the Tories to enter into an unavowed Anglo-American bloc." Neither Zilliacus nor Platts-Mills nor any of their two or three closest supporters ever utters a word which may reflect on the Soviet Union. To them the Soviet Union is white; America and Britain are black.

Such criticism plays into the hands of Bevin. He knows that his fundamental honesty is generally accepted. He knows that such shrill, almost hysterical denunciations will drown the voices of his shrewder and more numerous critics. He knows that many Labor members are very uneasy at the manifest drift of international affairs. He knows that on particular issues such as Greece or Spain there is great disquiet among trade-unionists as well as politicians. If there were to be a straight vote on certain aspects of his policy in Greece, he might even be in danger of defeat. But always he relates his policy in each individual case to the wider problems of Anglo-Soviet relations and the need to make U.N. a reality. On the wider issues he is sure of a great majority, particularly as he will be so bitterly attacked by those whom he regards as crypto-Communists.

The central problem is, of course, the problem of relations with the Soviet Union. The Labor movement has for long regarded itself as not merely the friend but the protector of the Soviet Union. A considerable but dwindling section of Labor opinion regards the Soviet Union as a Socialist country with which a Socialist Britain ought to be on terms of intimacy. The idea that "Left should understand Left" is widespread. At the Blackpool Labor Party Conference which preceded the General Election, Hugh Dalton said,

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"A British Labor Government would be more likely to create more quickly a state of confidence between London and Moscow than any alternative Government in this country." It is undeniable that arguments of this kind did form a considerable part of the propaganda of the Labor Party at the time of the General Election. Hugh Dalton was regarded as a likely Foreign Secretary, and it was believed that he would fly to Moscow as soon as possible after receiving the seals of office. A great new attempt would be made to establish particularly close relations with the Soviet Union. It is only fair to record that the great speech on foreign policy was made by Bevin and that he was much less optimistic on this issue than his colleagues. "I say this to my Russian friends — I hope they are my friends — whom we have stood by for 25 years, when they were a nation at bay. You cannot settle the problem of Europe by long-distance telephone calls and telegrams. Round the table we must get, but do not present us with *faits accomplis* when we get there . . . the cards should be on the table — face upwards." There was an unmistakable note of caution in his words and in his voice. Oddly enough he used the words a little later, "Left understands Left, but Right does not;" but they were used about France, not about Russia.

It is doubtful whether Bevin regards Russia as "Left" in the sense in which he himself is "Left." He does not denounce the Russian régime, because it would be highly undiplomatic to do so. But one derives the impression that he believes it to be an authoritarian form of government with a secret police and with concentration camps. At the same time, he insists that without Russian coöperation it is impossible to lay the foundations of peace. He insists that he does everything possible to come to fair and reasonable agreements with Russia. He discussed the Anglo-Russian Treaty in Moscow. "I offered to extend it to fifty years. When Generalissimo Stalin said, 'I should need to amend it,' I said, 'Let me know what would suit you. . . .' Regarding trade, Sir Stafford Cripps offered to fly to Moscow to discuss trade . . . I proposed in Moscow that we should open up a direct reciprocal air service between Moscow and London. . . . Well, if I cannot get reciprocity, what can I do? I cannot make them reciprocate. I cannot go to war and force them." Bevin counsels patience. He pledged himself to continue to seek permanent understanding with Russia. He believes that in the last resort it is deeds and not words that influence policy. He hopes that hard work will

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produce a number of agreements which will revive European trade. "Let the goods flow from the manufacturers to the peasant, and food from the peasant to the manufacturing districts. Let Europe live again." Bevin hopes that practical coöperation in such matters as these will lead to a wider settlement which will give security to all. Progress must be made by stages.

On the face of it, the charge that Bevin is particularly hostile to the Russians may well seem strange. It was the Russians who attacked Britain first, and not vice versa. They placed Greece and Indonesia on the agenda of the Security Council and alleged that British troops were a menace to world peace. If Bevin replied bluntly and provocatively, he can hardly be called aggressive on that account. A tame and moderate answer to such charges might well have been regarded as evidence of an uneasy conscience. But it is here that Bevin's position vis-à-vis the Labor Party is weakest. By way of answer to the extreme charges of the Russians, Bevin justifies the past policies and conduct of Britain under a Tory Prime Minister and with a Tory Foreign Secretary. He appears to accept the doctrine of continuity of foreign policy, which would be rejected by a great majority of the rank and file of the Labor Party. The Labor Party is anti-imperialist by tradition just as the Tory Party is imperialist by tradition. Of course, much ignorant nonsense is talked and written about British imperialism. In general, the influence of Britain even under Tory Governments has been pacific during the last thirty years. All the same, there is a strong feeling among Socialists that the alliance of imperialists and capitalists in Tory administrations was largely responsible on two occasions for policies which led to war. They cannot understand why Labor's Foreign Secretary should be so unwilling to make a clear break from the past.

Oddly enough, the criticism of British policy in Greece today is that it is not sufficiently undemocratic. Without doubt the majority of the Greeks at the recent elections wished to vote Right rather than Left. The unfortunate characteristic of Greek politics is that they tend to extremes. A Right Government goes very Right and uses methods reminiscent of the Metaxas Government. Similarly, no doubt, a Left Government would have gone very Left and become in due course a vassal of Moscow. The objective of British policy in Greece has been to support the moderate parties and to have a Government of Liberals and Socialists. The policy has failed because the British Government was not

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willing to interfere too drastically in Greek politics. The Foreign Office insists that British influence in Greece must be used within the limits of democratic persuasion. The present Greek Government was put into power at an election which the official British and American observers agreed to have been fairly held. Bevin and Hector McNeil are willing to bring pressure to bear on the Greek Government, but they are not willing to force that Government to take steps which are necessary for the safeguarding of the political and industrial freedom of the Greek working class. What will happen when British troops are withdrawn — as is urged by Winston Churchill — one does not know. Greece is in an extremely precarious position where she needs the support of world opinion. Measures taken by a right-wing Greek Government which alienate the sympathies of liberal opinion in America and in Britain are the height of folly. It may still be possible that the Greek Government can be persuaded by British and American influence to see the wisdom of policies of moderation.

Greece is a good illustration of Bevin's difficulties with his critics. On each issue on which he is attacked, it is obvious that events are moving against him. (Both in Palestine and in Spain conditions are worse than when Bevin first took office.) But the real causes of the present situation lie in the past. The over-all effect of the policies of the British Coalition Government during the war was to give indirect support to the so-called "legitimate" governments. The British Government did not seek to impose such governments on the peoples of the liberated countries, but their indirect influence in many ways was given in support of such governments. For example, Britain armed the resistance movement in Greece. Then at the time of the attempted coup d'état in December 1944 Britain disarmed E.L.A.S. and E.A.M. But the Greek security police remained armed and have since remained under arms despite a pledge to the contrary given by the Labor Executive in December 1944 at the Labor Party Conference. The importance of the police in Balkan countries can hardly be overestimated. Their influence on the elections must have been considerable. But most of the damage had obviously been done before Bevin came into power.

In Spain also Bevin has an unfortunate inheritance from the past. He maintains that above all else the Spaniards want peace. If left to themselves, they will eventually overturn Franco (for whose government Bevin has often expressed dislike bordering on

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disgust). But Bevin is convinced that attempted interference in internal Spanish affairs is not only of very doubtful validity under the Charter of the United Nations but even calculated to strengthen Franco. All the steps which critics advocate would in his opinion amount only to "meaningless gestures." Withdrawal of the British Ambassador would mean the withdrawal of the man who is today best able to intervene for the protection of those whom Franco persecutes. It would mean the withdrawal of the very people on whom Bevin relies for advice as to the true position in Spain.

There is much to be said for this view, and there are certainly a large number of knowledgeable observers (including Lord Beveridge) who agree with it. But it is reasonably clear that the majority of Socialists disagree — many of them violently. It is sad to think that Britain which fought Fascism longer than any other major Power should be the only country to retain an Ambassador in the capital of the last surviving Fascist European Power. It is more than doubtful whether the Spaniards and others regard the *retention* of our Ambassador as a meaningless gesture, particularly when considered in conjunction with such other British actions as Sir Alexander Cadogan's confident repudiation of Russian allegations as to the presence of German scientists and technicians in that country. For psychological reasons alone, the Doctrine of Avoiding Meaningless Gestures is dangerous. The refusal to make a gesture which everyone else is making is widely interpreted as being very meaningful.

On the more important issues of the use of economic or other sanctions against Spain, Bevin's critics are necessarily ill-informed. Indeed, in the whole field of foreign affairs it is all too difficult to cull the facts a knowledge of which is essential to the formation of a sound judgment. Much depends on the attitude of other governments, which are accurately known only to those having access to "Top Secret" files. The most that can be fairly said against the policy of the Labor Government towards Spain is that their actions appear to protect Franco whereas they should be willing to take the lead in attacking Franco. Maybe, when an appropriate occasion arises, action will be taken which will show that Bevin's policy was "*reculer pour mieux sauter.*" That, at any rate, would be the wish of the majority of supporters of the Labor Government.

Of course, there are many who take a much more cynical view.

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They see British policy towards Spain as an aspect of a general policy of preventing the spread of Communism. It is even suggested that concern for the security of Gibraltar is a factor of importance in the determination of our actions with regard to Franco. The same cynics would allege that a main objective of British policy in Palestine is to keep that country as a base for British troops. This very cynical attitude towards British policy is held by a small number of critics and an even smaller number of supporters in the Labor Party. It is, however, far more widely held abroad. Those who are in constant contact with Labor Ministers find it astonishing that they can be regarded as Machiavellian planners. If the British Labor Government were preparing for war against the Soviet Union, they would be adopting very different policies in Germany, in Egypt and in India. Above all, they would not have rushed demobilization as far as they have done. It is quite irrelevant in this connection to refer to the development of weapons of mass destruction by Britain and America. Aggressive wars even in the future will demand very large numbers of troops. The only Power which retains very large numbers of troops is the Soviet Union (possibly through exaggerated fears of American or British aggression). The only Power able to occupy and hold down vast areas of territory is the Soviet Union. From the strictly military viewpoint, aggressive war by Britain or America directed against the Soviet Union is unthinkable and impossible. For these reasons it is not reasonable to accuse the Labor Government of being engaged in some sinister plan to involve other Powers in a war with Russia. Mistakes may be made in the administration of British foreign policy, but they are not made deliberately and malevolently.

The gravamen of the most effective criticism of the British Government lies in a very different direction. It is that the Government acts too slowly and without imagination. For instance, Britain bears a terrible responsibility for the present plight of the British zone of Germany. But the true case in regard to this has not been brought home even to the people of Britain, who have had to accept bread-rationing as a consequence. The British Government and Bevin in particular have played the leading part in placing food on the agenda of the United Nations. Herbert Morrison's visit to America was a continuation of the efforts of Britain to avert famine in Europe. Even de Valera expressed his admiration for the conduct of the hard-pressed British people in

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accepting further reductions in their diet for the benefit of the starving Germans. But the British Government did not act openly with the courage which they in fact possessed. They allowed their opponents to produce a fairly convincing case that bread-rationing was partly due to ministerial muddles. This unfortunate result is mainly due to the unwillingness of certain members of the Government to have its policy based on morality rather than expediency. What an effect on world opinion would have been produced if Britain had openly avowed what she in fact did and had said, "We are reducing our ration of bread in order that our enemies may not starve!" In considering the Government's policy in this and other matters, one is often reminded of Milton's phrase: "I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue."

Again, there is the vexed question of diplomatic appointments. Here there have been no imaginative changes of personnel in key positions. The impression prevails that in most countries the officials who represent Britain are lovers of the old-fashioned kind of British imperialism, such as Wendell Willkie described in his book, "One World." Of course, it is very difficult to make great changes overnight without thereby endangering efficiency. But there is strong evidence that in many countries, particularly the Balkans, British diplomats have more affection for the ancient régime than is wise in the modern world. Bevin (unlike Dalton) had no personal knowledge of the officials in the Foreign Service. This must have been a great handicap to him. Bevin's important contribution in greatly increasing the numbers and standing of Labor attachés to embassies and consulates throughout the world is worthy of praise. But the reports on which vital decisions are made come often from old-fashioned diplomats. They are, of course, far abler and much more liberal in their views than the extremists of the Left acknowledge. Indeed, it would be difficult to find a diplomat with greater experience, good-will, ability and common sense than Lord Inverchapel. Sir Alexander Cadogan has exhibited a combination of restraint and shrewdness at the meetings of the Security Council which one cannot fail to admire. But without respect to individual persons, there is a strong case for a complete overhauling of many diplomatic appointments. Significantly, some of the younger Labor Members of Parliament are now representing Britain at international conferences.

There is not space to deal at any length with the complicated

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problem of Palestine, where Britain is seeking to hold the balance between Arab and Jew. There are today twelve times as many Jews in Palestine as when Britain first occupied that country. This is not a record of which Britain need be ashamed. Again, since 1934, Britain has herself taken nearly half a million refugees of one kind or another, including 70,000 Jews. Indeed, the record of Britain in respect of persecuted peoples (including Jews) is better than that of any other major Power. But, once again, we have been far too slow in arriving at a decision. Moreover, it is difficult to see why we have not already insisted on every country taking a fair quota of such of the displaced Jews in Europe as cannot be taken in Palestine. British visitors to America are astounded at the one-sided version of the facts about Palestine which is presented to the Americans. But they must ruefully admit that we have not taken the bold and imaginative action before U.N. which would have put the American and other Governments "on the spot."

The British Government has been widely applauded for its actions in India. These have at any rate shown unprejudiced observers that acquisitive imperialism plays no part in British foreign policy. If disinterested good-will and patience can bring a peaceful future to this Continent, the Government will have achieved a great, almost miraculous, result. The difficulties will prove far more menacing than most of the Government's supporters realize. Many shrewd critics will insist that Britain should remain responsible for Indian security until the new Indian Government or the United Nations is strong enough effectively to guarantee that security.

Over all falls the shadow of the atomic bomb and the other weapons of man's destruction now being devised. Britain's Prime Minister played a leading part in the discussions from which the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission arose. Since then, Britain has not played a distinctive part in the deliberations of the Commission. This may in the long run prove to have been a correct policy — if Britain is able later to help bring the Russian and American viewpoints together. On one question Britain will stand firm. We shall always advocate international control of atomic energy and shall never be content to accept the kind of proposals which Mr. Molotov appears at the moment of writing to have in mind. It must be admitted by a close student of the work of the Baruch delegation that America has gone very far

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towards meeting Russian suspicions. Indeed, the author of this article stated at the Labor Party Conference in 1946, "It is the fact that capitalist America has proved to be far more progressive in this matter than Socialist Britain and that Communist Russia has made no proposals whatever upon it." Russia has in fact made proposals, but they are vague and impractical.

How can the men of the Politburo be persuaded to accept inspection of their national territory and to assist in the execution of measures for the control of all weapons of man's destruction? It is overwhelmingly in their interest to do so. Russia would be in grave danger in a world in which a dozen powers possessed weapons of mass destruction. There are many persons to whose interest it is to promote war between Russia and America. Common sense must impel the Russian leaders to coöperate. Unfortunately, Communist ideology impels them at the same time not to coöperate. According to this ideology, they need only wait for the collapse of capitalism in America and other countries, and its supersession by Communism. It is their duty *as Communists* to help to promote conditions in which this violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie may take place as soon as possible.

Here in my view is the crux of our problems in foreign affairs. Can America and Britain persuade the Soviet Union to abandon ideology as a motive in its foreign policy and to hold fast to considerations of security and common sense? They must certainly be willing to go to the limit in meeting legitimate Russian suspicions of the western Powers. They will do much to undermine Russian ideology if they can maintain stable labor conditions in their own countries and promote full employment. Finally, they must use all means, orthodox and unorthodox, in public and in private, to ensure that the Russian leaders realize the enormity of the doom which will await their country as well as others if we do not succeed in banishing forever recourse to war as an instrument of national policy.

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U. S. STRATEGIC BASES AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

By Hans W. Weigert

THE last phase of the debate on the application of the trusteeship system to the former Japanese-mandated islands has now opened. The American position in regard to the control of the islands, certain of which are now included in our chain of military bases, was described by President Truman in a statement on November 6 and set forth in detail in a published proposal which later will be submitted to the Security Council. This proposal is in the nature of a compromise between the principles of collective and national security. We suggest that the Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas be placed under United Nations trusteeship, but with the United States as sole trustee. The United States would have administrative, legislative and jurisdictional power over the islands, which would be considered an "integral part of the United States." Moreover, areas would be classified as "strategic," under Article 82 of the Charter, at the sole discretion of the United States as administering authority. We thus claim the right to debar representatives of the Trusteeship Council from visiting such areas as we may designate at any time as "closed for security reasons."

These terms stop short of outright annexation. Moreover, that we are submitting them to the United Nations for approval and discussion is significant. Modifications will, of course, be proposed. The Administration is aware that the terms must finally be ratified by the United States Senate; but it is awake to the importance of world opinion. The President speaks of the willingness of the United States to place under trusteeship "any Japanese islands" for which it assumes responsibility, but says nothing specific about bases on the Ryukyu, Bonin or Volcano Islands.

It would be a hopeless undertaking to try to discuss the strategic bases in which the United States has a vital interest in limited and regional terms. American interests are world-wide. Even if attention is focused on a particular base or group of bases, the analysis leads inevitably to the general principles of our foreign policy. To raise the question of maintaining or abandoning any one of the bases established during the war is to raise the

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problem of the American security system as a whole. A discussion of strategic bases must therefore begin with an examination of primary questions concerning the security system at which the United States policy aims.

First, it is essential to note that we are in process of revising the basic geographical foundations of our national security, most significantly in regard to what has hitherto been thought to be its central pillar — the "western hemisphere." At one time President Roosevelt used to speak of "this hemisphere" or of "the western hemisphere" as if it were a clear regional concept permitting us to define geographically how far this country would go in defending and stabilizing its security zone. That was in the days when the American people were just awakening to the necessity of measures of defense. Now, in the age of the B-36 and the atomic bomb, few can believe that the zone of North American security is that which was accepted, almost as a law of nature, ever since the Monroe Doctrine warned "Hands off the western hemisphere." [1] What is the western hemisphere? Where are its frontiers? The idea to which we are adjusting ourselves is that the frontiers of our national security zone lie wherever American interests are at stake, and that they reach anywhere that peace is endangered. It means, of course, that as a yardstick for determining the extent of our security zone, the Monroe Doctrine has crumbled.

Realization that the concept of a western hemisphere is not definable clears the ground for an attempt to determine the requirements of our security. It does not in itself solve the numerous problems which are hidden behind the term "strategic bases." To say that we have interests everywhere is one thing; to assume that we are, therefore, justified in establishing a military base wherever such a base seems essential to protect this country against attack is something very different. The difference is between a nationalist policy and a policy of internationalism. Certainly there are many gradations on the long line stretching between them, but our policy must move in one direction or in the other direction. We shall delude ourselves if we think that it can move in both.

Before considering this question further, it is well to note explicitly that what we regard as bases intended for defense against attack by hostile Powers might, and surely will, be considered

[1] *Cf.* "The Myth of the Continents," by Eugene Staley, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1941.

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by other Powers, *e.g.* the Soviet Union, as evidence of a new American belief in Manifest Destiny. In other words, wherever we maintain a strategic base for defense purposes, we shall be suspected of harboring aggressive intentions. (Indeed, some early sponsors of the plan to erect an American security system upon a strong chain of fortified bases gave justification for this suspicion by explaining that the purpose was to offset the future power of the Soviet Union and of China.) A Russian admiral in a *Pravda* article of September 12, 1946, described the United States naval policy as clearly offensive in character. He declared that our far-flung peacetime naval bases cannot be intended for the defense of the American continent, since some of them are situated at the close approaches to the Asiatic continent (Okinawa) and of Europe (Iceland and Greenland). In the same vein, on September 13, 1946, the Russian historian Eugene Tarlé attacked Admiral Halsey's statement that henceforth American foreign policy must be conducted from "aggressive positions." Vice versa, we suspect the Russians of offensive intentions when they establish advanced bases.

II

The American base system grew out of the war. The number of bases which we built in order to mount the offensives against Germany and Japan defies the imagination. At a press conference in September 1945, Mr. Struve Hensel, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, stated that the United States, commencing in 1940, built 434 war bases of various dimensions: 195 in the Pacific area, 11 in the Indian Ocean and the Near East, 288 in the Atlantic area, 18 of which are in the North Atlantic, 67 in the Gulf of Panama and the Caribbean, 25 in the South Atlantic, 55 in North Africa and the Mediterranean, 63 in Great Britain, France and Germany.

The inclusion of 63 bases in Great Britain, France and Germany in these naval statistics points to the necessity of a study in the semantics of the term "base." Much fallacious thought on the subject results from an uncritical assumption that the word "base" is more or less synonymous with the word "port." Thus the term "strategic base" is usually associated with the idea of an insular area, or of a beachhead in foreign territory. But bases are not only overseas but overland, too, as in the important case of what might soon become a vital United States defense

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frontier in northern Canada. The occupied countries of Germany, Japan, Korea, Italy and Austria, or the territories of nations within the Anglo-American orbit, are not associated with the term "strategic bases." But a sound analysis of the question of bases cannot differentiate between island bases and beachheads, and other foreign territories available for military operations. Thus the complete story of American bases should include an appraisal of the rôle which, for instance, Japan and the American zones of occupation in Germany, Austria and Korea play within the framework of a United States security system of today, and, possibly, a United Nations security system of tomorrow.

Seen through Soviet Russian eyes, the United States security zone at present includes, for practical purposes, the impressive chain of strategic bases under the flags of the British Commonwealth of Nations, beginning with the British Isles (except Eire). The British and American base systems are, indeed, closely interwoven, and their full implications can be evaluated properly only if that is remembered. In this connection it is extremely significant to note that Britain is blueprinting a new defense system for her empire based on the supposition that in another world war seapower, and strongholds in the Mediterranean, would no longer safeguard the life lines of the Commonwealth. In this new system, the center of gravity has shifted from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and, through the heartland of Africa, to the Atlantic bulge of west Africa pointing toward America. Here the British system of defense almost links with the United States bases in Latin America, especially those in Brazil, Cuba and Panama. (For years, the United States has steadily broadened this defense system, which still stands in spite of the fact that many of the bases were returned to the Latin American republics after the war.) Cognizant of the fact that the Mediterranean may become too vulnerable in atomic and rocket warfare, Britain's new plan appears to be a drastic admission that even she must in the future rely on landpower and land-based airpower rather than on seapower alone. The equatorial heart of Africa, with its string of air bases constructed during World War II, has been chosen to protect the Mediterranean-Suez Canal-Indian Ocean artery and to control British (and American) oil interests in 'Iraq, Iran and Arabia. This new defense system in depth rests upon two main pillars. One is the Nigeria base, close to west Africa's Atlantic bulge and providing

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a natural bridge to both the British Isles and to the United States and Canada. The other pillar, to be connected with Nigeria by a 3,000-mile strategic highway, is Kenya, close to the Indian Ocean and to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan where Britain controls the headwaters of the Nile.

We would be dangerously mistaken if in analyzing the strategic bases of Soviet Russia we limited ourselves to a discussion of the Kuriles, or of her bases in Finland, or of Kalinograd (the former Königsberg), or to the appraisal of her actual or possible demands for bases in the Dardanelles, in Eritrea and Tripolitania, or on Spitsbergen. To complete the picture of the strategic bases of the Soviet Union we must include Germany east of the Oder-Neisse frontier, as well as northern Korea. We must also include the entire belt of nations within the Soviet sphere of influence, both in Europe and Asia. To fail to perceive the full meaning of the term "strategic base" is to misjudge completely the relative power positions of the United States and the Soviet Union. If one should limit one's appraisal of bases to those which come under the classification of islands or ports, and compare the strongholds of this nature maintained by the United States with those under the Soviet flag, one would reach the erroneous conclusion that the Soviet Union has shown considerably more restraint in establishing bases than has the United States. Henry Wallace seems to fall a victim of this generous but dangerous error when, in his letter of July 23, 1946, to President Truman, he claimed that "up to now, despite all our outcries against it, their [the Russians'] efforts to develop a security zone in eastern Europe and in the Middle East are small change from the point of view of military power as compared with our air bases in Greenland, Okinawa, and many other places thousands of miles from our shores." The Soviet Union, in fact, found ample compensation for the lack of opportunities overseas by establishing bases in lands directly adjacent to hers, either by military occupation or by the collaboration of friendly governments in her spheres of interest.

Our naval and air bases are usually classified in three groups: permanent operational bases, which are to be fortified and garrisoned with sufficient force to be held against a major attack until relieved from the continental United States; limited operational bases, which would be used chiefly for aërial reconnaissance; and emergency bases, which need not be garrisoned in

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normal times but which we would be entitled to occupy should an emergency arise. As examples in the first category, one could mention the following Pacific bases: Kodiak, Hawaii, Guam, Saipan, Bonin, Volcano, Palau, Ryukyu, Leyte, Manus; in the Atlantic, Guantanamo, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Trinidad and, of course, the Canal Zone. As limited operational bases, Attu, Midway, Truk, sites in the Philippines, French New Caledonia, Guadalcanal, Peru and the Galapagos (which belong to Ecuador) have been named. Emergency bases are planned in Dutch Harbor, Canton, in the Bermudas and throughout the Caribbean area. It should be noted, however, that many of these bases are primarily naval bases. Among the additional air bases, Iceland and Greenland, the Azores and further bases in the Caribbean are outstanding.

Living as we do in a constant state of emergency, the aforementioned classification has little more than technical significance. It is impossible to appraise the military significance of each individual base. Even if that could be done with full knowledge of all new and forthcoming weapons in the fields of atomic and bacteriological warfare and of airborne weapons, the appraisal would miss the point. Any discussion limiting itself to an individual base or an isolated group of bases disregards the fact that each base must be viewed as part of a general system of national or of collective security. If the bases of a Great Power are merely part of a national defensive system, then there is no escaping the sad conclusion that the more and better bases that nation has, the more and even better ones it needs, in order to protect the old ones. *L'appetit vient en mangeant.* The security zones of the Great Powers are already overlapping everywhere; but if Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the United States are proceeding on the assumption that collective security is already an outmoded concept, then the saturation point for base extension is not yet in sight.

III

The Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration committed the United States to the principle of territorial nonaggrandizement. This principle was reaffirmed in 1945 in Chapters XI–XIII of the United Nations Charter, dealing with international trusteeship. President Roosevelt's foreign policy had seemed to be directed toward a system which would include a chain of naval

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and air bases flying the flag, not of the United States, but of the United Nations. But the climate of international opinion was drastically changing. The Yalta Agreement which gave the Kuriles to the U.S.S.R. was so secret that it remained unknown even to the Secretary of State until February 1946; but a growing uneasiness in the United States in 1945 prompted high-ranking naval officers to make a series of statements which advocated strong naval and air bases under the flag of the United States. A statement by Admiral King in April of that year, shortly before the San Francisco Conference got under way, to the effect that the United States must keep those Pacific bases for which we paid "by the sacrifice of American blood" was typical. At San Francisco, in May 1945, a subcommittee of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee urged outright annexation.

The trusteeship principles were qualified in the Charter. The special dispensation for "strategic areas" in trust territories, which placed such areas under the jurisdiction of the Security Council (with its veto provision) instead of the Trusteeship Council (Articles 82, 83 of the Charter) made it possible for a Great Power to control strategic bases short only of outright annexation. A passage from the Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee of July 16, 1945, reveals the American attitude clearly:

> No island in the Pacific occupied by the United States could be placed under trusteeship without this government's consent, and therefore only on terms agreeable to the United States.
>
> It was pointed out that careful consideration has been given to the security interests of the United States with respect to the trusteeship system. In this connection . . . letters from the Secretaries of War and Navy, stating that the military and strategic implications of the Charter, as a whole, are in accord with the military interests of the United States, were read into the record.[2]

In January 1946, General Kenney, chief Army adviser to the United States delegation in London, suggested at a press conference that the United States should annex all the Japanese islands she needed. It was only then that two newspapers, *The New York Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor*, called attention to what seemed to be a serious difference of opinion within the United States delegation, and between the State Department and the military command, over the question of annexation of strategic areas in the Pacific. President Truman

[2] Huntington Gilchrist, "Second Commission: The General Assembly," *International Conciliation*, September 1945, p. 458.

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thereupon expressed himself in favor of placing the Japanese islands under trusteeship. But his remarks, made informally at his press conference on January 15, 1946, were so general that they did not make the official United States policy clear. The press, and opinion at Capitol Hill, were divided into two camps. Senator Byrd was one of the most candid; he declared that it would be "absurd" to talk about placing the Pacific bases under trusteeship when Russia was gaining complete control over the Kuriles.[3] The same nationalist philosophy was reflected in the report by the Special Senate (Mead) Committee to investigate the National Defense Program of August 31, 1946: "The War, Navy and State Departments should have had plans, before the end of the war, to utilize those overseas bases necessary to our national defense, and they should have used the full weight of our bargaining power in executing these plans. The appropriate government agencies must now work out and set into operation a feasible program for the acquisition or use of strategic overseas bases." Former President Herbert Hoover summarized the trend when he told naval officers on August 30, 1946, that we must hold on to the Pacific islands because "we must extend our perimeter of defense."

The "perimeter of defense" concept is equivalent to a somber admission that the decision as to what we shall do about strategic bases should be left to the military experts, though the American public was perhaps hardly aware of the implications of such a policy.

About this time, we suggested to the British that bases in Canton and on the Christmas and Funafuti Islands be transferred to the American flag. Australia was requested to grant us naval and air rights in the harbor of Manus in the Admiralty Islands, where during the war we built a base at the cost of $156,000,000. The difficulties which the United States encountered in these negotiations with the Government of Australia well illustrate the fact that two competing principles — national and collective security — are at stake in all this bargaining. The Government of Australia requested a regional defense agreement for the southwest Pacific area based on the principle of reciprocity, a demand which was reiterated by the Duke of Gloucester on November 6, 1946, when he declared before the Australian Parliament that Australia would welcome an arrange-

[3] *Cf.* Vernon McKay, "International Trusteeship," *Foreign Policy Reports*, May 15, 1946.

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ment with the United States "for joint use of Pacific bases on the principle of reciprocity." It also emphasized that Manus is part of the Australian mandated territory of New Guinea and argued that the trusteeship provisions of the United Nations Charter preserve for members existing rights and interests in Mandated Territories. To our argument that the expense involved in the construction of the Manus base was sufficient justification for retaining the use of it, they replied that the so-called "Anzac agreement" of January 1944 had advanced the principle that the construction and use, in time of war, of military installations in the territory of another Power does not, in itself, afford any basis for territorial claims after the cessation of hostilities. It is not without interest that, in an article on dependent areas in the Pacific, Professor K. H. Bailey, who was adviser to the Australian Government at San Francisco, mentions the fact that an American reference to the harbor base included the "contemptuous expectation" that the Australians would "put up a squawk" about trusteeship.[4] Unilateral action and collective action are two different things. To pursue one, under the assumption that we are dedicated to the other, can have only unhappy results.

Congress appropriated funds, for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1946, for United States bases on the former Japanese islands of Saipan, Tinian, the Ryukyus (Okinawa), Eniwetok, Kwajalein, Truk, Palau, Majuro, and the Bonins. It also allocated funds for bases in the Philippines, on Guam, Hawaii, Wake, Midway, Christmas and Johnston Islands, in Alaska, on the China coast, at Manus, and on Espiritu Santu, a British island in the New Hebrides.[5] But the very cloudiness of the situation, and the resulting dangers, helped start us on a new tack.

An official announcement by Admiral John H. Towers, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet, after a White House conference between President Truman and top Navy commanders on September 30, 1946, indicated a different trend in our policy in regard to bases in the Pacific. According to Admiral Towers, a considerable reduction of the number of bases had been decided upon. The reasons mentioned were a "re-examination of the general situation" and President Truman's directive to the Navy to curtail expenditures by $650,000,000. The bases which

[4] *Cf.* "Dependent Areas of the Pacific: An Australian View," by K. H. Bailey, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1946.

[5] *Cf.* "Influence of Armed Forces on United States Foreign Policy," by Blair Bolles, *Foreign Policy Reports*, October 1, 1946, p. 176.

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will be abandoned were not specified, but the Admiral's statement indicated that Eniwetok and Majuro, which flank Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands, might be given up. Truk, once a strong Japanese naval bastion in the Carolinas, will get little more than caretaker status, although an air strip will be maintained there. The anchorages at Ulithi and Peleliu, in the west Pacific, and Manus in the Admiralty Islands (where we modified our demands) are in a similar category.

In the Atlantic, we had earlier asked the Republic of Iceland to let us maintain our bases there for the duration of our military occupation in Europe. The people of Iceland did not consider that this harmonized with the policy expressed in President Roosevelt's message to Congress of July 7, 1941, in which our future policy toward Iceland was stated as follows: "[We] have given the people of Iceland the assurance that . . . immediately upon the termination of the present emergency all American forces will be at once withdrawn, leaving the people of Iceland and their government in full and sovereign control of their own territory." [6] Even if there were some justification for the argument that the "present emergency" carried over into the postwar occupation, it was not surprising that the Icelandic people and their Government were unwilling to permit us to retain the bases. For one good reason, they were aware that the Soviet Union might establish a counter-base on Spitsbergen. A possibly serious diplomatic conflict between Iceland and the United States was avoided by the State Department's announcement, on September 21, 1946, that we would withdraw our military and naval personnel from Iceland within 180 days. Under the proposed agreement with Iceland, the United States merely reserves the right to use the American-built Keflavik airfield as a transit point for planes coming from and going to Germany, until the occupation of Germany is over. Even this comparatively moderate request met with violent opposition by the Federation of Icelandic Trade Unions, which tried to force the hand of the Icelandic Parliament by a general strike.

In Copenhagen, Denmark's Foreign Minister told the Parliament on October 30, 1946, that Denmark is considering terminating the agreement under which the United States placed wartime installations in Greenland. The termination appears justi-

[6] *Cf.* Hans W. Weigert, "Iceland, Greenland, and the United States," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1944.

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fied, he said, because the "peace and security of the American continent was no longer endangered." Such developments show clearly how obsolete today would be the half-forgotten schemes for the purchase or even annexation of Greenland, dusted off in 1939 by some isolationist Congressmen.

We are reported to have made a request to Portugal for bases in the Azores. For reasons which are evident from Portugal's precarious geographical position in the Atlantic, we might be more successful in our dealings with her than with Iceland. The Portuguese Government is said to have asked for a political commitment in case her relations with other nations were damaged as a result of concessions to us.[7] We were granted transit rights for a period of 18 months. However, the United States went out of its way to stress its respect for the sovereign rights of small nations by selling the American base and its equipment on Santa Maria Island to Portugal.

In the Far North the situation is obscure. Here the U.S.S.R. is our immediate neighbor over the top of the world, across the "Arctic Mediterranean." "If there is a third world war," said General Arnold, "its strategic center will be the North Pole." The importance of the problems involved in this vast zone is highlighted by a report from Ottawa in *The New York Times* of June 28, 1946, to the effect that Prime Minister Mackenzie King denied in the House of Commons that a recent memorandum from Washington to Canada on Arctic defense was in any way in the nature of an "ultimatum" and that the United States had presented a plan for northern air bases. This denial was prompted by an article in a Toronto weekly which, for the first time, discussed the memorandum that had actually been received but had not been mentioned in Parliament or in the press. We may note that on June 28, 1946, the Moscow radio broadcast that 540 hydrographical expeditions would be undertaken in seas bordering the Soviet Union during the next five years.

IV

It is proper to remember that there are many stages on the road to effective collective security. A distinction may rightly be made between the advisability of maintaining distant national bases, and those close to the home center of national power. A chain of bases extending from the Caribbean to the Canal Zone

[7] *Cf. The New York Times*, James Reston, June 26, 1946.

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is and will remain essential to the defense of the United States, for example, however sincerely we subscribe to collective security. Equally, the Soviet Union can rightly claim that her bases in Finland are essential for her security, in the event that she wishes an agreement with the United States and United Kingdom founded on the principles of collective security.

The further national bases are from the homeland, the greater the danger that they will become barriers to the growth of the United Nations. The newest developments in weapons of war will perhaps weaken the usefulness of distant bases, and make more apparent the dangers of overextension. But even without inside knowledge of the new technology of warfare, solely from elementary facts of geography, it is apparent that some of the distant American bases are ineffective for a strategy based entirely on national interests. This seems to be especially true for the wide chain of bases off the coast of Asia. Dangerous errors of judgment can follow a habit of looking at Asia across the vast expanse of the Pacific. Look north! The claim that the United States needs naval and air bases close to the Asiatic coast in order to hold true the balance in the destinies of China and Soviet Asia does not rest on geographical realities. It overlooks the growing significance of the immense land frontier between China and the U.S.S.R. That area is the fulcrum for whatever leverage we, or any other Power, will exert in China. The age of colonial imperialism, in which China was opened and controlled from her ports, is coming to an end. The military and political developments of recent years make it evident that the decisive force in Asia will be generated in the center, and from there will radiate toward the Pacific coastline. Such trends cannot be much affected, let alone controlled, by even the most perfect chain of island bases overseas; such outposts are no longer blue chips of United States power. Lack of imagination due to geographic ignorance can have sorry consequences.

Strategic bases rest on the assumption that "strategic frontiers" are still realities. The remaining Great Powers should have learned from the last war to subject that assumption to close scrutiny. Obviously, the time is far away when the United States, Britain or the Soviet Union could entrust its defense to United Nations bases, protected by United Nations forces. But the course taken by the United States in regard to the former Japanese-mandated islands is one of the factors which will de-

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termine whether or not the United Nations is to become a strong organization. Our most recent proposal repudiates the radical demand for annexation, although it could easily result in the kind of military occupation which is practically indistinguishable from annexation. However, the proposal recognizes the right of the United Nations to have a voice in the matter. Attempting to steer a middle course between a foreign policy devoted to the ideals of collective security and what seem the immediate demands of national security we doubtless desired to do no more than protect our rights and needs in the event that the United Nations proves not to be as potent as we hope.

But the terms in which we announced our decision still make possible the charge that the United States has a double standard of international morals in a matter which we consider vital to our safety. Of course, there is a real distinction to be made between almost uninhabited islands and populous territories: the primary purpose of the trusteeship system is to guard and advance the native welfare in "backward" areas, through international supervision of national administrations. Nonetheless, precedents set in the Pacific will affect the situation elsewhere—in Africa, for example. The writer has stated above his reasons for doubting whether, for geographical reasons, the region in question (covering waters one-third the size of the United States, but a land area not larger altogether than Rhode Island, with a population of about 53,000) is really vital to our security. The attention now centered on the trusteeship areas in the Pacific should not obscure the fact that on several fronts the United States has taken the first steps toward a reduction of her strategic base system, though without advertising these steps as contributions to the cause of collective security. Whether we extend the areas which we proclaim to be strategic, thereby closing them to visit and inspection, will depend on the development of the international situation as a whole, and especially on whether there is evidence of reciprocal reliance on United Nations agencies on the part of the Soviet Union.

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UNFINISHED BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES

By Louis H. Pink

EVER since the United States surprised the world, and itself, by taking possession of the Philippines in 1898, the Islands have (among greater accomplishments) provided writers and orators with an essential article of their trade — a dramatic symbol. Or rather, they have provided two symbols, of vice or of virtue, according to the particular angle of vision: a new empire practising enslavement, or a free nation bestowing freedom. It appeared that the latter figure of speech squared with the fact when, in December 1941, the Filipinos, in heroic friendship, fought as free men in the cause of America's freedom and their own.

The Philippine Republic, an independent nation, is truly a portent in the east, and there is no doubt that it is recognized as such. But for the purposes of appraising the concrete problems the Filipinos face today, and the relationship that exists between ourselves and our former wards, a symbolical picture must perhaps be drawn too inevitably in black and white to be useful. The problems of the new Republic are complex. Unfortunately they have, in some respects, been made sharper by ungenerous or at least ill-considered actions of our own on the eve of the formal assumption of independence. The United States may be proud of its record in the Philippines; but there are items of unfinished business we must not overlook.

Perhaps the best evidence that the job has been well done is the fact that we did not exploit the Islands for our own selfish national advantage, or permit United States citizens or capital to exploit them during almost half a century of control. William Howard Taft, the first in the line of United States Governors, coined the phrase "The Philippines for the Filipinos," and in varying degrees this has been the motto of each of our representatives. Francis Burton Harrison, appointed by President Wilson, a strong exponent of a free Philippines, probably went too far and too fast in turning out experienced American administrators and replacing them with Filipino officials. Leonard Wood, his successor, was a hard taskmaster. He did not coddle the Filipinos. He was insistent on a high standard of political and business

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morality, and preferred United States citizens in the higher offices until Filipinos became better qualified. But he was stern with the American community and adamant in securing economic and social justice for the people of the Islands. Not one in the list of 13 Governors-General and High Commissioners, from Taft to McNutt, promoted United States capital or business interests at the expense of the Philippines.

The proof is that, contrary to what so many people believe — including the Marxists, whose version of imperialism seems never to be affected by any events of the real world — American capital is not dominant in the Philippines. After almost half a century of opportunity to "exploit" the Philippines, only approximately $250,000,000 of American money is invested there. This is about one-thirtieth of the assets of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, for example, and one-twentieth of the assets of the Chase National Bank. Before the war, our investments in Poland or Italy were approximately the same as in the Philippines. Those in Cuba were three times greater; in South America six times greater; in the United Kingdom four times greater; and in Germany five times greater. In Canada our investments were approximately $4,400,000,000. American capital has played an important part in the development of sugar, hemp, gold, copra, the railroads and utilities in the Philippines, but the land is owned by Filipinos, and Filipinos control the industries and the natural resources. Only in Manila itself do United States and Chinese interests own a substantial portion of business property. Americans residing in the Philippines numbered only about 8,500 before the war and only about 4,000 were engaged in business, trade, or industry. There are fewer now. This is a small battalion when compared with the 18,000,000 Filipinos, or the 117,000 Chinese who largely control the retail trade of the Islands. Political, social, business, professional and economic leadership is mainly Filipino.

The United States has not only been fair to the Filipinos in economic development, but it has not discriminated against capital or citizens from other nations. The old Spanish families still have large economic interests; and they retained their high social standing and their ties with Spain during the years of the American régime. The Manila branch of the National City Bank, which does the largest volume of business in the Islands, is the only United States bank in the Philippines, though there is considerable American capital in the Peoples Bank and Trust Company,

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a Philippine corporation. The National City Bank is largely used as an agency for American-Philippine transactions, but is in no sense dominant and controls only a minor portion of the total business. There are eight domestic banking institutions in addition to the National City, plus five foreign banks, which are chartered in China, Japan, the Netherlands and the British Empire. The Philippine domestic banks have had more than twice the local assets of all foreign banks, including the National City. The Philippine National Bank, which is owned by the government, is perhaps the most important of them.

In the life insurance field, American companies have so far played a minor rôle. The Sun Life of Canada and the Insular Life, a local Philippine company, have the largest number of policyholders, by a wide margin. There are a number of strong United States companies in the fire insurance, casualty and marine insurance lines, but the business of each is comparatively small. The British and Canadian companies are more numerous than those of the United States and do a much larger volume of business. Dutch, French, Swiss, Japanese, Indian, German, Italian, British, Chinese and American companies compete for the Philippine business on equal terms. Local insurance companies largely owned by the Filipinos themselves learned the business from their American and foreign competitors and are rapidly increasing in strength and volume. Charges that the Philippines have been administered for the benefit of American "monopoly capitalism" are unwarranted. Of course we have made mistakes; but our record, on the whole, is good.

II

What of the criticism of our more recent acts? Some American writers, and some writers in the Philippine press, called the promulgation of the Republic on July 4, 1946, a "phoney" independence. It is true that there are serious faults in the legislation which Congress enacted to implement the American determination to grant independence. The Philippine Republic is not as free as Canada, Australia or South Africa. But though some criticism is justifiable, in view of the economic and military restrictions which have been placed upon the new nation, the use of the word "phoney" is not. The establishment of the Republic places the destiny of the Filipino people in their own hands and permits them to work out the future. Independence, rightly

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enough, was achieved by gradual steps. The first Island legislature met in 1916. Since the enactment of the Constitution and the organization of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, the Philippines have managed their own affairs, except in foreign relations, currency and finance. There has been little interference from Washington in the ordinary affairs of the Islands. The Philippine Constitution, which was framed by the Philippine people, establishes self-government on the lines of our own — with a strong Bill of Rights, but with larger powers vested in the Presidency than under our Constitution.

Both in the United States and in the Philippines, some criticisms take the form of saying, in effect, that we have turned the Islands over to a small governing class whose aim is Fascism and economic exploitation. There is some factual basis for the charge, but not in such sweeping form. In the Philippines, as in most oriental countries, a comparatively small privileged class largely controls social, political, business and financial life. The great mass of the people are poor, closely bound to the land and with little direct influence in public affairs. Patriotism will be required, as well as statesmanship of high order, in order to develop the social and economic welfare of the large underprivileged majority and to spread political power more equitably. But such class divisions go back far beyond the period of our control; the extremes of richness and poverty, ignorance and cultivation, are less sharp than in earlier days. And in any event, the point is that the Filipinos of all classes wish to be free now from further tutelage.

But the United States Congress, despite its obvious desire to carry out our pledges for independence, is guilty of some unstatesmanlike acts which will come back to plague us. First, we required the new Republic to guarantee to our government its possession of property, *i.e.* bases, now held or to be acquired for the Army, Navy and other government agencies. Many Filipinos have no objection to the bases, seeing in them protection against aggression from Oriental neighbors as well as a source of employment and revenue. President Roxas has pointed out that our military strength in the Islands will make it unnecessary for the Philippines to engage in large military expenditures. On the other hand, if there should be another war, these islands may again be a battleground and the United States will need to use them for offensive and defensive purposes. The cities would again be ruined

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— even more thoroughly — and the country's economy disrupted.

There is undoubtedly a large body of thoughtful people in the United States and in the Philippines who would like to see those bases handed over to the United Nations. If we are concerned with the lasting good will of the Orient and with fundamental rather than technical security, we should turn these bases over to the United Nations. If that is not possible now, then we should negotiate with the Republic as we did with Iceland, as an equal. To require that the Philippines guarantee the title of the United States to these properties, as a condition of independence, was ungracious and unjustified. Arrangements could be reached with the Republic for the retention of such bases as we may need without such a show of force.

The difficulty of maintaining a large number of our military forces in a friendly foreign country without bickering and increasing tension is most delicate. The control of Filipinos within the base areas, and the control of our armed forces by military police when they are off duty, are apt to lead to misunderstanding and even graver consequences through the years. Already tension has developed, and in some quarters our undisciplined young soldiers are called "ambassadors of ill will."

Another serious mistake on the part of Congress is the requirement, as a condition of independence, that the Philippine Constitution be amended to provide special privileges for American citizens and American capital. The Philippine Constitution now provides that the development and utilization of the public domain, natural resources, and public utilities be confined to citizens of the Philippines and to corporations which are at least 60 percent owned by Philippine citizens. There are legitimate objections to such restrictions; they are "isolationist," and they are difficult to enforce, as has been proven in the case of the Chinese and Japanese in the Islands. Nonetheless, this question of policy is for the Filipinos to decide. They decided it when they adopted their Constitution, while we were in control of the Islands, and we did not object. Now we insist that during the 28 years of the trade act, United States citizens and corporations enjoy the same privileges that the Filipinos possess. This mischievous demand is contrary to the spirit of our whole previous administration of the Islands. It is in derogation of the legislative power of the Philippine Government. If abused, it might lead to wrongful exploitation of the mineral rights, power, public utilities and land

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of the Philippines by over-ambitious citizens of the United States.

It is true that we have not exploited the Philippines in the past, when we had every opportunity to do so. It is also true that, if American public opinion gives thought to the matter, it will not countenance exploitation in the future. In view of the many uncertainties in the Orient and in the Philippines, there is little likelihood, in fact, that a large volume of additional American capital will be invested, and the danger of improper exploitation is more theoretical than real. Nonetheless, in demanding this special status for Americans we have opened the way for abuses. The various detractors of the United States may be counted upon to point out the fact to the Filipinos. José P. Laurel, President of the puppet republic under the Japanese, has already found that attacks on the United States, based on this legislation, are a means to new popularity. The requirement that favoritism be extended to the citizens and capital of a particular country is just the treatment which occidental nations have taught oriental nations to expect.

Our State Department objected to the demand for a preferred position for our nationals at the hearing before the Congressional Committee. As Under Secretary Clayton put it, other nations will say, "You have taken advantage of the position here with the Philippines in this Bill to demand for yourself preferential treatment as against us, and we do not like it." It is obviously in flat contradiction to our protests against special preferences elsewhere. It will certainly place difficulties in the way of our efforts to secure equal trade opportunities for all nations in all parts of the world.

President Roxas made the best of the trade act in his special message to the Philippine Congress of June 21, 1946. He said that had he been in Washington he would have vigorously protested against the clause; but he advocated its acceptance as a practical necessity in order to secure the legislation for independence. He pointed out that the Philippines are very much in need of reconstruction and development and do not have the capital for it. He said that the provision will reassure potential investors against discrimination during the life of the trade treaty, and added: "Our rehabilitation would be impossible without such assistance."

A particular instance of American enterprise has recently aroused considerable concern and comment in the Philippines.

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Brigadier-General Ernest H. Burt, retired, formerly on Commissioner McNutt's staff, has arranged to purchase two large estates, comprising more than 840,000 acres, as a real estate development. These lands are owned by Catholic institutions as part of the immense land holdings which the Church still controls. The land is to be subdivided and sold in small parcels to those who need it, and according to General Burt, the project will benefit the Philippine people. But it is the kind of thing which arouses fear of exploitation, and may endanger the friendly relations which exist between the United States and the new Republic.

Even more essential to the new Republic than financial assistance from the United States is a trade arrangement which will enable the Islands to rebuild their agriculture and industries. The Philippines have enjoyed a large measure of free trade with the United States, though in recent years quotas have been placed upon such basic industries as coconut products and sugar. The new trade act is a compromise. It provides free trade, subject to definite quotas on basic agricultural industries, for a period of eight years. During the subsequent 20 years, duties are to be imposed gradually at the rate of 5 percent each year until 1974, when tariff preferences end. The obvious purpose of the act is to stimulate the rehabilitation of the basic industries upon which the Islands depend for their economic support, and at the same time gradually to eliminate these preferences. In other words, after 28 years, the Philippines will be subject to our full tariff requirements, as is every other nation.

This expedient of a gradual imposition of tariffs has been generally accepted both in the Philippines and in the United States. But it is hard not to view it as a lost opportunity for moving toward the goal of freer trade throughout the world. The Philippines and the United States by and large supplement one another economically. It would undoubtedly be in the interest of both if the rapidly expanding Philippine market were opened to our industries, which supply the wide variety of manufactures needed in the Islands, and the Philippines were enabled to dispose of their sugar, coconut products, hemp, tobacco and gold without undue restrictions. The Philippine standard of living is low by our standards, but higher than that of most other Oriental peoples, because of the free trade relationship of the past with the United States. We are making great efforts to promote multilateral trade and remove many of the arbitrary restrictions and nationalistic

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barriers which have been raised against trade all over the world. With the birth of this new nation there was an opportunity to create an ideal trade arrangement.

Perhaps the most vulnerable provision of the trade act is the creation of absolute quotas on sugar, cordage, rice, tobacco, coconuts and some other products. These quotas set limits to the growth of these industries in the Philippines and discourage the continued improvement of the standard of living which a growing volume of trade would stimulate. Even more serious is the requirement that the quotas be allocated to those who produced these products in 1940 and exported them to the United States during that year. Such an allocation of quotas creates a favored class which has a monopoly of trade with the United States, and will effectively discourage the development of new industries and the investment of new capital. Still other quotas are provided for, if it can be shown that the cost of production is 20 percent below the cost of similar articles in the United States.

The State Department opposed these absolute quotas. In his appearance before the Committee on Finance of the Senate, Mr. Clayton said that quotas are one of the most vicious trade restrictions, and that their use by other governments has been highly detrimental to American exports. It is certainly inconsistent for the United States to urge other nations to forego quotas and other restrictive barriers in their arrangements with us, and at the same time to impose a restrictive quota system on the Philippine Republic. The trade legislation puts American and Philippine commerce in a strait jacket for 28 years. It does not permit the writing of a more desirable trade treaty which will embody the progressive measures which the United States is trying to work out with other nations or allow for changed conditions.

In order to obtain the benefits of the trade act, the Philippine Republic must amend the Constitution to provide the preferences for United States citizens and capital mentioned above. According to the Constitution, amendments may be proposed by a three-fourths vote of all of the members of the Philippine Congress and submitted to the people for ratification by a majority vote. Congress has already voted to submit the amendment to the people, but with only two votes over the three-fourths required. Many of those who voted for the submission of the amendment did so without committing themselves as to the desirability of the

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amendment itself, stating that they thought such a change so important that the people should decide it. Generally speaking, the dissatisfied and radical elements in the Philippines will do their utmost to prevent its adoption, while the commercial and business people will be for it. But, beyond that, the amendment offends national pride. There is no certainty that it will be adopted.

The decision which the new nation has to make is grave. For the immediate future, stable and preferential trade relations with the United States are urgently in the interest of the Philippines. If the amendment is defeated, the American Congress will be annoyed and future aid which is necessary for the rehabilitation of the Philippines will be imperilled. The Filipinos must weigh present advantage against the development of a long-range international trade and financial policy — one of the most difficult tasks imaginable for an electorate.

III

The legislation which has been enacted by the United States Congress makes the reasonable, though not generous, appropriation of $400,000,000 for reconstruction of buildings and their contents, both private and public. Surplus property of the United States in the Islands, to the value of $100,000,000, is being turned over for use in repairing buildings and essential services, including hospitals, educational and charitable institutions. Another $120,000,000 is provided for training Filipinos in engineering, health, and commercial activities, and restoring roads, inter-island commerce, fisheries, port and harbor facilities. The amount allocated for war damages is considerably less than the estimate of $800,000,000 made by American experts sent over by the War Damage Corporation. That estimate, moreover, was based upon 1941 prices, and is therefore very conservative today. The provision that the Philippines may recoup from Japanese indemnities their losses not paid for by the United States is of doubtful worth.

The mere list of problems which face the Philippine Republic seems almost endless. Fifty percent of Manila was destroyed, 70 percent of Cebu, 75 percent of Iloilo, 35 percent of Bacolod and 90 percent of Zamboanga. Only a few important buildings in Manila have been made fit for use; rehabilitation in any real sense has not yet begun. None of the appropriations for war damages has as yet been paid over, though surplus goods are being used.

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The tax system has been deranged; people are seeking assistance from the government rather than paying taxes. It will take years to secure an adequate income from taxable sources, for the daily operation of the government. Basic industry is still at a standstill, except for some activity in hemp, copra and tobacco, and agriculture has been seriously impaired. There is a shortage of the faithful and picturesque carabaos used for so many purposes, and of other farm animals and farm machinery.

Inflation grew to huge proportions during the Japanese invasion. It has abated, but is still prevalent, due to the scarcity of goods. Even more serious is the disorganization of finances, and of the economic system as a whole, caused by the use of large quantities of now worthless Japanese military notes during the occupation. Aside from an abortive attempt to legalize Japanese transactions, accepted by President Osmena but vetoed by President Truman, the Philippine Congress has so far failed to enact a sound debtor and creditor law which would allay the financial unrest which results from the uncertainty about obligations contracted under the Japanese.

Health, never good in the Philippines, has declined appreciably, and tuberculosis and many other diseases have increased rapidly and are a source of grave concern. Sanitation is sometimes non-existent. Water and soil are contaminated in many neighborhoods. Many hospitals were destroyed during the war, and the United States Army is still in possession of many privately owned and public buildings required for local purposes. The health and morale of the people need immediate attention. The nervous tension of the three years of Japanese occupation, the suffering and death of so many people in so many families, the atrocities and the bombings and burnings, all have left their marks.

The mass of the people are poor, and are attached to the land. There has been little industrial development in the Philippines as yet, and the middle class is small. (Through the National Development Company which it owns, the Government has gone into several business ventures in order to stimulate industrial employment; but with doubtful success.) The unrest in the rice fields has received much publicity recently and undoubtedly is serious. The Hukbalahaps furnished many guerillas and did effective work against the Japanese, but they are still armed, and many of them are convinced that only by revolt can they obtain economic justice. The Huks represent the poverty-stricken small tenant who

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shares his crops with the landlord. They have been called Communists, but genuine Communists are few in number and without any significant following in the Philippines, where more than 90 percent of the people are Catholics; to the degree that the Huks are Communists, they are akin to the Chinese Communists rather than the Russian.

The movement for lower taxes and rents, fixity of tenure, and improved living and economic conditions is strong in central Luzon. Since the election in 1946, violence has been intensified, with riots and some loss of life. The problem is not a new one. When the Philippine Commonwealth was established in 1935, there were similar disorders in these areas. Local government was overthrown in several communities and some 60 people were killed by Sakdalistas, as they were then called. President Quezon faced the same problem which now confronts President Roxas. It can be solved only by improved agrarian conditions, which means a more equitable land system and the opening up of large estates for small farmers. In the period of his governorship, William Howard Taft went to Rome and purchased large areas from the Church, subdividing them among the people. That did not work out as well as was expected, since many Filipinos sold or abandoned the land thus acquired. Nonetheless, splitting up the large estates is an important part of any lasting reform. A policy of firmness in demanding the surrender of arms is an obvious requirement of the moment.

IV

The United States has by no means discharged its full duty by granting political freedom to the Philippines. That action must be followed by financial and economic assistance which will enable the new Republic to restore the buildings and public works destroyed by war, resume its governmental functions and promote an improved standard of living. We must provide not only funds for restoration and reconstruction, but loans to tide over the first difficult years. The Filipinos are a fine, kindly and intelligent people. They are capable politicians, but they lack administrative experience. Our public health service, educational and economic agencies must extend them every possible material aid; and we must be prepared also to supply trained and experienced administrators, if requested.

The Philippine Republic has come of age and must work out its

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own problems. But it is still entitled to our understanding and our help. We are proud that the new Republic has taken its place among the nations. We cannot afford to have it fail. Many of the mistakes in the legislation arranging for independence can be and must be adjusted. The financial aid which we have already arranged will have to be supplemented from time to time, for though the Philippine Islands are potentially wealthy, they are "money poor" and have few immediate resources of capital.

Aid to the Philippine Republic is by no means a one-way street. The Philippines can do much for the United States. They can and should, in their own interest, provide an expanding market for United States goods and products. But even more important, this young and enthusiastic people can be our spokesman in the Orient. It can help us bring home to China, India, Russia, the East Indies and the new Japan, our desire, not for aggrandizement in the east but for industrialization there, for open markets, and for equal opportunities for all nations to join in multilateral trade — in other words, that we stand for a rising level of living for all.

The Philippine people, who are friendly to the United States and appreciate the benefits which we have provided, can help us most by acting as our salesmen, not so much for goods and merchandise, as for our democratic ideas — specifically, the idea of the extension of self-government to backward people, and the policy of nonaggression. They can help us achieve a coöperative world society which recognizes the rights not only of nations but of human beings wherever they may be.

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HOPEFUL FACTORS IN THE BRITISH ECONOMY

By S. R. Dennison

"THE foundations of the United Kingdom's normal economic life are a high degree of industrial specialization, a substantial dependence upon imported foodstuffs and raw materials, and the maintenance of a volume of export trade and of other sources of foreign exchange earnings adequate to pay for those imports." This statement, taken from the United Kingdom official publication, "Statistical Material Presented During the Washington Negotiations" in December 1945 may be trite, but its fundamental importance is not thereby diminished. In the immediate future, the deficit on Britain's balance of payments on current account presents one of her most formidable problems, and it is understandable that economic policy should be preoccupied with the internal and external adjustments which can be made in the British economy adequate to restore equilibrium. But this ought not to obscure the fact that a transitional period must lead to something; the solutions adopted for immediate problems are bound to affect the future situation.

This fact underlay much of the controversy in Britain about the American loan. The main purpose of the loan is, of course, to assist Britain's balance of payments problem in the transition period. To the United States, believing that a multilateral commercial system is the best long-term objective, it was not unreasonable that another "important purpose" of the loan should be "to promote the development of multilateral trade and facilitate its resumption," and that for Britain this should mean membership in the International Monetary Fund and participation in discussions on commercial policy. To the isolationists in Britain, who consider that bilateralism is either necessary or desirable (if not both), these conditions of the loan are sufficient to vitiate its main purpose.

In an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS,[1] Sir Henry Clay has examined, in a setting of long-term trends, some of the factors in Britain's international economic position. Though not himself espousing the isolationist cause, the general tenor of his analysis

[1] Henry Clay, "Britain's Declining Rôle in World Trade," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1946.

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is against the practicability or desirability of British participation in a multilateral system. Full justice cannot be done to his argument here, but to summarize, "the economic policy and arrangements of the United Kingdom in the twenty years before 1914 were unique," based on conditions which were bound to prove transitory, and the difficulties of the inter-war years were as much the result of adaptation to changed underlying conditions as of the disturbance caused by the First World War. "A long-term tendency for foreign trade to become relatively less important is not improbable," and once the disturbances of the last war have been resolved, "the transition will be completed from the unique economy based on world trade and world finance . . . to the normal conditions of every other mature economy — a condition in which a protected home market is the basis of enterprise, and foreign trade is confined mainly to the export of surpluses and the import of commodities which it is not practicable to produce at home." Nor is it necessary "to repine over this change;" "the economic problem with which the present generation is preoccupied is the problem of security;" "employment, not cheapness [is] the first aim of economic policy," and it is in the achievement of this aim that "a country like England or America" can make its best contribution to international trade and to the welfare of other countries.

A short criticism of Sir Henry's case is that it seems too optimistic in its assessment of Britain's prospects of regaining a high standard of living in the sort of world which is envisaged, and too pessimistic in its view that this sort of world is inevitable. A world in which imports consist of "commodities which it is not practicable to produce at home," in which "the potentialities of technical science" are exploited to the full, comes dangerously near to what Professor D. H. Robertson calls "the Economics of War, [in which] the subtleties of Comparative Advantage become a foolish irrelevance. *A* must grow, not what he is most fitted to grow, but what will save most shipping space. *B* must make, not what he is most fitted to make, but what can be made most easily out of local sawdust and mud."[2] To believe that Britain could

[2] In case it should be argued that there is a big gap between moderate isolationism (if such a thing can exist) and the economics of war, it may be noted that Sir Henry, while stating that "there is a limit to the possible contraction of a country's foreign trade" (it is not, on his argument, apparent why this should be so), considers it "not obvious that the limit [for Britain] had been reached in 1939," and "*the war revealed possibilities of adaptation that were unexpected*" (my italics). Let it be said that Sir Henry's is a moderate view.

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maintain her standard of living in these conditions is a dangerous illusion, not to be dispelled by a reference to "security" or "full employment." That the "present generation is preoccupied with the problem of security" may be true; it may also be unfortunate. A little more attention to the classical economic problem of the standard of living might save us from some of the more extreme proposals put forward in the name of security and full employment. This is not, of course, to deny that "to regularize the flow of production and income" must henceforth be one of the primary aims of government. But we are not yet sufficiently rich to be able to ignore the fact that "regular" does not necessarily mean "bigger," and that for Britain at least some forms of attaining "security" and full employment might entail poverty rather than opulence. Nor is it intended to deny that probably the greatest contribution which the United States could make to world economic well-being would be to keep herself free from depressions. It is undoubtedly true that plans for maintaining full employment in a country which is heavily dependent on foreign trade could be seriously upset by external changes, and that there are here grounds for anxiety about Britain's position. This does not, however, abolish her dependence on imports for a high standard of life. It only makes the problem more difficult.

The official estimate is that Britain will have to increase her volume of exports by 75 percent over prewar if she is to get the imports needed to maintain the standard of living and achieve equilibrium in the balance of payments. This, of course, is necessarily a highly provisional estimate, which could be falsified by many factors, the terms of trade among them. "Such an increase is not impossible," writes Sir Henry, "but it will require a different world as well as a different Britain." It is a curious irony that many of those in Britain who most ardently advocate planning of the national economy, who fervently preach the inevitability of "conscious control," at the same time assume that international economic relations are governed by autonomous changes, and that the only realistic policy is to accept the inevitable. It would be unfair to attribute this view to Sir Henry. But he does interpret the commercial policies of the inter-war period as being largely inevitable developments, attempts at adjustment to the changed underlying conditions. Britain, it is true, made an attempt to get back to the pre-1914 world, but was not herself strong enough to reëstablish the old order and

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eventually had to fall into line; her gesture, though heroic, was perhaps ill-advised. This is one view of the history of that epoch; another is that the commercial policies were chiefly makeshift expedients to meet transient difficulties, that they were often maladroit in achieving even their immediate aims and generally disastrous in their long-term effects and in their powers of self-perpetuation and proliferation. If the latter view is the more correct, then the reëstablishment of a freer multilateral system is a wholly legitimate objective.

It is, however, often asserted that Britain is likely to be worse off, and her position more precarious, as a participant in a multilateral system than if she resorts to bilateralism. Sir Henry Clay inclines toward this view — however much bilateral arrangements may be frowned on, "the underlying influence of the dependence of the overseas producer on the British market is not removed" by their elimination. Nor, it can be added, is the dependence of the British standard of living on imports from overseas; it is at least possible that this would prove the more potent factor in an over-all series of bilateral bargains. Without discussing the matter in detail (the weight of evidence seems to be against the benefits of bilateralism), there seems to be here another strange irony, though again Sir Henry Clay's view is more moderate. Apart from the desire to avoid the disturbing influence of external changes on Britain's economy, bilateralism is sought as a means of enabling Britain to export where otherwise she would fail. Although it is partly justified in terms of overcoming restrictions imposed by other countries, there is also a strong bias toward believing that British industry is too weak and inefficient to be able to hold its own in foreign markets without the "support" of trade agreements. Those who are most vociferous in proclaiming the decadence of British industry are also the most vigorous advocates of prosperity and plenty through full employment in semi-autarchy.

II

The recovery of British exports in the first year after the war has been in some ways remarkable. Revival from the low wartime level (in 1943 the volume of exports was 29 percent of 1938) did not start until toward the middle of 1945, and at first proceeded slowly. By the second quarter of 1946, however, the volume was 97.6 percent of prewar, and in July it was 120 per-

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cent. Government policy has, however, put exports in a specially favored position; they have had the best of the reconversion of production from war to peace, leaving the British consumer to make do with anything left over. Moreover, industry is still in the first stage of reconversion; in broad terms, from production of warlike stores to peaceful products within the same industries and factories. The greater part of the more difficult change, the transfer of labor from industries swollen during the war to those which were denuded, has yet to be achieved, though it is in process.

With certain relatively minor exceptions (*e.g.* pottery) the increase in exports has been most marked in metals and chemicals. Thus, in the second quarter of 1946, the volume of exports of non-ferrous metals and their manufactures was 217 percent of the 1938 level, and of electrical goods and apparatus 160 percent. At the other extreme, the volume of exports of cotton goods was 41 percent and of coal only 13 percent of the 1938 level. Sir Henry Clay speaks of British exports as though they must consist almost entirely of coal and cotton; and on this basis some pessimism would be justified. But it was not true even in the inter-war years; in 1938, coal and cotton accounted for 19 percent of British exports by value, as against machinery and electrical goods at 15 percent, and vehicles at 10 percent. The character of the British export trade (and of British industry) was undergoing important changes, and although expansion of the newer exports was inadequate to compensate for the decline in the older staples, much had happened by 1939. The war has in some ways accelerated the readjustment between declining and expanding industries, and the present export figures are in accord with the desired trend.

Ability to export at the present time of intense world demand is not, of course, evidence of long-term competitive strength. This is a matter of the relative efficiency of British industries. Absence of data makes it difficult to assess even the present efficiency of British industry. Forecast of the future is virtually impossible. Nevertheless it is necessary to dispel the widespread misapprehension, which exerts a powerful influence on opinion, that British industry is relatively extremely inefficient. Perhaps a warning should be issued that this kind of self-denigration should not be taken too seriously; so far as Britain's industrial prospects are concerned it has been going on since at least the 1870's. The

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recent burst of criticism is matched in its intensity by the inadequacy of the evidence on which it is based. At a time when the critics were lamenting that British industry consisted of a "chaotic" collection of inefficient firms, industrialists were producing, at short notice, large quantities of some of the finest weapons used in the war, under conditions of almost incredible difficulty, and at costs which appear to compare favorably with those of producers in the United States. This does not, of course, prove that British industry was efficient, but it might at least have made the critics pause. They were, however, misled by certain widely-publicized international comparisons. For example, the Report of the Cotton Textile Mission to the United States, of April 1944, showed that in the production of coarse and medium yarns, output per man-hour in British mills was about 30 to 40 percent less than in American mills. This, however, is a severely limited comparison which by itself means very little; it refers to only one stage of the productive process in two industries organized on entirely different systems. One of the reasons for the difference is, of course, that the American industry uses much more capital equipment per worker; if this is taken into account the disparity of *costs* between the two industries becomes much less marked. A corrective is provided by the report of the Working Party set up by the President of the Board of Trade to investigate the position of the cotton industry.[3] On the data presented, the general conclusion (put forward by the employer-members and the independent members apart from the chairman) that reëquipment at the present time would be speculative, in that total costs under a new scheme would not be appreciably below existing prime costs, seems reasonable.

It is also significant that the other three Working Parties which have so far reported — for pottery, hosiery, and boots and shoes — give much the same result. The report on boots and shoes does, it is true, quote the familiar statistics to show that output per man-hour in British factories is about one-half of that in the United States; yet it makes no attempt to reconcile this with statements such as that "despite production costs which are higher than in Britain, the U.S.A. women's cheap fashion shoe industry. . . ." In general, it finds that there are no "striking

[3] Working parties, consisting of representatives of the employers and of the workers, with independent members, one of whom was chairman, were established for various industries late in 1945 and are now reporting.

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and far-reaching economies that could be made by reorganization." In all these reports there is nothing to suggest the conditions of general inefficiency so glibly depicted by the critics.

Efficiency depends upon a multitude of complex factors, with varying significance over a period of time, and the only real test is one of experience and not speculation — the ability to meet foreign competition. The result in future cannot be forecast with certainty; but at least it is not yet clear that Britain has reached that stage where she should throw away the chance of re-establishing the one system which can provide her again with a high standard of living because she is too weak to participate.

Whatever the final outcome, the next few years will be dominated by the stresses and strains resulting from the war and the change from war to peace. Some of the elements in the present situation will now be examined.

III

The shortage of manpower, and its maldistribution for the needs of peace, are of overriding importance in the immediate situation. During the war, the total numbers employed (including those in the Armed Forces) were increased by about 3,750,000, or 20 percent over 1939. With the end of the war, and consequent cuts in munitions programs, a slackening of the stringent controls over labor, and a weakening of the patriotic motive, the wartime increase soon melted away, and by June 1946 total employment was only 600,000 above June 1939. It is not to be expected that the employed population in the future will be much above that of 1939.

The war, of course, also saw a large-scale diversion of manpower. The Armed Forces and their supply absorbed 10 percent of Britain's manpower in June 1939; at mid-1943 (near the peak of mobilization) they absorbed 46 percent and still had 42 percent by the end of the war. Since then there has been a substantial fall, but, on present plans, this direct war sector will not have reverted to prewar numbers until the end of 1946. Employment in certain essential industries and services (coal mining, agriculture, transport, government) had to be largely maintained, or even increased, and the manpower needs of the Armed Forces and the munitions industries were met in considerable degree by transfer of workers from civilian manufacturing, building, and the various commercial and other services. In all,

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these gave up over 4,000,000 workers, or some 40 percent of their prewar labor force. The result was that by the end of the war there was an enormous pent-up demand for goods (and housing) at a time when the numbers employed in the civilian sector were well below prewar. Employment in manufacturing for the civilian market had almost reached the June 1939 level by mid-1946 (but this, of course, did not mean prewar standards of consumption), while the labor force in building was being fairly rapidly restored (but it will be several years before the wartime arrears of building can be made good).

With the completion of demobilization from the Forces and of the cuts in the munitions programs, about 1,000,000 workers will have been made available for the civilian sector in the second half of 1946. To restore civilian manufacturing, the building industry, and the various services to their prewar numbers would, however, require about 1,500,000 more workers than they had at mid-1946. This allows nothing for a further expansion of exports (which is necessary), of government service (which is possible), of agriculture, or of the public utilities. At best, some sectors will continue to go short.

During the war there was comprehensive direct control over labor, involving the mobilization of virtually the whole population. But this was regarded as an undesirable wartime necessity, and not much of it remains. If a certain distribution of manpower is desired and the use of wartime powers of conscription is not possible, the alternative is to use the wage incentive. This is one of the two aspects (the other will be discussed later) of the demand, recently vociferous, for a "wage policy." It is argued that many of the industries which are most acutely short of manpower have relatively low wage levels and inferior conditions, and that until wages are raised and conditions improved it will be impossible to attract labor to them. Lower wage levels and inferior conditions are not, however, the only difficulties. Some industries (*e.g.* cotton) were declining before the war; as a result they recruited few juveniles and the outbreak of war found them with a labor force above average age, and this was accentuated by the war. An influx of "green" labor would not now solve their problems; they need particular kinds of skill — the young men and women who would have been trained in the past 15 years if there had been no depression and no war.

Moreover, this solution does little to help the general man-

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power shortage. Although higher wages in these industries might attract into industry local pools of unused manpower, the implied assumption behind making some industries relatively more attractive is that labor will be diverted from elsewhere. This remedy, therefore, might fall into the category of an expedient which has to be indefinitely extended, and the effect consequently dispersed, however much the original intention may be to assist a small number of industries of most immediate importance. In any case, an increase in wages in one industry usually provides an incentive to trade unions in other industries to make new demands, and, provided free collective bargaining is to remain, it would seem impossible to isolate one group of industries as suitable for increased wages and leave the rest of industry outside. Effective intervention would, moreover, far transcend the immediate field of wage-fixing. On the one hand, the weakening of collective bargaining would create new problems of industrial relations; on the other, there would presumably be a new government responsibility for the maintenance of the profitability of industry (particularly where prices are already subject to control).

On balance it seems that wage policy designed to bring about a redistribution of manpower would achieve less success and raise more difficulties than its advocates realize. Although some desirable changes might be stimulated with official encouragement, there is no easy solution, and the necessary adjustments will take time to accomplish.

The second aspect of wage policy is in some ways inconsistent with the first; it arises from the desire to prevent inflation. Here it is necessary to go back a little. In March 1941, the government announced its intention of preventing, by means of subsidies, the cost-of-living index from rising more than 30 percent above prewar, and urged moderation on the trade unions in asking for increases in wages (the Ministry of Labor cost-of-living index was then 28 percent and the index of wage rates 20 percent above September 1939). The policy had only limited success. The cost-of-living index was stabilized, but the wage rate index continued to rise, not continuously, but with spurts and periods of quiescence. At the end of the war the cost-of-living index was 32 percent above 1939, the wage rate index 51 percent up, and average weekly earnings had increased by 80 percent. With the reversion to more normal hours of work, and consequent loss of

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earnings, there came demands for increased wage rates; by July 1946, the increase in the cost-of-living index was 32 percent and in the wage rate index 61 percent. Meanwhile, with the inflation of costs, expenditure on subsidies to keep down the cost of living was rising and in February 1946 was at the rate of £370,000,000 a year.

This is not the place to judge the stabilization policy; it may be remarked that financial policy as a whole has at least resulted in a much milder overt inflation in Britain than most other countries have experienced. But the present situation is potentially inflationary; and a stabilization policy which keeps a cost-of-living index stable with increasing subsidies while wages go on rising is the vicious spiral in another form.

To recognize a danger does not, however, give the answer to the problem. Those who shout most loudly for a wage policy are most reticent about what that policy should be; they confine their efforts to stating the obvious danger of inflation. As suggested above, government intervention to control (or "influence") wages — even though an appropriate and effective method could be devised — would raise as many problems as it solved. The present danger is not so great that some risks cannot be taken; the other controls are doing their work, and we are still far from repeating the experience of 1919–20. It is still too near the end of the war to judge how long present conditions will last before the elements of danger begin to be liquidated.

It is also too soon to assess the significance of the industrial unrest of the past year. This has added to Britain's difficulties; but it has received publicity out of all proportion to its intrinsic importance. A great deal of unrest was to be expected; again it has so far been less marked than it was in 1918–1920, though there are differences of form and apparently of motive. If Britain can pass through the transition period with no greater industrial disturbance of this kind than has so far occurred, she can be considered fortunate.

IV

The discussion of manpower has so far been in terms of numbers of workers. This, of course, is only part of the story; it is necessary to consider also the amount of work which those workers do and the productivity of that work.

A striking example can be found in coal mining — partly be-

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cause the various elements are more easily measured than in most other industries. Taking weekly averages, between 1939 and 1945 the total volume of output fell by more than 24 percent. The labor force, however, declined by only 8 percent. The difference is explained by a fall in the hours worked (from 5.15 to 4.73 shifts per week, or 9 percent) and by a fall in average output per manshift of about 13 percent. There were, of course, valid reasons for this — *e.g.* the increasing average age of the workers, wartime strain and privations, shortages of certain supplies — but it remains the essential feature of Britain's coal crisis.

The amount of work can be roughly measured by weekly hours. The war, of course, saw an increase over the whole of industry; in July 1943, average weekly hours for men were 52.9, against 47.7 in October 1938. After July 1943, there appears to have been a decline, and since the end of the war a rapid reversion to prewar hours, or less.

The immediate reaction after the war (and one which was perfectly understandable) was a desire to work less hard. Beyond this, however, has been the organized trade union demand for a 40-hour week (compared with the prewar normal week of 47 or 48 hours) without any loss of weekly earnings. It is impossible to assess how far this demand will be seriously pressed in view of the present situation and the government appeals to people to work harder. It is perhaps significant that in several recently-negotiated agreements the basic week has been fixed below the prewar level. It is hardly to be expected that longer hours of work will compensate for the shortage of numbers.

It is an article of faith (at least in public) of the trade unions that a reduction in hours of work can be made good by increased productivity, so that neither total output need suffer nor costs be increased. To achieve this result, reliance is placed mostly on improved organization, increased mechanization and "new" methods of production. It may well be that, over a period of time, improved industrial technique and more mechanization will give increased productivity. But the proviso "over a period of time" is vital.

The view that a great increase in productivity is possible, without much delay, is largely based on the remarkable achievements of the munitions industries during the war. There is here, however, some confusion of thought; the enormous savings in costs which occur when the manufacture of, say, a particular

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type of aircraft moves from the prototype stage to mass production is not by any means the same thing as increased productivity of output as a whole. Yet it is this kind of change which is often used to demonstrate the potentialities of industry. Nevertheless, the war did provide a stimulus to new methods of production, and opened up new possibilities in the economy of resources. It is not to be expected, however, that this experience, which was largely concentrated in the engineering industries, can be applied quickly to industry generally.

At present three other legacies of the war almost certainly outweigh any benefits from increased knowledge of organization and technique. The first is that workers are on the average less efficient than they were before the war. Those who remained in industry are tired after six years of exceptional effort under difficult conditions. Many who have been in the Forces have lost some of their skill, and will need time to regain it.

Secondly, there is a shortage of factory capacity arising from the curtailment of building and losses from air raids. While it would be untrue to say that lack of factory capacity has been a general bottleneck, it has almost certainly limited the speed of reconversion and placed obstacles in the way of making the best of the other resources which are available.

Thirdly, there is deterioration of capital equipment resulting from the deliberate wartime policy of deferring all but the most vital repairs and maintenance. It is officially estimated that industrial disinvestment (excluding war damage) from 1940 to 1944 amounted to £885,000,000, perhaps one-tenth of the industrial equipment of the country. It is hardly surprising that many industrialists are anxious to undertake some reëquipment. The main limiting factor is found in the industries which have to produce the equipment, where the capacity is far below the needs, and the gap cannot be filled by imports. In so far as "new methods" and "improved organization" depend upon increased mechanization, therefore, it will be some time before any substantial benefits can be derived from their application.

It remains to be seen how great those benefits will be over the system as a whole. Substitution of capital for labor may be desirable simply because the latter has become relatively scarce and more costly. This is one part of the present situation in Britain. In addition to the technical developments offering possibilities of economy, but which could not be exploited during the

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war, there is also the manpower shortage, with a big rise in wage rates and a continuing upward pressure. It is undoubted that much of the demand for reëquipment arises for this second reason, and although it would be an exaggeration to regard the condition as one in which industry must run as fast as it can in order to stay in the same place, it would be equally false to believe that reëquipment will yield sweeping over-all economies.

Finally, compared with 1939, both in the building and engineering industries (and, of course, in certain other industries) a larger labor force, with its associated equipment, must be held back from producing houses and consumption goods if, within the next few years, the capital losses of war are to be made good and then a higher degree of mechanization reached. This is another additional call on Britain's limited resources. The benefit to the standard of living to be derived from increased productivity belongs therefore to tomorrow and not to today.

V

With the major exception of coal, in the long run the availability of raw materials is largely a question of imports, and therefore another facet of our main problem. During the war, the most rigid economies, together with substitution of less scarce for more scarce materials, were enforced by shortage of shipping and lack of supplies in non-enemy countries. Now the situation in shipping is much easier, world supplies of most materials are becoming more adequate, and the limiting factor is the need to restrict imports on grounds of the balance of payments. The situation is therefore easier — the limits are less absolute — and it would be misleading to regard shortage of materials as an important bottleneck. With some exceptions, materials can be provided where the manpower is available to use them. Shortages at a stage of production higher than the basic materials (*e.g.* foundry products, building materials) are the result of lack of manpower and not of basic materials.

There is, however, one general aspect which may be of some importance. The use of materials is still subject to fairly comprehensive controls, and however well these may be administered, there is an inherent danger that they cannot be sufficiently flexible to allow the most rapid and most efficient adjustment of industry. Thus, for example, allocation to producers on the basis of some past period is not always the best possible guide to pres-

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ent need or potentiality. Though adjustments can be made, it does not follow that they always are, and in any case they take time. This is not to say that control should now be abandoned; but it should be recognized that it has its disadvantages.

Shortage of coal continues to be a leading issue. This is partly because it bears hardly on the domestic consumer; but forecasts for the later months of 1946 suggest that it may also result in stoppage of factories more widespread than any which has so far occurred. Moreover, there has been a considerable rise in price, with bigger increases in wages (which comprise the major item in costs) than in other industries. While the immediate position is indeed serious, the long-run importance of this matter is often exaggerated. Though the cost of coal will no doubt continue to be a significant item for certain parts of the economy, the days of Britain's dependence on cheap coal as a source of power have been over for some time. Moreover, costs have risen in other countries, and it is highly improbable that the coal situation will be more than a minor factor in competitive strength. And with new possibilities on the horizon the danger is not that the nationalized industry will exploit the consumer by higher prices, but that too much (subsidized) investment will be put into the industry in an endeavour to make it more "efficient."

VI

Economic prophecy is always hazardous. Even in times of apparently steady development, the exact situation at a given time ahead cannot be forecast with any degree of certainty. In times of major upheaval, any attempt at close forecasting is futile. We need to be content with dissection of the various elements in the existing situation; although this can provide some guide to future possibilities and therefore has its bearing on economic policy, it does not attempt to predict what the final outcome will be.

Our review of the present situation in Britain may seem to have dwelt almost entirely on the various difficulties in the way of recovery of the economy to the point of providing unaided a high standard of living comparable to that of 1939. This has been deliberate; a period of readjustment is a period of difficulties, and they cannot be ignored. But this should not obscure the extent to which readjustment has successfully occurred. In spite of all the difficulties, the recovery of exports is proceeding. Internally,

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though the general manpower shortage is a major factor and specific shortages still delay full recovery, in little over a year the major part of the resorting of six years of distortion has been achieved. This is more rapid, and has been less painful, than the comparable process after 1918, when there was the added assistance of inflation.

Moreover, the past year has seen a noticeable lessening of many difficulties. It is too soon to say whether this improvement will continue; perhaps in the first stages it was more or less inevitable. If the experience of 1918 is any guide, then some of the concomitants of a period of intense unsettlement (*e.g.* industrial unrest) have so far barely shown themselves; it does not, of course, follow that the former experience must be repeated. There is, moreover, the new factor of the loan from the United States, which will provide great assistance in meeting some of the more immediate difficulties. At least it is too soon to decide that Britain will *not* be able to make those "internal and external adjustments . . . adequate to restore equilibrium" within the transition period of three to five years.

Finally, to return to where we started, Britain's competitive strength in export markets depends on her *relative* position. Other countries have their troubles and difficulties of adjustment; so far as it is possible for an observer in Britain to judge, the strains to which she is subject are at least not appreciably greater than those elsewhere.

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THE STRAITS: CRUX OF WORLD POLITICS

By Ahmed Sükrü Esmer

THE "question of the Straits" has been the basis of Turkey's relations with the Powers for almost two centuries. The Ottoman Empire, founded in Anatolia in the fourteenth century, was carried into Europe by Suleiman, the son of the second Sultan. The point which Suleiman chose for crossing into Europe was the Dardanelles, the narrow strait about 40 miles long and between one-and-a-half and four miles wide which runs from the Sea of Marmora to the Aegean. Both banks of the Dardanelles have been in Turkish hands ever since. Having established themselves on European soil, the Turks took Adrianople and moved their capital there in 1367. Istanbul still continued for a century to be the capital of the rapidly declining Byzantine Empire; and through this period its conquest was the foremost aim of the Sultans. They realized their ambition in 1453, thus securing control of the Bosphorus, the strait 21 miles long and between half and one-and-a-half miles wide running from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora.

In this manner the whole length of the waterway from the Black Sea to the Aegean came into Turkish hands. By the further conquest of the Crimea, on the northern shore of the Black Sea, the Turks a few years later made that sea into a Turkish lake, and it continued as such until the signing of the Treaty of Kainarji in 1774.

During these three centuries, from 1475 to 1774, the problem of the Straits did not exist and the Ottoman Empire established the rule of excluding all foreign ships from the "virgin waters" of the Black Sea.

It was not until Catherine II of Russia conquered and definitely took over the northern shores of the Black Sea that the Turkish monopoly of trade in that region was broken. This came about because the Ottoman Empire joined Poland in a war on Russia and suffered a crushing defeat. The Treaty of Kainarji, mentioned above, which put an end to that war, forced Turkey to recognize the independence of the Crimea. Actually, however, the Crimea became a Russian protectorate and was annexed by Catherine within a few years. Russia thereby established herself

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as a major Black Sea Power. By Article XI, the Black Sea not only was opened to trade, but Russia obtained the right of free passage through the Straits for her merchant shipping.

The date 1774 thus really marks the beginning of the "question of the Straits." Since then the Straits have been open to commercial ships, with restrictions in effect only when Turkey is herself at war.

But Catherine's ambitions were of a political as well as a trade nature. She wanted to conquer Istanbul, and with this in view she allied herself with Austria and started war against the Ottoman Empire.[1] While this war was going on, the French Revolution broke out and Austria withdrew. Catherine continued the struggle, however. England now entered the scene as a new and powerful factor. Since the Treaty of Kainarji, she had been watching the development of Russian designs on Turkey with deep anxiety, and when the Russo-Turkish war took a very unfavorable turn for the Ottoman Empire, Prime Minister Pitt intervened and prevailed upon Catherine to sign the Treaty of Jassy (1792), thus preventing the dismemberment of Turkey. England's interest in the question of the Straits dates from then.

After the Treaty of Jassy, other Powers were granted the privilege of passage through the Straits. But it was not until Napoleon's rise, and especially his expedition into Egypt in 1798, that there was any question as to the passage of warships. When Napoleon attacked Egypt, Turkey appealed to the Tsar and a Russian fleet entered the Bosphorus. England joined the alliance. Later English and Russian fleets continued to pass in and out of the Straits without regard for treaty stipulations. Then Russia, taking advantage of the situation, began to invade Turkey; and when the Ottoman Empire closed the Bosphorus to Russian ships and declared war on Russia, England, as an ally of Russia, sent her fleet up the Dardanelles and anchored before Istanbul. A few months later the situation was completely changed when Alexander signed the Treaty of Tilsit (July 1807) with Napoleon. This broke the Russian alliance with England and promised the French Emperor the Tsar's collaboration.

England thereupon signed with Turkey the Peace of the Dardanelles, a document having an important bearing on the subject of this article, since it mentions for the first time the closing

[1] *Cf.* "Turkey at the Straits," by James T. Shotwell and Francis Deák. New York: Macmillan, 1940.

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of the Straits as being an ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire.

In the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire began to decline rapidly. The ideals of nationality spread among the Sultan's subject races. When the Greeks revolted in 1821, Russia intervened to help them and Ottoman arms sustained a crushing defeat. By the Treaty of Adrianople (1829), Turkey not only recognized the independence of Greece but gave freedom to Russian commercial ships in all Turkish waters. Russian ships passing through the Straits were not to be searched. But although the language of this treaty was harsh, the terms in this respect nevertheless remained the same: that is to say, the Straits were to be open only to merchant ships. The question of opening the Straits to Russian warships did not come up until the development of a second crisis, which in a sense was another phase of the Greek War of Independence.

Mohamed Ali, Governor of Egypt, feeling that his services in the attempt to suppress the Greek revolt had not been remunerated, revolted against the Sultan and invaded Syria and Anatolia. His intention appeared to be to march on Istanbul, depose the Ottoman dynasty and proclaim himself Khalif and Sultan. Russia offered the Sultan help, and he reluctantly accepted it. A Russian force was landed at Unkiar Skelessi, near Beykoz, on the Asia Minor banks of the Bosphorus. The differences between Mohamed Ali and the Sultan were settled through the intervention of Great Britain and France, who were alarmed at seeing the Sultan throw himself into the arms of the Tsar. But Russia did not withdraw her troops from the Bosphorus before signing the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (1833), which opened a new phase in the question of the Straits. Unkiar Skelessi was a treaty of mutual assistance in which the Tsar and the Sultan promised to help each other in case of need. But there was a secret article which provided that instead of the help which the Sultan was to afford, he should open the Straits to Russian warships while keeping them closed to warships of other Powers.

The Treaty of Kainarji had opened the Straits to commercial ships; now, to suit the demands of the Tsar, the Sultan was abandoning his "ancient rule" of keeping the Straits closed to all warships. The reaction both in England and in France was so strong that the Tsar realized he could not maintain the provision, and a second revolt of Mohamed Ali provided the opportunity to change it. After the revolt had been crushed with the help of

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Great Britain, a Conference was held in London (1841) where the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was abrogated. The Straits were proclaimed as closed once more to foreign warships of all nations.

The important significance of this convention regarding the Straits was to translate what up to now had been "an ancient rule of the Sultan" into an international concern. During the ensuing century the question of the Straits has come up many times and several new conventions have been signed. However, the fundamental rule laid down in 1841 has remained the same.

No sooner was the Treaty of 1841 signed than Russia began to plan the partition of Turkey. These intrigues led to the Crimean War, in which Great Britain and France were involved as allies of the Ottoman Empire. After Russia's defeat, peace was signed in Paris in 1856. The significant stipulation of this treaty from the point of view of the Straits is that the Black Sea was neutralized, while its waters and its ports were thrown open to the mercantile marine of every nation. The Black Sea was "perpetually interdicted to the Flag of War, either of Powers possessing its coasts, or of any other Power."

This evidently was a provision which could not be maintained against Russia for very long. It continued, however, until the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Then Russia, taking advantage of the opportunity the war afforded, issued a note denouncing the provision. Great Britain protested that this unilateral denunciation could not change the situation, but in the end she consented to discuss the question in an international conference. This conference, held in London in 1871, abrogated the provisions of the 1856 treaty neutralizing the Black Sea; but it maintained the principle of the Treaty of 1841 with regard to closing the Straits to the passage of foreign warships — with the proviso, however, that the Sultan could open the Straits in times of peace to war vessels of friendly powers.

The principles with regard to the régime of the Straits remained unchanged thereafter until the First World War. Russia's several attempts to alter them in her favor met with no success.

II

Some months after the beginning of the First World War, Turkey joined the Central Powers. Russia thereupon proposed to her allies, Britain and France, a "radical solution" which would fulfil the age-long Russian ambition to control the Straits. In a

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note to her hard-pressed allies, she claimed the outright annexation of Istanbul, both banks of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, the two islands of Imbros and Tenedos at the western entrance, and Thrace up to the Enos-Midia Line. They reluctantly conceded the Russian claims in March 1915. These claims lapsed, however, through Russia's desertion of the Allies towards the end of the war. The Bolsheviks who seized power in 1917 proclaimed themselves in favor of peace without annexations, and renounced all claim to Istanbul and the Straits, which, they said, should remain under Turkish sovereignty.

During the peace negotiations Turkey and Russia, both of them outcasts from the European system, found themselves collaborating. Bolshevik Russia had been attacked on all sides; Turkey, under Mustafa Kemal, was waging a war of independence. The régime set up by the Treaty of Sèvres, opening the Straits to merchant vessels and warships both in war and in peace, was never ratified by Turkey. Instead, the new Ankara Government entered into an agreement with the Russians in 1921 not to recognize any arrangement with regard to the Straits which did not recognize Turkey's sovereignty and safeguard the security of the Powers bordering on the Black Sea.

Because of this understanding Turkey insisted on the participation of Russia in the negotiations at Lausanne looking to the settlement of the Straits question. At Lausanne, both Russia and Britain took opposite views from those which they had held historically. Russia now insisted on closing the Straits to warships of all Powers, in peace and in war; while Britain insisted on full freedom of passage on a basis of equality for all Powers, whether or not non-riparian to the Black Sea. A final agreement compromising the two points was signed in Lausanne on July 24, 1923. It laid down the principle of the freedom of passage, thus completely changing the provisions of the Treaty of 1841 which had given international sanction to the "ancient rule" of the Porte to keep the Straits closed to warships of foreign powers. Provisions were accepted to safeguard the security of the Black Sea Powers.

The rules laid down at Lausanne with regard to the passage of merchant vessels and warships may be summarized as follows:

1. *Merchant Vessels.* Turkey being neutral, complete freedom of navigation in time of peace and in time of war. Turkey being belligerent, freedom of navigation for neutral vessels and non-

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military aircraft, if these do not assist the enemy, *e.g.* by carrying contraband, troops to enemy nations.

2. *Warships.* (*a*) *In time of peace.* Freedom of passage, with the provision that no Power might send into the Black Sea a force larger than that of the most powerful fleet maintained in that sea by a littoral state. But the Powers reserved to themselves the right to send into the Black Sea at all times and under all circumstances a force of not more than three ships, of which no individual ship should exceed 10,000 tons. (*b*) *In time of war, Turkey being neutral.* The same rules and limitations applied with regard to neutral ships. (*c*) *In time of war, Turkey being belligerent.* Freedom of passage of neutral ships only, under the same rules and limitations.

To ensure execution of the above provisions, the Convention provided for the demilitarization of both banks of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, the islands in the Sea of Marmora and the Greek and Turkish islands commanding the entrance to the Straits. An International Straits Commission was set up to supervise the freedom of passage and ensure proper application of the other provisions of the Convention.

Russia was not pleased with this result, and refused to ratify the treaty embodying the Convention. As for Turkey, so long as the collective security system of the League of Nations promised any hope of being successful, she did not raise the question of the remilitarization of the Straits. But the League began to weaken and the international situation as a whole deteriorated. Italy attacked Abyssinia, and Germany remilitarized the Rhine by unilateral action. In these circumstances the Turkish Government felt in a position to raise the question of the remilitarization of the Straits. Her action was received with approval and a conference was held at Montreux beginning June 22, 1936.

At Montreux, Turkey was in the difficult position of reconciling the views of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea Powers with her own interests and strategic considerations. The results of the Montreux Conference were as follows:

The demilitarization clauses of the Lausanne Convention were abrogated.

Freedom of passage for merchant vessels was maintained, but the right of transit of other than Black Sea Powers was further limited to a maximum aggregate tonnage of 30,000.

All transit of warships was to be preceded by a notification to

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the Turkish Government (Art. 13). Non-Black Sea Powers could send an aggregate of only 15,000 tons at one time into the Black Sea (Art. 14).

In time of war, Turkey being neutral, "vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not, however, pass through the Straits" except in the execution of obligations under the League Covenant and "in cases of assistance rendered to a state victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey," concluded within the framework of the League (Art. 19).

In time of war, Turkey being a belligerent or considering herself threatened by imminent danger of war, the passage of warships was to be left to the discretion of the Turkish Government (Arts. 20 and 21).

Under Article 24, the functions of the International Straits Commission reverted to Turkey.

The result, although favorable to Russia, did not please the Soviet Government, and the friendship between the Soviet Union and Turkey began to cool. The Soviet press complained that Turkey was yielding to the pressure of the "imperialistic" Powers.

Differences between the democracies and the authoritarian Powers meanwhile deepened. Turkey, desiring peace, went with the democracies. After the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, the relations of the democracies with the Axis Powers became still more strained. Great Britain began constituting a "peace front," in which, after consulting Russia, Turkey decided to join. Russia had held out hope that she would join herself. Consequently, in May 1939 Great Britain and Turkey issued a joint declaration and ultimately the two nations signed a treaty of alliance. The declaration was endorsed by an article in the Moscow paper *Izvestia*. The situation completely changed in August, however, when Russia, instead of joining the peace front, signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Germany. The same Russian papers now began criticizing Turkey for having joined Great Britain and France. Molotov even went so far as to say that Turkey would some day repent this action.

Up till then, Turkey had been negotiating with the western Allies to form a barrier against aggression, in which Russia was slated to hold a key position. Despite Russia's treaty with Germany, she continued to discuss with Turkey a pact of non-aggression to stabilize the Black Sea balance. Indeed, Saracoglu,

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the Turkish Foreign Minister, went to Moscow in September 1939 in the belief that such a pact would be concluded. He was astonished to find there, however, that the Russians demanded as the price of the pact a unilateral reversal of the Montreux stipulations. Saracoglu flatly refused to discuss such a suggestion, which meant not only the unilateral violation of a freely-negotiated instrument, but the reversal of the policy on which Turkey and Russia had agreed three years before. The Turkish Foreign Minister left Moscow; and the Tripartite Treaty with Great Britain and France — still containing an "escape clause" to save Turkey from the obligation of conflict with Russia — was signed in Ankara.

Relations with the Soviets continued correct but cool in the period between the signing of the Tripartite Treaty and the Nazi attack on Russia on June 22, 1941. At the time of Stalingrad, the Russian press began to express dislike of Turkish policy during the war, and its criticisms became more pronounced as the prospects of victory for the Allies became brighter. Finally, the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, which had bound the two countries for twenty years, was denounced by Russia in March 1945. Turkey now became an object of slander and adverse propaganda, and the Soviet press began laying claim to the eastern provinces of Turkey and asking for bases on the Straits.

In denouncing the treaty, Russia gave the excuse that conditions had changed radically and that a new treaty more in conformity with the altered situation ought to be negotiated. When the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow inquired what changes might be required he was told bluntly that Russia wanted to alter the régime of the Straits so as to secure "effective guarantees," and also to annex the eastern provinces of Turkey. The claims with regard to the Straits, however, were not put on paper until August 7, 1946.

III

Meanwhile, when the three Great Powers met in Potsdam in the summer of 1945 Russia raised the question of revising the Straits Convention. It was agreed that the three Powers should get in contact with the Turkish Government — an important decision, since it formally recognized the interest of the United States in the revision of the Convention.

In a note to the Turkish Government in November 1945, the

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United States suggested that action proceed on the basis of the following principles:

1. The Straits should be open to merchantmen of all nations in time of peace or war.

2. The Straits should in all circumstances be open to war vessels of the Black Sea Powers.

3. Passage through the Straits should be forbidden to war vessels belonging to other Powers, except with the consent of the Black Sea Powers or in the execution of a mission under the authority of the United Nations.

4. Certain changes should be introduced to bring the new Convention up to date, such as substituting the "United Nations Organization" for the "League of Nations," and eliminating Japan from among the signatory Powers.

The Turkish Government promptly answered that this suggested solution could be accepted as a basis for discussion, with certain conditions and reservations. There the matter rested until Russia presented her counter-proposition on August 7, 1946.

The Russian demand for the revision of the Montreux Convention was based on the claim that Turkey had not properly applied the provisions of that Convention with regard to Axis warships during the war. Four instances of Turkish neglect were alleged: (1) That Turkey on July 9, 1941, allowed a German craft named *Seefalke* to pass through the Straits to the Black Sea. (2) That in August 1941 an Italian "auxiliary ship" named *Tarvisio* passed through into the Black Sea. (3) That on November 4, 1942, the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara warned the Turkish Government that 140,000 tons of German shipping (auxiliary warships disguised as merchant ships) were about to pass through the Straits. (4) That in June 1944 the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara protested the passage, in May and June of that year, of eight ships of the "Ems" type and of five ships of the "Kriegs transport" type, from the Black Sea — where they had been used for military purposes — into the Aegean Sea.

The Russian note also put forward the following proposals:

1. The Straits should be open to merchantmen of all nations in time of peace or war.

2. The Straits should be open in all circumstances to war vessels of the Black Sea Powers.

3. Except in special cases, the passage of war vessels belonging to non-Black Sea Powers should be forbidden.

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4. The power to formulate the régime of the Straits should be left to Turkey and the Black Sea Powers.

5. The Straits should be defended by the "common means" of Turkey and the Soviet Union.

The Turkish Government in a note of August 22, 1946, categorically denied the Russian allegation that Turkey had allowed the Axis Powers to use the Straits against the Allies, or that the passage of a few small ships was contrary to the provisions of the Montreux Convention. These ships, being of less than 100 tons, were not covered by the Annex, and anyway were not warships but vessels of commerce.

It seems that the *Seefalke*, a 37-ton motorboat, unarmed, appeared at the Straits on July 6, 1941, and asked permission to go through to Constanza. As she did not come under the description of a warship as defined by Annex II of the Convention, she was allowed to pass. The *Tarvisio*, an Italian ship, unarmed, was allowed to pass in June 1941; but when it was discovered that she had once been registered as an auxiliary warship, and subsequently deleted from the list, she was refused permission to pass a second time when she appeared at the Dardanelles on August 9, 1941. On August 25, 1941, the Soviet Government expressed its thanks for the decisions taken with regard to the *Tarvisio*.

The Soviet warning in October 1942 to the effect that 140,000 tons of German shipping intended for use in the prosecution of the war were to pass through the Straits never had any sequel. In fact, no German commercial vessels passed through the Straits during November and December of that year; and the aggregate of German commercial shipping which passed through the Straits from January 1943 to January 1944 amounted to only 19,476 tons.

With regard to the passage of "Ems" and "Kriegs transport" types of ships, these did not come under the description of warships as defined in Annex II of the Convention. They belonged to private German shipping companies and carried coal and timber. But when the British Government, on very reliable information, drew the attention of the Turkish Government to the fact that some of these ships had been used as auxiliary vessels and for transporting troops, the Turkish Government immediately prohibited their passage.

After answering these Russian allegations in detail, the Turkish note proceeded to examine the five points proposed for a new

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régime for the Straits. It accepted the first three points as a basis for discussion, these being, in fact, similar to the first three points in the American note.

The Turkish note, however, refused the fourth and fifth points. It pointed out that the Montreux Conference is valid until 1956 and that it had been negotiated and signed by the Black Sea as well as the non-Black Sea Powers. To exclude the non-riparian Powers from the negotiations for its amendment would upset the broad basis and general harmony of the régime. The interests of the non-riparian Powers could not be overlooked. As for the proposition that there be a common defense of the Straits, this obviously was unacceptable, since it would limit Turkish sovereignty on the Straits and, on the pretext of giving further security to the Black Sea Powers, would upset the balance of the whole security scheme.

After a month of study, the Soviet Government answered in a second note delivered September 24, 1946. It reiterates the same allegations with regard to Turkey's application of the Montreux Convention during the war, expressed satisfaction at the acceptance of the first three points "in principle," and insists on the next two points. It explains at length why the régime of the Straits should be set up by negotiations between the Black Sea Powers and Turkey alone, pointing out the paramount interests of these Powers and insisting on the exclusion of outsiders. There is an expression of resentment that Turkey refused the fifth point, regarding the common defense of the Straits, before even inquiring as to the meaning of this proposition, and an insistence that only by "bringing together the common means" can the Straits be adequately defended.

The Soviet note does not refuse the idea of an international conference on the Straits, but suggests that the question be discussed as "widely as possible" between Turkey and the Soviet Union before the conference is held. Here, as these lines are written, the matter rests.

IV

To comprehend "the question of the Straits" one must remember that it has two phases: commercial and strategic. The first presents no difficulty. In fact, there is no difference of opinion on this point between Turkey and either the riparian or non-riparian Powers. The Straits should be kept open to ships of com-

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merce without any restriction, in time of peace or in time of war. This has always been the accepted rule for the régime of the Straits.

In considering the much more complicated strategic phase, one must keep in mind that since the development of modern implements of warfare the zone of the Straits has become much enlarged and now extends as far as the island of Crete in the Aegean Sea. By occupying Crete and the Aegean islands Germany effectively closed the Straits to the passage of Allied ships during the recent war. This probably explains Russia's deep interest in Greece.

The Straits present a triangular question, in which the strategic exigencies of the Black Sea Powers, of the other Powers and of Turkey must all be met. The Montreux Convention provided a balance between these three sets of interests, in so far as that was possible in 1936; and it still seems the arrangement best suited to the requirements of today. Any upset in this balance would involve the Powers in a war.

Under the Montreux Convention, the Straits are open to warships of Black Sea Powers in time of peace, but not to warships of non-riparian Powers. This adequately safeguards the security of the Black Sea Powers, since the aggregate tonnage of other Powers allowed to pass through the Straits into the Black Sea is lower than that of the riparian Powers.

In case of war, the passage of warships of belligerent Powers is prohibited while Turkey is neutral. Only by this provision can Turkey protect herself from being involved in the war, because to allow passage through the Straits to the warships of both riparian and non-riparian Powers would inevitably result in the Straits becoming the field of active operation. To allow passage only to the Black Sea Powers, and to deny this right to non-riparian Powers, would mean that the ships of Black Sea Powers, passing through the Straits, could engage an enemy fleet and then retire into the Dardanelles, soliciting the protection of neutral Turkey against pursuit by their enemies. Here again Turkey would be involved in a war.

In any case, so long as Turkey is neutral and guards the entrance into the Black Sea, the riparian Powers are adequately protected, as the Second World War showed. The passage of warships of riparian Powers in that case would not be for defensive but for offensive purposes.

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Despite Russia's complaint, the fact remains that the Montreux régime helped Russia during this last war, for it prevented the Italian fleet from entering the Black Sea. If it had been allowed to do so, the Axis Powers would have gained control of the Black Sea and greatly facilitated their task in the east.

The Russian demand for a "common defense of the Straits" is generally interpreted to mean the establishment of Russian bases on the Straits. That would be the equivalent of handing the Straits over to the Russians. The European part of Turkey would be separated from Anatolia and the country's own sea communications would be severed. If one bears in mind that Turkey is a peninsular Power, depending on sea routes for her domestic communications, one can realize what this would mean. In case of war, she would be deprived of the use of either the Black Sea or the Mediterranean, depending on whether her enemy was in the north or in the Mediterranean. She would be reduced to the position of a Russian satellite.

Furthermore, the Russian scheme would completely upset the balance between the great land power in the north and the great sea power in the south. For it must be remembered that if the Straits can be a bulwark of defense, they can also be a strong base for offense. With Russia on the Straits, Eastern Mediterranean Powers would be at her mercy. If Russia is herself anxious for her own safety against dangers threatening from the Mediterranean, the Mediterranean Powers must likewise be equally anxious for their own safety against dangers threatening from the Black Sea. The Montreux régime provides this safety to both. In principle, therefore, it is an ideal system, safeguarding the interests and strategic exigencies of all three parties: the riparian Powers, the non-riparian Powers, and Turkey. It is the best system that can be devised for safeguarding peace in this part of the world.

The experience of the last ten years has shown that some details of the Convention which set up such an admirable system may require modification. This should be the task of the coming conference. But no attempt should be made to change the essential structure of an edifice which has stood the test of the greatest crisis in the world's history.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE IN TRANSITION

By William P. Maddox

SOMEWHERE along the road between Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima a fundamental schism in the American outlook on foreign affairs disappeared. The reference is not to the division of opinion which developed over, for example, a policy of "aid-to-Britain" versus one of "traditional neutrality," but to a difference in temper and judgment much deeper and not always in correspondence with the cleavage over a particular issue. The true "isolationist" was not necessarily identifiable in a debate on policy, because frequently he found himself (as did the so-called "internationalist") allied with a strange assortment of men whose motivations he detested. His essential characteristic was a conviction — sometimes sophisticated, usually naïve — that forces and events in other parts of the world were not, or need not be, of vital concern to the American national interest. Coupled with this was a faith that, come what may, the United States would through its own might and wisdom be able to direct its high destiny independently of the fate of the outside world.

The impact of events has so shattered this type of outlook that it no longer finds expression in any significant political grouping. Divisions in opinion have, it is true, developed as to whether this is or can or should be one world or two, but in the last Congress only a few scattered voices faintly sought to echo the isolationist pleas of yesteryear, and many of these were subsequently extinguished in the primaries or in the elections. In striking contrast to the political generation of 1919 and 1920, the overwhelming majorities of *both* parties stand together in the conviction that the welfare and security of the United States demand today an energetic and positive participation in world affairs, and an unshakable policy directed towards the achievement of world peace and justice through international coöperative action. Differences over this or that foreign issue may develop, even spiritedly, but if the temper of American political opinion over the past 18 months gives any clue to the future, they will manifest themselves on a common plane which assumes that — in the words of a President a generation ago —"we are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world."

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This public awareness of America's world-wide concerns has already produced its chain of repercussions on the principal governmental instruments charged with the conduct of our foreign relations, *viz.* the Department of State and the Foreign Service of the United States.[1] It was inevitable that a greater appreciation of the need for an active assertion of America's rôle in world affairs would result in an expansion in the functions which these agencies were called upon to perform. Commensurate with the new responsibilities which the Department of State must assume in Washington, the Foreign Service now faces tasks abroad more exacting, vast and various than any it has performed before. It constitutes the front line of America's world-wide peace organization, yet it is not equipped in human resources to hold this line effectively under the pressure of enlarged responsibilities. The first major step in expanding, strengthening and developing the Foreign Service was taken last summer when Congress passed the Foreign Service Act of 1946. It received the President's approval on August 13, and, in accordance with its provisions, came into force three months later, although a number of its provisions must depend on liberal and sustained appropriations to ensure that the intentions of Congress are properly executed. This was the most important legislative reform of the Foreign Service since the original Rogers Act of 1924. It is significant to note that while five postwar years elapsed before the passage of the Rogers Act, Congress and public opinion responded to the peacetime needs of the Foreign Service after the Second World War in less than one year. This is indicative of the greater swiftness with which the implications of America's new world position issuing from the second great war have been publicly perceived.

A picture of the Foreign Service in the 1930's would bear little resemblance, in dimensions or in scope of functions, to that of today, and still less to the Service projected for tomorrow. When Selden Chapin, the first Director General of the Foreign Service under the new Act, served as third secretary in Quito, Ecuador, in 1934, his only associates were the Minister and two clerks, and even this small staff sometimes found time hanging heavily on

[1] The distinction between these two organizations is not always clearly understood. The Department of State directs and controls our foreign relations in, or from, Washington. The Foreign Service (as its name implies) serves abroad. Primarily, it is the foreign instrument of the Department but it performs functions for other government agencies as well. The Foreign Service retains a legal and administrative status separate from the Department, even when its personnel serve therein for temporary assignments.

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their hands. As of July 1, 1946, the Mission at Quito consisted of the Ambassador, a counselor of Embassy, 10 officers, and some 30 clerks, in addition to the staffs of the military and naval attachés. Practically every American diplomatic and consular establishment in the world would reveal a corresponding expansion. In 1939, the entire Service consisted of some 800 career officers, 2,000 clerks, and 1,250 miscellaneous employees — a total of 4,000. As of today, the over-all strength is about 11,000 made up as follows: 58 Ambassadors and Ministers, 980 Foreign Service Officers, 3,800 other American officers and employees, and 6,200 aliens. Careful surveys conducted during the past year by the Division of Foreign Service Planning indicate that the Service is still badly hampered in the performance of its enlarged functions by staff shortages, in some cases critical. The Planning Division has estimated that satisfactory efficiency in 1948 could be obtained only if authorization is provided for a Service of over 16,000, of whom 1,400 would be career Foreign Service Officers, 600 Reserve Officers, 5,300 staff officers and employees, and some 9,000 alien employees (chiefly maintenance personnel and minor clerks).

The increase in officer personnel during the war was principally due to the appointment of temporary officers known as Foreign Service Auxiliaries, many of whom rendered distinguished wartime service, and who as a group made good a critical personnel deficiency arising from the suspended recruitment programs of regular Foreign Service Officers. As of this writing, the auxiliary service, which was intended only as a war-term emergency, is being disbanded, but selected individuals are being retained in other capacities. The necessity of recruiting large numbers of inexperienced personnel to supply emergency requirements during the war illustrates a certain lack of foresight in administration, and was one of the factors which led to the adoption in the new Act of the Reserve Officer class. A contributing circumstance to the personnel shortage in the early years of the war was the decision, now believed by many to have been unwise, to suspend the examinations for the career Foreign Service on the grounds that the military and naval services should have first claim on all good men.

As is generally known, the career Foreign Service Officer has been selected by a competitive examination system since 1924. Ambassadors and Ministers are, of course, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,

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without examinations. Until 1942, from 20 to 40 new officers were admitted annually, with the exception of three years in the early thirties when recruitment was suspended due to insufficiency of funds. Thousands of young men and women became familiar with the pattern of these examinations during the prewar years. They consisted of four general examinations designed to test the general intelligence and fund of knowledge of the candidate, a language examination, and three special examinations in law, history, economics and government.[2] Upon receiving a passing grade of 70, the candidate appeared personally before an examining board at the State Department for a half-hour or more, and if he survived this test was then admitted into the Service. Whether the examination process is well designed to attract and to select men of the high quality needed today is open to debate, but it should be noted that the Board of Examiners is undertaking an exhaustive inquiry to determine whether its methods are adequately devised to obtain the results desired today.

The spirit of the Foreign Service in 1947 is one of change to meet a new situation and new obligations in a changed world. A certain complacency and stodginess of which some in the Service were not entirely devoid were given a rude shock two years ago when, on an open invitation from the editors, the *Foreign Service Journal* began to receive, and to print, letters of searching self-criticism from Service officers. Out of this healthy ferment eventually developed some of the most constructive provisions of the 1946 Act. Outworn habits of administration, which groaned and creaked and nearly collapsed under the wartime and postwar inundation of hordes of new personnel and pressures of work, are being progressively overhauled in an effort to adapt the machine to the fast-moving requirements of the new enlarged Service. The composition of Service personnel is undergoing radical change. Over 300 new junior officers, mostly war veterans, are being commissioned in 1946 and 1947. In addition, authorization was given by the Manpower Act of 1946 to admit into the Foreign Service at higher classifications 250 war-service men over 31 years old. Budgetary appropriations will permit the appointment of 120 of these men this fiscal year. As a result, the Foreign Service Officer (projected) Corps of 1,400 in 1948 will be composed of 40

[2] It should be added that when the examinations were resumed in 1945 and 1946 for ex-service men, the special subjects were omitted, but they will be restored in the first postwar examinations open to all in September 1947.

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percent new personnel, most of whom will be war veterans. And these figures do not include an even larger number of reserve and staff officers authorized by the 1946 Act, who, for the most part, will represent an additional infusion of new blood, new energies and new ideas into the Service.

Expansion in the size of the Service is due to the more extensive and varied responsibilities imposed upon it, not only by the Department of State, but by other government departments in Washington. In turn, these Washington agencies act in response to requirements laid upon them by the President or by Congress, which, along with public opinion, have formulated a new and broader conception of American national interests abroad in the light of postwar situations. Moreover, as a result of America's new commitments arising from membership in the United Nations Organization and other bodies, and from participation in scores of international conferences, the Foreign Service must have at hand a reservoir of personnel, skilled and experienced in international negotiations.

As of October 1, three hundred embassies, legations, consulates-general, consulates, vice-consulates and consular agencies were being operated abroad. The functions performed in these establishments may be conveniently divided into six basic categories: political, economic, commercial, consular, informational and cultural, and administrative. Of these six, the informational and cultural represents a phase of activity which has only recently been accepted officially as a definite and clearly defined function, but most of the others have expanded in scope and dimensions. In addition to his responsibility for all these activities in his sphere of jurisdiction, the chief of mission has an additional duty — that of being the chief representative of the United States, and the spokesman for the government, in the country or area to which he is assigned.

Of the 2,000 officers (including reserve officers and top staff personnel) presently in the Service, some 18 percent are employed in political work, *i.e.* as diplomatic secretaries or counselors. That means they are engaged, under the Ambassador's direction, in handling diplomatic relations with the local Foreign Office, ranging from minute day-to-day matters to large-scale agreements. They are also responsible for the preparation and transmission of reports on the political situation in the country. In an earlier day, the drafting of political reports was too frequently a

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routine and leisurely performance consisting of culling items from a morning newspaper or relating gossip from the previous evening's cocktail party. This practice has not been wholly abandoned, but the trend to a new order of political reporting is now so pronounced that tomorrow's Foreign Service Officer will not dare, if he values his career, regard it as more than a superficial minimum exercise. The man sitting at a desk in the State Department requires a living, continuous and comprehensive picture of all the significant political forces and ferments (in their larger social, economic and psychological contexts) operating in the country with which he must deal. Today the reporter must know the foreign government with which he is dealing, but he must also reach below to the man in the street, to representatives of the opposition parties, the labor unions, etc., in order to gauge political currents and "foresee" developments. He must supply judicious appraisals, analyses and interpretations of the facts he is reporting. On the basis of his reports, action recommendations are formulated in the "geographical" divisions of the State Department for the consideration of the Secretary of State. The career officer plays an additional rôle from time to time when he is called to serve a tour of duty in the State Department as an expert on a given region. In this capacity, he is immediately responsible for recommending policy decisions to the Secretary of State. Of the fifty-odd officers in the political-geographic offices of the State Department, approximately 80 percent are, or once were, in the Foreign Service.

The economic functions of the Service are no less important; and in the performance of them 22 percent of officer manpower is engaged. Economic and financial analysts of a caliber equal to that produced by the best university graduate schools need to be developed in greater numbers, along with specialists in agriculture, mining, petroleum, aviation, shipping, labor and telecommunications. In these specialized fields service is rendered to other government agencies in Washington; but the vast new structure of economic offices and divisions in the Department of State is also closely concerned with broader as well as technical aspects of our economic foreign relations. Closely associated with the economic function is the commercial function, largely in the way of trade promotion and market reporting. Thirteen percent of Foreign Service officers are engaged in these duties and, for the most part, their service is rendered to the Department of

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Commerce for the benefit of the industrial and business community. Private foreign trading, generally suspended during the war, is beginning to revive, which means that the commercial responsibilities of the Foreign Service are expanding rapidly. The same may be said of consular duties, in which nearly one-fourth (24 percent) of the Service is engaged. With the return of peace, old consulates are being reopened, and consular staffs the world over are deluged with an accumulation of work, much of which was in suspense during the war. This includes the handling of American citizenship cases, applications for visas, shipping services, assistance to displaced persons, and tens of thousands of requests from American citizens for aid in locating relatives, in identifying and recovering property, and similar services.

The informational and cultural program, under the general direction of Assistant Secretary of State Benton, represents a new type of specialization in which at the present time 12 percent of officer personnel are engaged. Many of these officials, like their functions, were inherited from the wartime Office of War Information and the Office of Inter-American Affairs. The assumptions underlying this program are that America must undertake positively and energetically to make its way of life known to peoples the world over, both in order to foster a better understanding of America as a step toward better international understanding, and to assist in the cultural, economic and technological development of less advanced countries. Through the informational media of motion pictures, press releases and the radio, and the cultural services afforded by the exchange of students and scholars and the operation of libraries and institutes, the Foreign Service brings the life of America into the lives of other peoples. The obvious corollary is that Foreign Service Officers must develop a commensurately keen and sympathetic appreciation of foreign cultures.

Last but not least in the order of Foreign Service functions is that of administration, which occupies 11 percent of the officer personnel. Efficient administration has never been the strongest feature of the Foreign Service, but the phenomenal expansion in numerical strength and functions of the past few years has rendered it indispensable. Men engaged in an executive or administrative capacity in a foreign post, and also the chief of mission, must have a firm grasp of the purposes and operations of every phase of Foreign Service work and, at the same time, an under-

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standing of mechanisms for the management and coördination of complex activities. Challenges on the score of purposefulness, ingenuity and imagination face the Foreign Service in many fields, but in few if any fields of more importance.

The searching inquiry made over the past two years into the adequacy of the Foreign Service to meet America's new world-wide responsibilities and interests was made on the basis of four general assumptions: that there was a need for new legislation, more men (and the best available), more money, and better administration. A new basic statute was provided, as mentioned above, in the Foreign Service Act of 1946. It remains only an instrument, which, if it is to be employed effectively, will need additional legislative authority for an increase in manpower and substantially enlarged appropriations.

The new Foreign Service Act (Public Law 724 – 79th Congress) retains the Rogers Act principle of a professional career Foreign Service, with appointments and promotions dependent on merit, with political influence rigidly excluded, and with sufficient compensation to attract able men regardless of their private means. The Foreign Service is placed under the administrative control of the newly-authorized Director General, subject to the supervision of the Secretary of State, but with the assistance of administrative policy recommendations from a new statutory Board of the Foreign Service, comprised of three Assistant Secretaries of State, the Director General, appropriate representatives designated by the Secretaries of Commerce, Agriculture and Labor, as well as *ad hoc* representatives of other departments when their interests are concerned. This Board replaces a predecessor of more limited representation and authority; its creation serves to emphasize the legitimate concern of government agencies, other than State, in the Foreign Service.

Steps have been taken towards sounder administration by establishing a more systematic classification of the Foreign Service into five principal categories: Ambassadors and Ministers, Foreign Service Officers, Foreign Service Reserve Officers, Foreign Service staff personnel, and alien personnel. Adjustments have been, or will be made, in the salaries of most of these personnel, but none more deservedly than in the case of Ambassadors and Ministers. For nearly a century — from 1855 until 1946 — the maximum salaries of Ambassadors and Ministers remained fixed at $17,500 and $10,000 respectively. Even with

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official allowances, modest enough (in London, about $12,500), no man has been able to accept an appointment as Ambassador to a large capital such as London or Paris unless he enjoyed a substantial independent income. In its report on the Bill, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs pointed out that, in sharp and humiliating comparison, the British Government furnished its Ambassador in Washington with an annual compensation of $70,000, *tax free*. The new Act provides that embassies and legations shall be grouped into four classes according to their importance, with salaries for the chiefs of missions, respectively, of $25,000, $20,000, $17,500, and $15,000. Moreover, an "establishment allowance" is authorized to enable a representative to maintain a residence worthy of his official position.

The salary of the entering Foreign Service Officer has been fixed at $3,300, ranging upward through six classes (replacing 11 at present) to the seventh class of "career minister" who receives $13,500. The allowance system has been improved and strengthened by an attempt to establish the principle that expenses incurred, directly or incidentally, in the performance of official duty should not be a burden on the private pocketbook. Furthermore, retirement provisions have been altered to permit an officer to retire between the ages of 50 and 60 with a more advantageous annuity than heretofore. On the other hand, as a safeguard against the risk that career security may develop a cult of humdrum mediocrity, the Navy system of "promotion-up or selection-out" has been adopted so that officers who fail to receive a promotion during a prescribed number of years will be separated from the Service.

The Reserve Officer class is a new creation. It is designed to provide a flexible means for the temporary employment (up to four years) of specialists from any government agency or from private life. By this means, the Service will obtain the benefit of periodic infusions of new talent and energies to perform specialized tasks and, it is hoped, such officers would constitute a recruiting nucleus in the event of an emergency. The Reserve Officer occupies a position of rank among Foreign Service Officers appropriate to his age, experience, and responsibility.

All other American employees — specialists, technicians, administrators, clerks, etc. — constitute the staff corps, appointment to which is made on the basis of technical qualifications similar to those in the Civil Service. There are 22 classes ranging

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from the lowest employee to a high-ranking staff officer receiving up to $10,000. Corresponding to the "CAF" classification in the Civil Service, capable employees will be able to rise from lower classifications to the upper brackets where they may discharge responsible duties of a consular, administrative or technical character.

An important provision of the Act is the authorization of the Foreign Service Institute, which, however, cannot be actually established until Congress appropriates the necessary funds. The Institute, which will succeed the present Division of Training Services in the State Department, will have the responsibility for providing comprehensive as well as specialized in-service training for personnel of the Foreign Service and of the Department of State at successive stages throughout their careers. The programs will be designed to enrich the knowledge, deepen the insight and sharpen the skills of men and women of all classifications. For instance, a Foreign Service Officer will, upon successfully completing the examinations set by the Board of Examiners, receive a three-months period of instruction to prepare him for the performance of his duties. At subsequent intervals in his career (provided that he survives the basic period of probation in the field), he will be assigned to the Institute for a program of instruction in such subjects as diplomacy, economics, area studies, principles of staff work (as in the Army and Navy staff colleges), or in any one of the 30 languages offered at present. The Institute will not attempt to establish a complete curriculum but will, in many cases, send officers to an appropriate university graduate school.

In the past, instances have been known of an officer remaining abroad for a stretch of a dozen years because funds were not available to bring him back to the United States. The disadvantage of this is obvious. If the Foreign Service Officer is to be a representative spokesman for his country abroad he must keep in touch with it through periodic revisits. The new Act makes it mandatory (subject, of course, to funds appropriated) for officers and employees to be returned to the United States for leave every two years at government expense, and to receive assignments in this country for a total of three out of his first 15 years. The Institute will be responsible for developing an "American reorientation" program, both in the form of conferences in Washington and through systematic tours of inspection of American

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business, industry, agriculture, technology, etc. Such a program will bring the officer into direct contact with citizens and currents of life throughout the country, and thus give him fresh insights into the America he represents.

The legislation of 1946 provides only a framework for Foreign Service reform. To become the living organism envisaged by its creators, the skeleton will require the flesh and blood of firm and diligent administration, of adequate annual appropriations (which need not, however, exceed the construction cost of a single battleship), and of more and better-trained manpower. Only then will the Foreign Service be suitably equipped to perform its rôle as an efficient instrument of America's postwar determination to "wage" a vigorous and constructive peace. Only then will a small and good organization — but good enough only for a semi-isolationist age — have effected its full transition to the high-powered Foreign Service demanded today.

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SHAW, WAR AND PEACE

1894 to 1919

By William Irvine

"YOU may demand moral courage from me to any extent," wrote George Bernard Shaw many years ago, "but when you start shooting and knocking one another about, I claim the coward's privilege and hide under the bed. My life is too valuable to be machine-gunned." If Shaw ever pursued this policy, he must have dived under the bed oftener and remained there longer than he expected to as a young Socialist. In any case, he has done an extraordinary amount of very dangerous talking about war from a position of doubtful safety. What he said becomes doubly important with the world making another international settlement and Great Britain under the government of a party whose policy has been largely formed by Shaw and other Fabian leaders.

Most people lose the real Shaw in the wit and the white whiskers. They are incredulous when it is said that the striking feature of his earlier politics — international as well as domestic — is their cautious realism. The truth is that he is an Irishman chiefly from the wit outward. His politics are inveterately English. In the *axiomata media* which Walter Bagehot called the peculiar ground of politics Shaw is hard-headed, shrewd and generally consistent, as in fundamentals he is jaunty, somewhat frivolous and effervescently logical. On the nature of God he is quite unreliable. On the future of the British Empire, he is surprisingly sound. Altogether, he is a strange combination of Voltaire and Sir Robert Peel.

Shaw's conception of political motive tends steadily to be Benthamite or Marxist with aristocratic qualifications. The economically powerful follow their own economic self-interest — and usually attain it. The masses are ruled sometimes by self-interest but much more frequently by illusion, through which they are victimized and manipulated. But Shaw's discussion continually implies the efficacy of other motives — intellectual, religious, national and psychological. Wars, for example, are brought about not only by capitalistic imperialism, but by human pugnacity — in other words, by aggressive nationalism. Yet as a rationalist

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and a man without a country Shaw tends steadily to despise this motive and to underestimate its force. "Patriotism is, fundamentally, a conviction that a particular country is the best in the world because you were born in it." [1] Though keeping always in view the possibility of Marxist revolution, he tends as a Fabian Socialist to emphasize continuity and evolution, tradition and habit. Wars, he notes, are not followed by millenniums of brotherly love, but by situations which lead to other wars. Heterogeneous and discordant nations can no more be welded into a permanent league by a paper covenant than a democracy can be so created out of a despotism.

II

Shaw made his first close study of world affairs in 1899, when he was ordered to think about them by the Fabian Society, of which he was then literary expert. It was during the golden age of modern imperialism. Among the European nations, conquering the world had become not only a business but one that was highly organized and up-to-date, with sensational press campaigns and stocks and shares on 'change. Pursued by its Marxian dilemma of overproduction and underconsumption, led by its twin heroes of enterprise and abstinence, capitalism was reaching out everywhere for new markets — to China, India, Africa, South America — and industrial civilization was following the pound, the franc and the mark into many a remote corner of time and space. The nineteenth century was growing up triumphantly in the midst of the fifteenth, or of the first, or of the ages before history began. Sometimes the process was a little puzzling to the natives. It was always very exciting for the people at home.

Indeed, modern life was rapidly becoming a Roman circus for the delectation — and the deception — of Demos. As he grew in economic and political power, some of the shrewdest brains in Europe began to devise methods for leading him about by the nose. The art of mass suggestion was developed. Advertisements taught him what to buy, cheap novels taught him what to dream about, and the penny press what to think — or rather, what to love and hate. The result was that rulers retained power, but had to deal with a dynamic rather than an inert mass. The more imperialism became a business, the more nationalism became a religion — and one of the most dangerous of all religions, for be-

[1] George Bernard Shaw, "Music in London 1890–1894." London: Constable, 1932, v. III, p. 86.

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cause of the absolute sovereignty of nations it was a religion without a morality.

Entrusted with the task of translating Fabian opinions into effective pamphlet form, Shaw began to think internationally within the limits of the Fabian tradition — as a Socialist who aspired to bring about revolutionary changes by an evolutionary and constitutional process. The immediate occasion for his services was the outbreak of that classical struggle of capitalistic imperialism — the Boer War. It was an embarrassing event for the Fabian Society. Half of the members wanted to show that they understood Marx by disapproving of it. The other half, headed by Shaw and Sidney Webb, wanted to follow the Society's traditional policy of ignoring all issues not directly connected with reform at home. The dispute, carried on amid the excitement of an approaching election and a war frenzy which only a developing yellow press could create in an age of innocence, was sharp and bitter in the extreme and led to several resignations from the Society, including that of Ramsay MacDonald. The remaining Fabians moved gradually toward a moderate position and at length decided to formulate their ideas in a pamphlet, the drafting of which was as usual entrusted to Shaw. The task was one of terrifying delicacy. There were then 800 Fabians and nearly 800 shades of opinion about what the tract should contain. Shaw labored for three months, and then the first draft was sent to every member of the Society for comment. Shaw achieved prodigies of verbal and logical adjustment and at the next meeting all but 14 voted for the pamphlet. It was published late in 1900. Too generous to the Boers for the warmongers, and too imperialistic for most Socialists, it pleased few besides the Fabians themselves.

They were justly pleased, for under their close supervision, Shaw had produced an able and on the whole statesmanlike adaptation of Fabian ideas to imperial problems. The basis of his argument is an attack in the name of efficiency and progress on the principle of absolute sovereignty. A few Great Powers, he says, are destined to rule the world, its trade and resources. Until a global federation is achieved, the great imperial federations are the most practical substitutes. They must govern in the interests of civilization as a whole. Isolation, especially for small states, is no longer possible. A nation has no more right to do what it pleases in its own territory than an individual on his own estate.

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It must regard the best interests of its neighbors or submit to their interference. If China refuses to grant other nations the international rights to trade and travel within her borders, then those nations may force her to do so. This does not mean that weak countries should be steam rollered because they are weak, any more than they should be preserved because they are romantically nationalistic. Moreover, if Englishmen have a right to trade with and travel in China, then the Chinese have a right to emigrate to Australia. Australian labor must find its protection in a minimum wage guaranteed by the state.

Continuing, Shaw reasons that superior armament does not confer moral rights on a Great Power, but greater efficiency and superior civilization do. Thus Germany is a formidable rival. England will remain a Great Power only if she becomes calmer, more clear-sighted, more efficient and civilized. Her institutions need drastic reform. There is no genuine democracy in England because there is no rational and educated electorate, no acknowledged aristocracy of ability. The country is ruled by two plutocratic cliques — the liberals and the conservatives, who represent the same restricted class. The newspapers support that class because they are owned by it. The masses vote for it because they receive wages from it.

Imperial administration must be improved, expanded, liberalized, rendered more flexible, he goes on in his 1900 pamphlet. The consular service needs more technical experts. It must be made less sensitive to private, and more sensitive to public, interests — especially if the causes of war are to be reduced. India should be given a greater measure of self-government. English institutions should not be imposed on her wholesale, but native institutions studied and understood, so that they can be adapted to the requirements of progress. South Africa is a more complicated problem. The Boers should be granted self-government as soon as possible, but the Negroes placed under imperial protection. And the gold fields should not be left in the possession of a small frontier community but be made international or imperial property. The war was a terrible mistake which the Government never intended.

This tract also contains Shaw's first attack on militarism, which he has continued to satirize and vituperate for nearly 50 years. Army life hides torpor, inefficiency and injustice under the dark cloak of brutality. The army grossly underpays its men and sup-

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presses any revolt with savage punishments. Officers obtain obedience not by the moral virtue of genuine leadership but by the deadening tyranny of military discipline. Hence they are obeyed everywhere except on the battlefield. They will be obeyed there only when their men are better paid and better treated. Obviously, this criticism contained much truth, for in most civilized countries army life has since become infinitely more human, its discipline infinitely more humane, and even its pay — a little higher. Shaw's criticism fails in its romantic individualism. It discounts the military value of rigid training and habit, which are necessary to the coördination of large bodies and sometimes carry a man through the extremities of peril when courage and presence of mind have failed. To be sure, Shaw appeared at the time to have the facts on his side in this respect also. The Boer War seemed fought to prove regular armies unnecessary. It was a prolonged skirmish in wild country between frock-coated marksmen led by natural generals, and trained regulars led by parade-ground commanders whom no amount of training could have made clever and resourceful. Shaw advocated a national militia on the Boer model.

England can never hope to hold her empire by force, Shaw points out. Therefore, she should allow white colonies their political liberty, establish an Imperial Council, and attempt to guide not according to her own interests but those of the world. Exclusion from the Empire should be regarded as a penalty. Membership should guarantee certain constitutional rights and such organization of capital and labor as to result in the highest minimum standard in the world. Above all, England must not, like Rome, allow capital and industry to go abroad while giving *pan et circenses* to the people at home. Free trade should be maintained and essential industries that cannot meet foreign competition must be nationalized. England must have the intelligence and generosity to become Socialistic.

In its treatment of international affairs, Socialism has tended to be either idyllic or cataclysmic. In "Fabianism and the Empire," on the contrary, Shaw is practical. He asserts downrightly that world peace and world order will be achieved neither by a utopian movement of universal brotherhood nor by a Marxian revolution of the international proletariat, but by the continued growth and improvement of such great political organizations as the British Empire. Moreover, mere military

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science in itself promises no imperial triumph. There must be general efficiency, higher civilization, greater social justice. Thus foreign policy is largely domestic policy. The vast problems which loom at the horizon pose a very prosaic solution at the doorstep. The Empire must be Fabianized.

III

The imperial policy of "Fabianism and the Empire," whether original or not, did not spring into Shaw's head at an order from the Fabian Society. He had long thought about it. Moreover, Shaw had also developed elaborate views about war (which is, after all, an inescapable part of empire) and had expressed them in his dramas — notably in "Arms and the Man" (1894), "The Man of Destiny" (1895) and "Caesar and Cleopatra" (1898). "Major Barbara," to come in 1905, would likewise be a variation on this theme. The first three present his conception of the military and political hero or superman — the type which he develops most fully in the character of Julius Caesar. Shaw's Caesar reminds one of the magnificent improvisations of Disraeli. He is a Benthamite in a toga, and succeeds so admirably in that higher egotism of identifying his own highest good with the greatest good of the greatest number that he reconciles despotism with virtue and world conquest with non-violence. Shaw's attitude toward war was profoundly affected by the Ibsenian antithesis between romance and reality, the ideal and real. Moreover, his reality, like Ibsen's, tends to be too much Benthamite logic neatly woven into the seamy side of illusion. Consequently, he drains so much of the heroism and romance out of war that, even when allowance has been made for satire and comedy, the result tends to be an unbelievably logical and precise kind of madness pursued amid blood, sweat and dirt.

"Heartbreak House," largely written in 1913, is an interesting prediction of catastrophe. But as the international situation became rapidly graver, Shaw also published, in March 1913 and in January 1914, letters in which, after attacking the melodramatic secrecy of European diplomacy, he proposed a security pact among England, France and Germany. If any one of these nations attacked another, the third should side with the defender. Shaw had suggested the Locarno Pact 12 years in advance. But his proposal came too late to possess any practicability; by splitting the Entente and separating France and England from

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Russia it would, of course, simply have played into the hands of Germany. By now every foreign minister in Europe, including Sir Edward Grey, was working not so much to prevent war as to guarantee victory. War was "inevitable."

Moreover, Shaw does not bring forward any plan to remove the fundamental differences between Germany on one side and France and England on the other that were at the bottom of their mutual hatred and fear. What he thought about Alsace-Lorraine he does not say. He does say that Germany had as much right as England to a large navy, since both countries had colonies and both were vitally dependent on imports: German naval policy was perhaps ill-advised, but not immoral, he remarks, for no nation has the right to dominate the seas. The point, however, as subsequent events were to make plain, was that Germany had an appetite for world empire, that she dominated the Continent with her army, and might well dominate the world with a navy as large as England's. Sir Edward Grey perceived these essential truths a good deal more shrewdly than did Shaw. Had Shaw made a constructive proposal, it apparently would have been for an international police force under the joint control of the most powerful and civilized nations.

In August of the same year war broke out and with it an unparalleled spasm of mass hatred. Behind elegant club windows, in the grave council chamber, in the quiet library, an appalling atavism sprang up. To utter less than ferocious hatred against the enemy was a crime against society. Shaw quickly became guilty of that crime. He collected all possible documents, retired to Torquay, sunned himself on a hotel roof for two months, and then published in the November supplement of Sidney Webb's *New Statesman* his lengthy pamphlet, "Common Sense About the War." Most Englishmen — like most Germans and Frenchmen — were hysterically self-righteous. Therefore Shaw was coolly judicial — noticeably generous to Germany and sharply critical of England. Then, and for many years afterward, his alert, witty detachment was regarded as, at best, criminally frivolous perversity in the face of appalling tragedy. He seemed more than ever a monstrous enigma. As a matter of fact, he had never been more frankly himself. In "The Man of Destiny" he had recognized that the sword could be a constructive force in history. In "Caesar and Cleopatra" he had, somewhat ambiguously, exalted it to the level of the cross. But now these ideas,

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whether relevant or not, were completely forgotten. Faced with the overwhelming reality itself, he was revolted, not only by the tremendous waste, but by the spiritual degradation of war. In the crisis he reverted to what was fundamental in his character — to the Puritan and the rationalist.

"Common Sense" was a deliberate use of his great powers as a propagandist. He addressed his words to a rational minority in England, to the United States — which was peacefully inheriting the future while Europe fought over the past — and, above all, perhaps, to the American President, whose international views, he early foresaw, were to be more important than those of any other living man.[2] He was resolved, for once in history, to propagandize truth and sanity. Unfortunately, he could not resist taking out some of his animus against British capitalism on British democracy and national character. His Socialist zeal against middle-class government, which, he felt, he had detected in a major crime against civilization — together with his keen sense of isolation from the infuriated patriotism of his countrymen — forced him into a kind of inverted partisanship which narrowed his outlook and diminished his influence through the subsequent period. Closing his eyes to the evidence of contrast between the spirit and institutions of England and Germany, he refused from the outset to see very much difference between the two countries. The war was the work of conservatives everywhere, he declared with doctrinaire confidence. "I was fiercely determined, like Ramsay MacDonald," he insisted afterward, "that the diplomatists and militarists who brought about the war should not get the credit for having saved the world from the peril which they had in fact created."[3]

Applying Marxist doctrine, Shaw regards the war of 1914 as a horrible accusation against capitalistic leadership. If it must be fought, let it be fought with a minimum of illusion, he proclaims. If the common man must die, he owes it to himself to know how uselessly he is dying, to understand that English capitalists contribute to war by competing with German capitalists, that they profit from war because war raises the rate of interest. Indeed Shaw uses the big guns as a kettledrum to summon the world to what he thought to be a lesson in basic realities. The horror is not

[2] Thomas Dickinson, "Bernard Shaw and Woodrow Wilson," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, VIII, 1931, p. 1–17.

[3] Archibald Henderson, "Table-Talk of G.B.S.: Conversations on Things in General Between George Bernard Shaw and His Biographer." New York: Harper, 1925, p. 122.

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so much that Rheims was destroyed, he says, as that in the hands of a private firm it would have been torn down long since, the statues sold to American collectors, and the ground rented out for building sites. In fact, Shaw becomes so interested in his moral that he seems to forget the war itself and the plain fact that it must be fought through to a finish. What the world needs, he declares, is not a war but a revolution. The war might have been avoided entirely had not international politics been in the secret and almost exclusive charge of *Junkers* — not only German, but English and Russian.

This introduces the question of war guilt. Here Shaw was dependent chiefly on the press and the English White Paper for his facts and on Marxism for his convenient key to the puzzle. He sees the war chiefly as a struggle between plutocratic imperialisms. He maintains that though the German *Junkers* were more militaristic, the English *Junkers* were more quarrelsome and that they began to talk about war first. He then cites such articles as that by Lord Roberts in *The Hibbert Journal*, in which the author speaks of "the White Man's Burden" and "our fitness as an imperial race." Moreover, he continues, the English are the true masters of *Realpolitik*. Instead of being isolated by Germany, they have isolated her — with an air of the most innocent self-righteousness, for England is the Pecksniff of nations. She has a genius for finding her duty in her advantage, and, like all genuinely successful deceivers, she is best at deceiving herself. Measured by his own intentions and by English opinion, Sir Edward Grey is a gentle and virtuous statesman. Measured by his actions he is an incompetent Machiavelli whose very shortsightedness has enabled him to carry out the purposes of such militarists as Winston Churchill better than they themselves could have done. Being a liberal, Sir Edward could not promise certainly to fight — and the end of the militarists was achieved: Germany attacked. When Sir Edward declared war, he was astonished to find the nation applauding him frantically. Yet had he published the secret military agreements with France and Russia, he might have prevented war.

Among the underlying causes of the war Shaw lists the sensational press, secret diplomacy, the armament race, and above all plutocratic government, which fattens on war. But most of these certainties, like the confident conclusions about Sir Edward Grey's easy opportunities to prevent the First World War, had

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crumbled away by the end of the thirties. The acid which dissolved them finally was distilled from the astonishing evidence that among the unmistakable causes of the Second World War were open diplomacy (that is, the free trade in insults), and not the armaments of the "plutocracies," but their disarmament and their pacifism. Though it is true that Shaw minimizes German guilt in the First World War, actually he accuses England more than he excuses Germany. He vigorously attacks Prussian militarism. Perhaps his most serious error is that he fails to analyze the connection between German character and German destiny. But the connection was not so clear in 1914 as it is now. One might almost say that Germany suffered catastrophe in 1914 because of the foibles of German character; in 1939, because of the mortal sins.

Shaw predicts the ultimate defeat of Germany and proposes a generous peace. For he believes that Germany can be destroyed as a nation only by the mass slaughter of German women, and that is unthinkable. She cannot be permanently disunited. In fact the disappearance of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs will probably lead to union with Austria. The best solution is to democratize the German constitution. All nations should pay reparations to Belgium, but unlimited reparations from Germany would be silly. Poland should become independent. Shaw deplores the alliance with Tsarist Russia and sees little hope for democracy there. Indeed, the war is really a conflict between the barbarous east and the civilized west. England, France and Germany should form a league of peace, and if Germany were democratic, the United States might enter. The greatest hope for world peace, he concludes, is in a federation of states organized against war on the basis of international Socialism.

"Common Sense" is frequently said to reflect a perverse frivolity. Nobody writes an 80-page pamphlet on a dangerous subject out of sheer frivolity. But though definitely in earnest, Shaw is undoubtedly carried away by his talent for didactic comedy. He does not make history too frivolous, but he does make it too clever, too superficially lucid and self-conscious. In order to heap the ashes on the heads of his countrymen, for example, he makes Sir Edward Grey sometimes too mischievously clairvoyant and sometimes too ludicrously the purblind Englishman who muddles through. Yet despite its doctrinaire narrowness, its caprice and extravagance, "Common Sense" nonethe-

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less had a valuable astringent detachment. Like President Roosevelt many years later, Shaw wanted to "quarantine" war, to keep as many people as possible sane — in England and in the one great nation that remained at peace. Above all, he wanted to temper public fury with a rational plan for peace.

IV

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities Shaw became interested in British propaganda to the United States — and particularly to German-Americans. In May 1916 he published in *The New Age* his own "Case Against Germany." Here, as in subsequent references to the same question, he generously acknowledges the achievements of German civilization, but calls attention to the dangers of the German monarchy and the German officer class, who not only behave like dangerous paranoiacs in a civilized society but, being *Junkers* who until lately had enjoyed mediæval privileges, treat their soldiers like serfs. So far as it goes, the indictment is just, but Shaw was too much afraid of falling into the ferocious partisanship of his countrymen to see the full possibilities of the case against Germany. He sees nothing new or sinister in the Prussian state. It is simply the French or English state arrested in the eighteenth century or earlier, the *Roi-Soleil* system as yet unmodified by democratic revolution. Again, in his eyes Prussian militarism is but another example of the bullying tendencies of an officer class. German society is in his opinion not specially influenced by the German officer, nor German policy by the German general staff — which in its irresponsible anonymity and priestlike devotion to war and country Liddell Hart compares to the Society of Jesus. Indeed, Shaw denies, and with some justice,[4] that the Germans were as well prepared for war in 1914 as the French and English. That the ethical romanticism of Nietzsche or the *Volk* mysticism of Wagner and Houston Chamberlain constitutes a force in German civilization Shaw decries as utter nonsense. His indictment of the enemy always verges on defense. He is in his skeptical mood, and views the question with a kind of Voltairean common sense. Of Cecil Chesterton's "Perils of Peace" he says: "It starts from the monstrous assumption that any sixty millions of modern white Europeans can differ from any other sixty millions of them." And yet they

[4]Sidney B. Fay, "The Origins of the War." 2nd ed., revised. New York: Macmillan, 1930, v. II, p. 498–9, 521–5.

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can differ. What "sane" observer would have predicted in 1914 the Nazi excesses of 1940? So far as war guilt is concerned, Shaw is as incredulous that nations have a distinctive character as Voltaire was that the fossils of sea shells had been found on the summits of the Alps.

In 1918 came the Russian Revolution. To Shaw the collapse of the eastern front seemed trivial by comparison. Here it becomes sharply clear how much more he was a Socialist than a patriot. He predicted direly that now the real war would begin. Now the battle between competing capitalisms would become the battle between rulers and ruled, between capitalists and proletariat.[5] Upon the Revolution itself he cautiously refused to pronounce. Successful Communism weaned him only gradually from his early contempt for Slavic ignorance and barbarism.

In the same year the Germans surrendered. Now crisis yawned before the statesmen of the world. The mind of a generation suddenly found itself faced with the problems of centuries. It seemed such a moment as utopian idealists dream of. The past was in the melting pot. The victors were omnipotent. All they seemed to need were ideas. These ideas were ready. Essentially they were an attempt to eliminate the causes of the last war in terms of nineteenth-century liberalism. There were also idealists ready to believe in them. Violently nationalistic at the beginning of the war, Labor moved steadily to the left and in 1917 advocated a negotiated peace.

Undoubtedly Shaw played a principal part in formulating and propagating the ideas which animated this trend. He also lectured them, as noted above, to the one man who might be able to carry them out. "Common Sense" was published prominently in *The New York Times*, where it could scarcely have escaped Woodrow Wilson's notice. A little later Shaw had addressed an open letter on Belgium to the President. He had seen that statesman's attitude develop from splendid isolation to his own democratic internationalism. The outlook was favorable but Shaw was not optimistic. His newspaper interviews up to this time do indeed indicate an enthusiastic approval of Wilson's moves and pronouncements, but his next lengthy pamphlet, "Peace Conference Hints," issued shortly before the gathering of the victors at Versailles, is a sharp and realistic warning of the dangers

[5] Letter to *The Daily Chronicle*, March 8, 1917, "What I Really Wrote about the War," p. 281–2.

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ahead. The American President will need all his mystic force for the coming ordeal. He has already suffered the fate of a prophet, for though he has a wide following in Europe, that in the United States is small. So complicated a situation, he writes, may easily turn into a chaos of greed and opportunism: genuine success will depend on the presence of a true leader, a man of principle, energy and courage, and for this Europe looks to Wilson.

Shaw is most interesting and original on the League. For a loose, heterogeneous, sentimentally splendid league of all countries, he shows no enthusiasm whatever. The problem will be not how to bring nations in but how to keep them out. Those involved should have similar forms of government, common ideas, traditions, civilizations, and, if possible, a common language. They should be capable of sustained unity and ultimate fusion. The ideal combination would be England, France, Germany and the Scandinavian states. Clearly, despite some grievances against the British Empire, Shaw has not departed greatly from his imperialistic thinking of 1899. The best guarantee of peace lies in a world dominated by superstates, which have everything to lose and very little to gain from war.

Shaw's conception of the settlement was only in part Wilson's. They agreed on the freedom of the seas, open diplomacy, the independence of Poland, self-determination of peoples, and a league of nations. They differed in that Wilson more or less necessarily wanted a loose and all-inclusive league, was much more inclined to be severe with Germany as a pirate state, and less inclined to temper his principles by practical considerations of power politics. At Versailles, the world seemed waiting to be remade at Wilson's touch. Actually, it had been considerably remade already. To win the war, the British and the French had bought weak allies with extravagant promises. Moreover, the French quite understandably wanted security. Unfortunately, it meant under the circumstances attempting to perpetuate the military superiority of 40,000,000 people over 60,000,000. The Paris Peace Conference had the atmosphere of a great democratic election many times magnified. The principal leaders infuriated themselves with newspaper denunciation of the enemy, irritated themselves with noise and confusion, and stupefied themselves with facts and overwork. In this inferno, Wilson strove heroically, achieved much, and ultimately failed. The treaty left Germany still strong enough to renew her attack and at the same

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time it vaccinated her against peace and democracy by dooming her to failure in them. It also created a league which, though it achieved much good, lacked the cohesive force to survive.

Shaw's disappointment was extreme. Apparently he suffered more from a romantic conflict between head and heart than the shrewd sobriety of his prose would lead one to suspect. Versailles marked the end of an era in his development. His subsequent history might be said to represent a victory of his Irish over his English characteristics, for London and the Fabian Society had made him an Englishman, as Dublin and the Shaw family had made him an Irishman. After 1919 he more and more lost faith in negotiation, compromise, constitutionalism, democracy, and even in logic and common sense. Inevitably, therefore, he lost his influence on democratic opinion throughout the world. He became more irresponsible, more cynical about the future, more irritably sensitive to the slightest hypocrisy, and also — at intervals — more romantically hopeful of extravagant and desperate remedies. After 1919 Shaw became impatient with history. That impatience led him, like Carlyle, ever closer to a philosophy of force. In his eyes Marx's prophecies were all coming true. Private enterprise seemed ever more bankrupt; depressions were becoming more acute and disastrous. The class struggle was becoming more violent, he thought, capitalistic imperialism more brutal and rapacious. Force alone seemed able to achieve anything, and in Russia force was apparently building up something very like the utopia he had always worked for. Sometimes when he was particularly disgusted with democracy it seemed exactly the utopia he had always worked for. He became steadily more Marxist. He took a sour pleasure in the early successes of Mussolini and defended the Russian blood purge of 1934.[6] Yet the Fabian has never quite died within him. When in the Second World War it became clear that the "stupid democracies" were once more somehow muddling through to victory over "clever dictatorships," he responded with surprising flexibility in a man so wonderfully old and published in 1944 "Everybody's Political What's What," which attempts to solve the old problem in the old way. World peace and prosperity, he says, depend on the realization of democratic Socialism, which is possible only through drastic improvement of democratic machinery and the democratic electorate.

[6] *Cf.* Preface, "The Simpleton, the Six, and the Millionairess." London: Constable, 1936.

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NEW TRENDS IN DUTCH FOREIGN POLICY

By J. Barents

TWO great postwar questions have been educating the Dutch people in the realities of foreign relations: What is to be the future of their next-door neighbor, Germany? What is to be the future of their distant overseas territories in Indonesia?

Those who have lived for five years under German occupation have found in German pillage, imprisonments and executions plenty of reason to hate the Germans. To such persons "the German problem" is not academic. But its real significance became clear to the Dutch people only gradually, and the forms which it took in Dutch eyes changed more than once. Initially, the Dutch spoke about an annexation of German territory. Then they talked about the desirability of occupying militarily a sector of western Germany. Now the question is focused on Dutch economic relations with Germany — and in this form, indeed, the problem is seen to be one almost of life and death.

Annexation was a most unusual idea for the Dutch Government to entertain. Never during the last three centuries had the Netherlands made any claim to other people's territory. After the Dutch "Golden Age" in the seventeenth century, various territories had been lost, until a static condition was reached following the Napoleonic wars. When some portions of Germany were offered to the Netherlands after the First World War, the Government declined them: the Dutch had no wish to create a German irredenta within their borders.

But in the summer of 1944, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs in the London Government, Dr. Eelco van Kleffens, suggested first in an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS,[1] and afterwards through diplomatic channels, the possibility that the Netherlands might annex German territory in order to make good the injury the Germans had done to Dutch soil by wanton flooding. The Government did not make an outright claim, wishing to leave the matter open for action by Parliament; it simply reserved the right to ask for some annexation. The question was much debated in Holland in the months after liberation. There was a general feeling, of course, that the Germans ought to pay for the immense damage they had wilfully inflicted upon the Dutch people. From the beginning it was clear that there was no possibility of extracting sufficient reparations from Germany, in cash or in kind, to satisfy the claims of all the Allied nations; and to a great many people in the Netherlands, the annexation of German land seemed a natural and justifiable method of obtaining "payment."

Moreover, the German invasion of Holland in 1940 had destroyed much of the validity of the former argument against the creation of a German irredenta. The Dutch had been careful — perhaps overcareful — not to offend touchy German feelings and to preserve a "spiritual" as well as political and military neutrality. Nonetheless, the Germans overran their country overnight. What

[1] Eelco H. van Kleffens, "If the Nazis Flood Holland," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1944.

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use, then, was there in *not* annexing German land? Plainly, however, it would be impossible to permit the Germans of any annexed territories to remain within the Dutch frontier: during five years of war the Dutch had seen too many German faces to want to accept a German minority with "rights" and some day, perhaps, Dutch status. The idea of a transfer of German population did not seem so unthinkable as it would have seemed six years earlier, before the horrors of the German concentration camps, Germany's extermination of the Jews and her deliberate starvation of the western provinces of Holland. But the Dutch have a strong tradition of tolerance and they remained reluctant to support a plan entailing the uprooting of millions of men, women and children.

Early in 1945, Holland and Belgium asked to have their own sectors of military occupation in Germany. Their aim was to be included among the Allied nations which would exert the chief influence in deciding Germany's future. As a result, the Belgians were given charge of a tiny portion of the British zone, though ultimate control remained in the hands of the British authorities. The question of granting a similar zone to the Dutch was dropped, however, when all available Dutch troops had to be sent to Indonesia.

Now the Government of Dr. L. J. M. Beel, which has been in office since July 1946, has announced that it intends to ask only for some small strips of German territory which would straighten the boundary between the two countries and thus reduce its length by about 100 miles. It does not even use the word "annexation," but prefers to describe this restricted proposal as "frontier corrections." It states that frontier regions could be better drained if the whole of a frontier river were in Dutch hands, that a shortening of boundary lines would mean a reduction in the number of customs officers necessary, and so on. Inevitably, some critics ask the Government whether these advantages are not so insignificant as to make it hardly worth while to raise the questions which any forcible transfer of territory can bring into being. At any rate, only about 100,000 Germans live in the areas in question — so small a number that they would hardly have to be evacuated.

Happily, the Netherlands Government has not restricted its attention to the question of frontier corrections, which after all is minor. It now has begun conversations with Great Britain and the United States, which, it is hoped, will lead to a greater Dutch influence in decisions affecting the future of the German economy. Those decisions will be of tremendous importance to Holland. Sometimes it is thought, quite mistakenly, that the economic relations of the Netherlands and Germany have to do chiefly with the export of Dutch fruit and vegetables. The surplus of these went almost entirely to Germany in prewar times and cannot very well be sold elsewhere. This is indeed a major aspect of German-Dutch trade, but still only a part of a larger question. Before the war, about one-fifth of Dutch foreign trade was carried on with Germany. Contrary to Nazi propaganda, Germany was not Holland's "best customer;" Holland's best customer was the United Kingdom. But Germany is not only the hinterland of the great port of Rotterdam, but plays a vital part in the country's whole economic life. The Dutch Government is particularly concerned, at the moment, to get Rotterdam's trade going again. The British and American authorities in Germany are using Hamburg and Bremen almost exclu-

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sively as ports of entry for Germany; as long as they do so, Rotterdam cannot revive.

Even more fundamental, of course, is the necessity of setting German economic life on its feet, so that the Germans can pay for Dutch imports with their own agricultural and industrial products. Most responsible persons in both Great Britain and the United States realize that western Germany cannot be allowed to rot away in misery while German industry in the Soviet zone is working at full capacity. The German problem must be tackled in a positive way. That does not imply, of course, a "soft" policy for Germany; there is nothing the Dutch would like less. But the Dutch are in a position to see that the maintenance of a vacuum in Germany would spell hunger and poverty, not only for the Germans, but for the neighboring nations — and a permanent political danger as well.

To get production under way in Germany, huge sums will have to be invested in German industries. Dutch investments in Germany were estimated before the war at the equivalent of about $400,000,000. Dutch circles have a good deal of "know-how" for the job of rebuilding German industry, and might be useful as intermediaries between the United States and Germany. They usually are proficient in the German language, and have an insight into the German way of thinking, feeling and acting. Dutch experts in economics, education and public administration could be used to advantage in positions of some authority in Germany.

II

The second big problem which brought home to the Dutch the simple but sometimes neglected truth that foreign policy is conditioned by distant events even more than by domestic wishes was the situation which developed after the war in the Dutch East Indies. During the war the Dutch had dreamed of "liberating" the Indies from the Japanese in more or less the same terms that Holland itself would be liberated from the Germans. But alas, the Japanese surrender freed the Indies only theoretically from Japanese domination; Lord Mountbatten, to whose command the Indies had been transferred just the day before, did not have enough troops to compel the Japanese to surrender or himself to take over the whole of Indonesia.

Moreover, it appeared that the Indonesian nationalist movement, dating from before the First World War but much reinforced during the Japanese occupation, looked forward to a "liberation" not only from the Japanese but from the Dutch, too. It expressed itself as being completely dissatisfied with the prewar status of Netherlands East Indies. In the first months after the Japanese capitulation, many people in the Netherlands imagined that this agitation originated only with "rebels," headed by the Japanese collaborationist Soekarno. But this pleasant illusion could not be maintained after the former Resistance leader, Sjahrir, had to a large extent taken over command of the nationalists. The Dutch had to face the hard fact that there was a more or less general desire in the Indies to be rid of them, if not as economic advisers, at least as political rulers.

Luckily, the Government of Professor Willem Schermerhorn (June 1945–July 1946), in which Professor Logemann held the portfolio of Overseas Terri-

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tories, was quick to grasp the real situation. It saw that the international situation made only one solution possible: an agreement with the nationalist elements headed by Sjahrir which would give Indonesia a status of equality in the Netherlands Commonwealth. If it had resolved upon a militaristic policy under the slogan, "Peace and order first, agreements afterward," as suggested in some quarters, the Allied authorities would not have supported it for a moment.

Mr. Jonkman, who became Minister for Overseas Territories in the cabinet of Dr. Beel, has continued the progressive policy of his predecessor. His task is easier, however, because even conservative circles in the Netherlands have come to realize that the idea of fighting a colonial war cannot be entertained. They now are willing to grant Indonesia if not complete independence, at least a large degree of autonomy. This was confirmed by the fact that on November 13 Professor Schermerhorn, Chairman of the Dutch Commission-General to Indonesia, and Sutan Sjahrir were able to issue a joint statement to the effect that they had found a "possible basis for agreement." It later was announced in Batavia that the Republic of Indonesia, including Java, Sumatra and Madura, will be recognized; that this Republic and all the other territories of the Netherlands Indies will be formed into a United States of Indonesia, which will be linked to the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union, in equal partnership under the Queen; and that there will be close military and economic coöperation between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

At home the Dutch people have come up against the Indonesian problem in very direct and personal terms — they have had to send Dutch troops out to the Indies. This certainly has made Mr. Jonkman's task more difficult. Few want to go to Indonesia as soldiers, or to see their sons go. Communist propaganda has been telling them that in supporting such a policy they are risking Dutch lives in a "new colonial war." The Government explains that the troops are going only to perform police duties. The chief aversion to service abroad springs, however, from the understandable desire to settle down to everyday pursuits after the trials and upheavals of the last five years.

In the first months after the start of the uprising, the presence of either Dutch or British troops in Indonesia was frowned upon from all sides. But this has changed. The troubled situation in Sumatra, which Indonesian republicans claim as part of their territory, makes it very probable that even Sjahrir and his followers will now be glad, once they have reached a political agreement with the Netherlands authorities, to see some Dutch troops on hand in Sumatra to ensure peace and security after the British troops have left.

The American public has lately become very opposed to "colonial" politics (except, as the London *Times* recently remarked, in the case of Hawaii, the Philippines and Puerto Rico), and the American press would certainly have spoken in critical terms of bloodshed in Indonesia. Americans did not always realize that blood had already been spilt by the extremists, and was still being spilt. One need not favor the thesis that military pacification must precede political negotiations to regret that the Allies were not more helpful in putting down gangsterism in Indonesia. Most of the so-called extremists are not political radicals, but simply bandits.

Since the latter part of 1945, many foreign circles seem to have become

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alarmed at the possibility that an entirely independent Indonesian Republic might be set up. Expecting the U.S.S.R. to take an aggressive course in eastern Asia and the Pacific in the next few years, they do not want to see such an important territory in that area pass into the hands of a government which, while independent in name, might in fact be largely controlled from Moscow. The British, who have had to bear the chief responsibility for what was done militarily in Indonesia, but who were severely handicapped by a lack of available troops, adopted a policy of caution and moderation. They did not want to see Java, and possibly other parts of the Indies, become a fully independent republic. And even Sjahrir, though publicly asking for complete constitutional independence, knew very well that simply to get rid of the Dutch would not be the equivalent of securing freedom from all foreign influence. But the British had far too great difficulties of their own in India to wish to give Indian nationalists a pretext for accusing the London Cabinet of siding with "capitalist aggressors" against their Indonesian fellow nationalists. Nor was the Labor Government free of pressure from sincere but not always well-informed elements which wished to see all help denied to the Netherlands Government. In the desire to avoid anything like military repression in the Indies, the British policy often seemed to Netherlanders vacillating and weak.

Dutch public opinion was greatly upset, in the last months of 1945 and the first of 1946, by the inability of authorities in the Netherlands East Indies to get clearance for supply ships bound from Australia to Indonesia. Australian crews and dockworkers, visibly under the influence of Communist propaganda, asserted that the supplies were for a Dutch colonial war against the Indonesian republicans. Gradually, however, it became apparent that the Netherlands Government was in reality pursuing a policy of appeasement, and the Australian workers were persuaded that the supplies were for civilian use and for relief. Gradually, too, Australian public opinion became somewhat alarmed at the potentialities of the situation. It was realized that an undefended Indonesia could under certain circumstances be a great danger to Australian security. It was realized further that Australian trade relations with the Dutch East Indies, which should grow in importance, depend on Dutch as well as Indonesian coöperation with Australia.

The debates in the Security Council about the presence of British troops in Indonesia illustrate the character of the Soviet interest in the problem. Unless Russia expands into the Pacific, Indonesia is too far away to be a Russian satellite state. But Russia can use the Indonesian problem to embarrass the western Allies by accusing them of "imperialism." Sjahrir and his fellow nationalists naturally tried to exploit world opinion as a means of strengthening themselves at home and reinforcing their position abroad. But now they are coming to see that Russia is using them as a pretext for propaganda for her own political purposes, and they have recently appeared less anxious to have the Indonesian problem brought before the Security Council. At the same time, the Dutch people have learned an important lesson, namely that their policy in the Indies is inextricably bound up with world politics as a whole. They would have learned it even without the threatened intervention of the United Nations Security Council.

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III

I have cited the German and the Indonesian problems as prime examples of how necessary it has been to reorient Dutch foreign policy. In the nineteenth century the traditional Dutch policy was one of neutrality. The neutrality of the Netherlands was not guaranteed by the Powers, as was that of Belgium and Switzerland, nor was such a guarantee wanted by the Dutch, who thought it would lay too much stress on the rôle of the Powers in Dutch affairs. Holland wanted to be left alone. She looked upon the policy of neutrality as the best way of achieving that end.

After the First World War the idea of neutrality became less attractive, in the light of what had happened to neutral Belgium in 1914. Dutch policy, although working along much the same lines as before, began to be called a "policy of independence." The new name implied a realization that the Netherlands might not be able to remain neutral in a war, but that she did not want to commit herself beforehand to any international grouping. She preferred to stand aloof as long as a deliberate choice did not become absolutely necessary. This policy of independence, although more realistic than the neutrality policy, nevertheless partook of the illusion that the hour when a choice was to be made could be selected according to Dutch preferences. It is hardly necessary to point out that this illusion was disposed of by what happened in the Second World War. Now the Dutch realize that they can only look around them and decide which side they had better take — with or without reservations. The question whether the Netherlands should or should not accept certain international commitments is no longer debatable.

This implies not only a change in the groundwork of Dutch foreign policy, but also a recasting of the Dutch diplomatic service. Before the Second World War, Dutch diplomatic missions abroad were mainly centers of social intercourse. The situation has now changed considerably. Many legations have been raised to embassies, and the diplomatic and consular services have been fused into one Foreign Service, as in Britain and the United States. The personnel of the new Foreign Service is being expanded rapidly, and many reforms have been promised; but, of course, time will be necessary for the development of the sort of democratic foreign service called for by the more active needs of the new Dutch diplomacy.

The era of either a "neutrality policy" or a "policy of independence" is ended. The experience of the Dutch people with the German problem and the Indonesian question has brought home to them the truth that their foreign policy is dictated, not by themselves, and not even by the policies of the big Powers, but by the development of world forces. This portends not merely a more active but a more imaginative foreign policy.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE GREAT GLOBE ITSELF. By WILLIAM C. BULLITT. New York: Scribner, 1946, 310 p. $2.75.

Mr. Bullitt, in his youth very well disposed toward the Soviets, was sent by President Roosevelt to Moscow as American Ambassador at the time diplomatic relations were resumed in 1933. Since then he has become progressively more and more disillusioned about the possibility of working peacefully with them. This book states his belief that they are embarked on a gigantic plan for global conquest and that our American safety lies in organizing as much of the world as possible, notably western Europe, into an anti-Soviet bloc.

TWO WORLDS. By WILLIAM B. ZIFF. New York: Harper, 1946, 335 p. $3.00.

In this "realistic approach to the problem of keeping the peace" Mr. Ziff lets his imagination run riot. Since he is sure that Russia is bent on world conquest, and since by his definition the United Nations are incapable of preserving peace, our salvation (he holds) lies in organizing the western hemisphere, Britain and her Dominions, and the East Indies into a bloc, with China, India and western Europe serving as buffer states against Soviet expansion. Among other things he suggests the advisability of putting Perón out of business forthwith by an aërial attack on Buenos Aires.

IT'S UP TO US. By HARRIS WOFFORD, JR. New York: Harcourt, 1946, 146 p. $2.00.

A youthful exponent of world government states the case for international federation.

ONE WORLD OR NONE. EDITED BY DEXTER MASTERS AND KATHARINE WAY. New York: Whittlesey House, 1946, 79 p. $1.00.

Into the 18 articles of this slim volume there has been crammed a vast amount of information about the development and use of atomic energy, as well as some startling and depressing ideas about the nature of the world in which we in consequence are living. The contributors are in most cases scientists.

FROM GENEVA TO SAN FRANCISCO. By NORMAN BENTWICH. London: Gollancz, 1946, 111 p. 4/6.

The background and the provisions of the United Nations Charter set forth briefly and clearly by a prominent British lawyer.

LA CONFERENCIA DE SAN FRANCISCO Y SU OBRA. By ALFONSO GARCIA ROBLES. Mexico: The Author, 1946, 186 p.

An interpretation submitted to the Second Mexican Congress of Social Sciences.

THE UNITED NATIONS. By LOUIS DOLIVET. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1946, 152 p. $1.75.

This handy little reference book contains a fund of data concerning the structure and functions of the various organs set up by the United Nations, together with the texts of the Charter and Statute of the International Court of Justice. An appendix lists persons connected with various delegations to, and offices of, the U.N.

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LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES. By Général Nemours. Port-au-Prince: Deschamps, 1945, 188 p.

A Haitian diplomat, delegate to the San Francisco Conference, compares the Charter drawn up there with the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the League Covenant, the Hague Convention, etc.

THIS THING CALLED HISTORY. By Harold Wheeler. London: Macdonald, 1945, 156 p. 6./

How the ordinary reader can become his own historical critic.

LES TECHNICIENS DE LA COLONISATION (XIX^e-XX^e SIÈCLES). Edited by Ch.-A. Julien. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1946, 321 p. Fr. 150.

Appreciations of the careers of 15 noted colonialists, including Italo Balbo and Lyautey.

THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST. By F.S.C. Northrop. New York: Macmillan, 1946, 531 p. $6.00.

An analysis of the great cultural traditions of the west and east, with suggestions as to how these can be brought together on a common ground. The author of this important work is professor of philosophy at Yale.

THE FUTURE IN PERSPECTIVE. By Sigmund Neumann. New York: Putnam, 1946, 406 p. $4.00.

This is a solid review and interpretation of the march of history, primarily in the western world, from 1914 to 1945. Despite the unhappy story which Professor Neumann is obliged to tell, he is sanguine about our future. A number of drawings by Derso are included.

SPHERES OF INFLUENCE. By Sydney Morrell. New York: Duell, 1946, 339 p. $3.50.

Mr. Morrell served as an official in the OWI and UNRRA in Iran, Greece, Jugoslavia and Italy. His account of recent events in those countries underlines the seriousness of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the west that is evident wherever their "spheres of influence" overlap.

FRANCE AND BRITAIN. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946, 110 p. $1.75.

The report of a study group at Chatham House in which the full sweep of Anglo-French relations, particularly the prospects for the future, are candidly faced and concisely described.

DEMAIN LA PAIX. By Jacquier-Bruère. Paris: Plon, 1945, 178 p. Fr. 54.

Suggestions for organizing the world for peace, written during the Nazi occupation.

WORLD WAR: ITS CAUSE AND CURE. By Lionel Curtis. New York: Putnam, 1946, 274 p. $2.75.

The first edition of this book was noted in Foreign Affairs in the January 1946 issue. This second edition takes account of the atomic bomb.

THE NIGHT IS FAR SPENT. By Harry P. Van Walt. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1945, 221 p. $2.00.

A Dutchman surveys some contemporary trends in Europe and America.

MOSAICO INTERNACIONAL. By Augusto Barcia Trelles. Rosario: Editorial Rosario, 1945, 275 p. Pesos 6.

Numerous brief essays on world events in recent years, by a Spanish liberal.

IT HAPPENED IN 1945. Edited by Clark Kinnaird. New York: Essential Books, 1946, 464 p. $3.50.

A slapdash, episodic, sensationalized review — with pictures — of some of the more newsworthy events in a climactic year.

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THE ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS ANNUAL: 1945. VOLUME I. BY RUSSELL LANDSTROM. New York: Rinehart, 1946, 565 p. $4.00.

This volume introduces a new series, in which the material is based on the reports and photographs collected by the Associated Press. The events of the year are summarized month by month, the important with the trivial.

EUROPA TRÁGICA: CRÓNICAS DE UN TESTIGO DE LA GUERRA 1914–18. BY RICARDO LEÓN. Madrid: Suárez, 1945, 412 p. Ptas. 12.

This is not so much reporting on the war, which the author observed from the German side, as reflections inspired by it.

PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF DEMOCRACY. BY GEORGE B. DE HUSZAR. New York: Harper, 1945, 140 p. $2.00.

A sociological and educational approach.

DEMOCRACIA SANA Y DEMOCRACIA FALAZ. BY VIRGILIO FILIPPO. Buenos Aires: Editorial Lista Blanca, 1945, 180 p. Pesos 1.50.

"Real democracy" is Christian and authoritarian.

DEMOCRACIA Y TOTALITARISMO. BY ANTULIO F. POZZIO. Buenos Aires: Editorial Ideas, 1945, 279 p. Pesos 7.

An attempt to present in an orderly way the basic facts concerning the differing conceptions of the state and of law that characterize the totalitarian and democratic doctrines.

TOTALITARISMOS. PART I. NACIONALSOCIALISMO Y FASCISMO. BY GUSTAVO J. FRANCESCHI. Buenos Aires: Editorial Difusión, 1945, 488 p. Pesos 4.

Articles by an Argentine prelate that originally appeared in local periodicals. The author's primary concern is the ultimate contradiction between Nazi-Fascism and Christianity.

AUTORIDAD Y LIBERTAD. BY MARQUÉS DE LA ELISEDA. Madrid: Cultura Española, 1945, 226 p. Ptas. 15.

An historical and theoretical treatment in which the author seeks to reconcile the two concepts.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. BY K. C. WHEARE. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1946, 278 p. $4.25.

A suggestive analysis of the federal system as it operates in the United States, Switzerland, Australia and Canada.

LOS PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS INSTRUMENTOS DE GOBIERNO. BY SEGUNDO V. LINARES QUINTANA. Buenos Aires: Alfa, 1945, 839 p. Pesos 28.

A compendious treatise in comparative government, emphasizing Argentine law and experience, but also examining the legal status of parties in several other American republics and in Czechoslovakia.

EL MAR COMO FACTOR DE PROTAGONISMO EN LA POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL. BY CAMILO BARCIA TRELLES. Santiago de Campostela: Editora Universitaria Compostelana, 1945, 68 p.

An historical interpretation covering the last four centuries, by a professor of international law at Santiago de Compostela.

LANDING OPERATIONS. BY ALFRED VAGTS. Harrisburg (Pa.): Military Service Publishing Co., 1946, 831 p. $5.00.

A recognized authority on military history traces the development of this form of amphibious warfare since classical times.

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L'AGGRESSIONE INTERNAZIONALE. By Enrico Serra. Milan: Hoepli, 1946, 203 p. L. 200.

A documented historico-legal study concluding with the San Francisco Charter.

General: Economic and Social

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION. By J. Tinbergen. New York: Elsevier, 1945, 208 p. $4.00.

A sound treatise, dealing principally with theoretical aspects of trade and finance, by a professor in the Netherlands School of Economics. The author has also carefully considered the criteria of policy to be adopted by international advisory and regulatory agencies.

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND DOMESTIC WELFARE. By Norman S. Buchanan. New York: Holt, 1945, 249 p. $3.75.

An important monograph on a timely subject by a professor of economics at the University of California. The author enters several caveats against a rapid and indiscriminate resumption of foreign lending by the United States.

KAPITALEXPORT UND ZWISCHENSTAATLICHE WARENBEWEGUNGEN. By Jürg J. Schwenter. Berne: Francke, 1945, 90 p. Swiss Fr. 6.50.

A theoretical analysis rather than a review of current practices.

THEORIE DES MITTELSTANDES. By Fritz Marbach. Berne: Francke, 1942, 425 p. Swiss Fr. 15.

A comprehensive treatise on the economic and social functions and status of the middle class in the modern capitalist world. The author is professor of economics at the University of Bern.

DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM. By David W. Raudenbush. New York: Day, 1946, 338 p. $3.50.

Mr. Raudenbush, using the thesis of James Burnham's "The Managerial Revolution" as his *point de départ*, unfolds a rather exotic plan of his own for breaking up the monopolies and trusts and thus achieving what the reader will be surprised to learn is "democratic capitalism."

THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By Martin Hill. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1946, 168 p. $2.00.

A careful weighing of its failures and successes and of what that experience has to teach us.

EUROPEAN POPULATION TRANSFERS 1939–1945. By Joseph B. Schechtman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 532 p. $5.00.

A factual — and where possible, statistical — survey of policies and movements, especially those involving the movement of Germans.

NOT BY BREAD ALONE. By Vilhjalmur Stefansson. New York: Macmillan, 1946, 339 p. $3.50.

The noted Arctic explorer dwells on the virtues of a meat diet, notably among some of the more "backward" peoples on the periphery of civilization, and in so doing punctures a number of current beliefs.

THE FEVER BARK TREE. By M. L. Duran-Reynals. Garden City: Doubleday, 1946, 275 p. $2.75.

The romantic story of quinine, its use and its production. There is a chapter on the crisis created by Japan's conquest of the East Indies in 1942.

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AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST ANTISEMITISM. By Mark Vishniak. New York: Research Institute of the Jewish Labor Committee, 1946, 135 p. $2.50.

A scholar's review of legislation concerning Jews enacted since Roman times, with proposals for international guarantees to insure them equal rights.

ISRAEL OF TOMORROW. Edited by Leo Jung. New York: Herald Square Press, 1946, 501 p. $3.75.

A score of contributors on the cultural, legal and political position of the Jews, with special attention to Palestine, Poland and America.

HEALTH RECOVERY IN EUROPE. By Sir Arthur S. MacNalty and W. Franklin Mellor. London: Muller, 1946, 180 p. 7/6.

A description of the measures being taken or planned in order to restore health standards on the Continent.

THE WORLD'S HUNGER. By Frank A. Pearson and Floyd A. Harper. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1945, 90 p. $1.50.

Two agricultural economists at Cornell survey the world's food-producing resources and conclude that these cannot be expanded to any marked degree.

PROPAGANDA, COMMUNICATION, AND PUBLIC OPINION: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE. By Bruce Lannes Smith and Others. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946, 435 p. $5.00.

This is a revision and expansion of the authors' "Propaganda and Promotional Activities" published in 1935. The body of the work consists of an extensive and annotated bibliography.

PEOPLES SPEAKING TO PEOPLES. By Llewellyn White and Robert D. Leigh. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946, 121 p. $2.00.

This is the first of six projected reports to be issued by the Commission on Freedom of the Press, created some two years ago with a grant from *Time* and operated under the auspices of the University of Chicago. The subject matter treated, of necessity rather summarily, covers the whole field of international communications (including, for example, the movies) and their political and economic implications.

GOD AND THE ATOM. By R. A. Knox. New York: Sheed, 1946, 166 p. $2.00.

A thoughtful analysis of today's spiritual crisis, for which the atom bomb is the symbol and, in no little degree, the cause. Monsignor Knox finds that modern man's belief in progress has given way to despair, even desperation.

TOWARDS CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY. By Stafford Cripps. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946, 101 p. $2.00.

A statement of practical Christian action, by one of the leading statesmen in the Labor Government.

PIONEERS FOR PEACE THROUGH RELIGION. By Charles S. Macfarland. New York: Revell, 1946, 256 p. $2.50.

The story, based on official records, of the work accomplished by the Church Peace Union since its foundation in 1914 by Andrew Carnegie.

The Second World War

SISTA FÖRSÖKET. LONDON-BERLIN, SOMMAREN 1939. By Birger Dahlerus. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1945, 225 p. Kr. 6.50.

Dahlerus, a Swedish manufacturer, involved himself in the negotiations between Berlin and London on the eve of World War II. As a friend of Goering, he acted as an

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ineffectual emissary between Berlin and London. His account, despite its naïveté, has a certain historical value. A lengthy analysis of its "revelations," and how they dovetail with other accounts of those feverish days (including Dahlerus' own statements at the Nuremberg Trial), will be found in *The Times Literary Supplement* (London) for May 25, 1946.

LA DEUXIÈME GUERRE MONDIALE. By Pierre Belperron and Georges Andersen. Paris: Plon, 1945, 240 p. Fr. 100.

A chronology of the military operations in Europe and North Africa, with several maps.

WORLD WAR II. By Roger W. Shugg and Major H. A. DeWeerd. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1946, 538 p. $3.00.

The trade edition of a "brief military history of the war" which was used by the War Department in its orientation work.

FIGHTING DIVISIONS. By Chief Warrant Officer E. J. Kahn, Jr., and Technical Sergeant Henry McLemore. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1946, 218 p. $2.50.

A compendium of information concerning the organization and fighting record of each of the 90 combat divisions in the American Army during the recent war.

BATTLE STATIONS. New York: Wise, 1946, 402 p. $3.95.

Over 500 photographs illustrating the Navy's part in the common victory, accompanied by brief text.

THE R.C.A.F. OVERSEAS: THE FIFTH YEAR. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 404 p. $3.00.

This volume completes the record of the Canadian fliers begun in "The R.C.A.F. Overseas: The First Four Years" (1944) and covers operations in the Mediterranean, western Europe and the Far East.

EISENHOWER'S OWN STORY OF THE WAR. By General Dwight D. Eisenhower. New York: Arco, 1946, 122 p. $2.50.

This report was prepared in mid-1945, and is published now presumably without revision. A valuable historical document, it will be a piece of prime evidence when the final story of the victory in Europe is written. It should also serve as a counter-agent to some of the more personal effusions now coming off the presses.

GAUNTLET TO OVERLORD. By Ross Munro. New York: Cambridge University Press (Macmillan), 1946, 477 p. $3.50.

An account of the military operations undertaken by the Canadian Army in Europe — Spitsbergen, Dieppe, Sicily, Italy and Normandy. The author witnessed much of what he describes, and in general he sticks to military matters, eschewing politics or judgments on high strategy.

WAR REPORT. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 452 p. $3.75.

Excerpts from on-the-spot reporting by BBC correspondents with the Allied invasion forces in western Europe. The material is arranged more or less chronologically and is held together with brief transitional paragraphs.

ECLIPSE. By Alan Moorehead. New York: Coward-McCann, 1945, 309 p. $2.75.

A superior job of reporting on the Italian and west European campaigns, by a correspondent of the London *Daily Express* who has already established a solid reputation with his previous books on the war in the Mediterranean.

DUNKIRK. By A. D. Divine. London: Faber, 1945, 307 p. 15/.

A thoroughly circumstantial chronicle of the epic withdrawal, based on official records as well as a wealth of personal reports.

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PATTON AND HIS THIRD ARMY. By Colonel Brenton G. Wallace. Harrisburg (Pa.): Military Service Publishing Co., 1946, 232 p. $3.00.

A chronology of the operations of General Patton's forces from D-Day to the conquest of Germany.

MONTGOMERY, FIELD-MARSHAL. By Michael C. McGill and William D. Flackes. Belfast: Quota, 1946, 122 p. 5/.

The British Commander's character and career as seen by two fellow Ulstermen to whom he is very definitely a hero.

BASTOGNE. By Colonel S. L. A. Marshall and Others. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1946, 261 p. $3.00.

A carefully compiled and rather technical reconstruction of the famous siege that helped decide the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944. The author and his collaborators had full access to official documents and discussed the conduct of the battle with leading participants on both sides.

NO WOMAN'S WORLD. By Iris Carpenter. Boston: Houghton, 1946, 338 p. $3.00.

A British war correspondent reports on what she saw and heard on the western European fronts.

TOUR OF DUTY. By John Dos Passos. Boston: Houghton, 1946, 336 p. $3.00.

A noted American writer displays his keen perception of things seen and heard on his journey in the Pacific during the closing weeks of the war and in Europe after hostilities had ceased.

BURMA SURGEON RETURNS. By Gordon S. Seagrave. New York: Norton 1946, 268 p. $3.00.

In this sequel to "Burma Surgeon" Dr. Seagrave tells how his hospital outfit was reorganized in India in order to accompany the Allied forces that reconquered Burma.

INTO SIAM. By Nicol Smith and Blake Clark. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1946, 315 p. $3.50.

The remarkable story of how the Office of Strategic Services established and maintained contact with the anti-Japanese underground in Siam.

IT IS DARK UNDERGROUND. By Loo Pin-Fei. New York: Putnam, 1946, 200 p. $2.75.

The amazing story of the resistance activities carried on against the Japanese by teen-age Chinese youngsters.

CORAL COMES HIGH. By George P. Hunt. New York: Harper, 1946, 147 p. $2.00.

A captain in the Marines recounts the bloody story of how his company was nearly annihilated while winning a foothold on Peleliu.

FLEET AGAINST JAPAN. By Fletcher Pratt. New York: Harper, 1946, 263 p. $3.00.

In this sequel to "The Navy's War" Mr. Pratt tells how American ships and planes destroyed Japanese naval power in the far Pacific. There are a number of excellent action photographs.

The United States

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MAKING, 1932–1940. By Charles A. Beard. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946, 336 p. $4.00.

At various times during the thirties Mr. Beard gave voice to the opinion that the United States enjoyed a wide margin of choice in determining whether or not it would become involved in armed conflicts that broke out elsewhere in the world. Notable expositions of this optimistic point of view were his "The Devil Theory of War" (1936)

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and "Giddy Minds and Foreign Quarrels" (1939). The present volume is a little more circumspect, but inevitably leaves the impression that Mr. Beard thinks he was right all along and that President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were wrong.

WHERE ARE WE HEADING? By Sumner Welles. New York: Harper, 1946, 397 p. $3.00.

In this interesting and controversial volume the former Under Secretary of State carries forward the account of American foreign relations begun in his "The Time for Decision." He is sharply critical of President Truman and Secretary Byrnes, though by implication admitting that the origins of some of their failures must be sought in compromises accepted by President Roosevelt in order to preserve "Big Three" unity and win the war. One of the most caustic chapters is entitled "The Inter-American System in Jeopardy."

LES ÉTATS-UNIS ET LA NEUTRALITÉ DE 1939 À 1941. By Pierre Monniot. Paris: Pédone, 1946, 414 p.

This objective and careful study traces the process by which the United States discovered that it was a part of the rest of the world.

THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN LOYALTY. By Merle Curti. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946, 267 p. $3.00.

A scholar's review of the historical development of the patriotic tradition in the United States.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN FUNDS. By Louise Overacker. Boston: Boston University Press, 1946, 76 p. $1.50.

Lectures delivered at Boston University in 1945, by a professor of political science in Wellesley College.

RUNNING THE COUNTRY. Edited by A. N. Christensen and E. M. Kirkpatrick. New York: Holt, 1946, 1001 p. $3.95.

This "anthology of American politics in action" contains 120 articles and excerpts from longer works by many hands.

A TRIAL ON TRIAL. By Maximilian St.-George and Lawrence Dennis. Chicago: The Author, 1946, 503 p. $5.00.

The animus of this "exposure of the sinister anti-libertarian, totalitarian and internationalist forces" behind the mass sedition trial in Washington can easily be surmised from the fact that Lawrence Dennis, one of the defendants, is co-author.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE GENERAL STAFF. By Major General Otto L. Nelson, Jr. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1946, 608 p. $5.00.

A documented official history of the development of the Army's organization and administration during the last half century.

HISTORY OF THE MODERN AMERICAN NAVY. By Donald W. Mitchell. New York: Knopf, 1946, 477 p. $4.50.

A competent, critical review of the growth of our naval power from twelfth to first place in the world.

WHITE MAN'S BURDEN. By Ruth Smith. New York: Vanguard, 1946, 222 p. $2.00.

Light on race relations in the United States, by one who has lived with the problem for many years.

NEGRO LABOR. By Robert C. Weaver. New York: Harcourt, 1946, 329 p. $3.00.

A Negro labor expert with the Federal Government reviews the recent economic and social progress of his race and makes some forecasts concerning future developments.

A NEGRO'S FAITH IN AMERICA. By Spencer Logan. New York: Macmillan, 1946, 88 p. $1.75.

An American Negro has high hopes for the future of his people in this country.

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ALASKA: PROMYSHLENNIK AND SOURDOUGH. By Stuart Ramsay Tompkins. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1945, 350 p. $3.00.

A reliable history of the exploration and development of our northern territory. Extensive bibliography.

Western Europe

LA POLITIQUE DES PARTIS SOUS LA IIIe RÉPUBLIQUE. By François Goguel. Paris: Seuil, 1946, 2 v.

This lengthy essay on the political history of the Third Republic is by no means cut-and-dried, for the author ventures opinions and critical remarks about such controversial matters as the Dreyfus Affair. The thread that runs through the whole story is the conflict of the Left with the Right.

NON-RÉSISTANCE OU LE CHEMIN DE L'ABATTOIR. 1918–1940. By Edouard Helsey. Paris: P. Dupont, 1944, 222 p. Fr. 55.

Wartime reflections on the mistakes of French policy during the inter-war period, by a French journalist.

FACE À LA GESTAPO. By André Mutter. Paris: Champion, 1944, 188 p. Fr. 40.

The prison record of a French Resistance leader.

CORRESPONDANCE, 1870–1924. Vol. III (1912–1924). By Paul Cambon. Paris: Grasset, 1946, 453 p. Fr. 225.

This volume contains the noted French diplomat's correspondence from 1912 to his death in 1924. It comprises some 300 letters, in many of which one will find interesting sidelights on events just before, during and immediately following World War I.

FOR ALL MANKIND. By Léon Blum. New York: Viking, 1946, 186 p. $2.50.

A faithful translation of the book Blum wrote during the early days of his imprisonment by the Nazis. The French edition was reviewed in the October 1946 issue of Foreign Affairs.

EL RIN, FRONTERA DE FRANCIA. By Octavio González Roura. Buenos Aires: Hachette, 1945, 157 p. Pesos 3.

An anti-Nazi Argentine journalist, long a resident in France, discusses certain current aspects of the age-old Rhine problem.

GERMANY TRIED DEMOCRACY. By S. William Halperin. New York: Crowell, 1946, 567 p. $3.75.

A critical review of German history since World War I by a professor of history at the University of Chicago. Halperin seeks to be objective, but some readers will feel that he has a higher opinion of the strength of German liberalism than the record warrants.

THE GERMAN PEOPLE. By Veit Valentin. New York: Knopf, 1946, 730 p. $6.00.

Professor Valentin obliges his readers to wade through a lengthy, old-fashioned political history of Germany in which small appreciation is evinced of social and economic factors. The second half of the book is given over to the period since the time of Frederick the Great. The author left Germany and went into exile shortly after Hitler took power.

THE COURSE OF GERMAN HISTORY. By A. J. P. Taylor. New York: Coward-McCann, 1946, 231 p. $3.00.

This review and interpretation of the last 150 years of German history moves inexorably to the conclusion that militarism and Nazism are not aberrations but logical consequences of the evolution of the German spirit.

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IN GERMANY NOW. By William Peters. London: Progress Publishing Co., 1946, 115 p. 3/6.

Impressions of defeated Germany, by a British soldier-interpreter.

AMERICA'S GERMANY. By Julian Bach, Jr. New York: Random House, 1946, 310 p. $3.00.

As correspondent of the official Army weekly *Army Talks*, Mr. Bach enjoyed unusual opportunities for studying the administration of the American Zone. On the whole he regards it as a success, though he is not blind to some of its defects and failures.

GERMANY IN DEFEAT. By Percy Knauth. New York: Knopf, 1946, 233 p. $2.75.

Before the recent war Mr. Knauth, an American newspaperman, served as correspondent in Berlin. He returned to Germany in the spring of 1945 to find a country physically destroyed but a people still harboring in dangerous degree the ideas that produced Nazism.

THE GERMAN AIR FORCE. By Asher Lee. New York: Harper, 1946, 310 p. $3.50.

A first-rate, critical history of Hitler's air force — its development, its part in the Nazis' near-victory of 1940–42, and its ultimate failure.

WRITTEN IN DARKNESS. By Anne Somerhausen. New York: Knopf, 1946, 339 p. $3.00.

The author of this diary is the wife of a onetime member of the Belgian Parliament imprisoned during most of the war in Germany. Madame Somerhausen's account shows how she and her children managed to survive under the Nazi occupation without collaborating.

EXPERIMENT "E." By Leon Szalet. New York: Didier, 1945, 284 p. $3.50.

A first-person description of existence in the extermination laboratory at Sachsenhausen.

ROME UNDER THE TERROR. By M. De Wyss. London: Hale, 1945, 218 p. 15/.

The author of this informative volume is said to be a lady who was in Rome continuously during the last days of Fascist rule. It is in the form of a diary — running from April 1943 to June 1944 — and combines a lot of chitchat with some really interesting items.

ITALIAN JOURNEY. By G. Blake Palmer. Auckland: Oswald-Sealy, 1945, 239 p. 13/6.

The material in this pleasant book about Italian places and history was prepared primarily for the use of New Zealand troops fighting in Italy.

LA PEQUEÑA HISTORIA. By A. Lerroux. Buenos Aires: Editorial Cimera, 1945, 618 p. Pesos 12.

A Republican leader, several times Prime Minister, lifts the veil on some of the inner workings of the Second Spanish Republic. At the outbreak of the Civil War, Lerroux withdrew to Portugal.

FRANCO, VALEROSO CABALLERO CRISTIANO. By E. O. Iredell. Buenos Aires: Editorial Americalee, 1945, 222 p. Pesos 3.50.

A scrapbook of material demonstrating that Franco is anything but a "gallant Christian gentleman." The author is "presented" by Luis Araquistáin.

EL BOLCHEVISMO Y LA RELIGIÓN. By Ladislao Kania. Bilbao: El Mensajero del Corazón de Jesús, 1945, 202 p. Ptas. 10.

An example of current anti-Communist propaganda in Spain.

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HISTORIA DEL NACIONALISMO VASCO 1793–1936. By Maximiano Garcia Venero. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1945, 495 p. Ptas. 40.

The author, though not himself a Basque, believes that every good Basque must put loyalty to Spain above all else. His account is replete with quoted documents.

Eastern Europe

RUSSIA ON THE WAY. By Harrison Salisbury. New York: Macmillan, 1946, 425 p. $3.50.

Mr. Salisbury, an American correspondent, spent eight months during 1944 reporting conditions in various parts of the U.S.S.R. His book is not profound or sensational but is full of keen observations on Russian ways and points of view. He is aware of the unhappy aspects of Russian behavior but sees no reason why we should fight over them.

BEHIND SOVIET POWER: STALIN AND THE RUSSIANS. By Jerome Davis. New York: Readers' Press, 1946, 120 p. $2.50.

A popular and very definitely sympathetic survey of the accomplishments of Stalin's rule.

LAND OF THE SOVIETS. By James S. Gregory. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1946, 284 p. 1/.

A handy, readable survey of the geography of the Soviet Union.

SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE. By Alexander Baykov. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946, 100 p. $2.00.

A valuable companionpiece to the author's "The Development of the Soviet Economic System" (reviewed in the October 1946 issue). His treatment provides historical depth and statistical documentation.

THE RUSSIANS AND THEIR CHURCH. By Nicolas Zernov. London: S.P.C.K., 1945, 193 p. 7/6.

A concise historical review since the tenth century.

HABLAN LOS JEFES DEL COMUNISMO. By Virgilio Filippo. Buenos Aires: Editorial Lista Blanca, 1945, 244 p. Pesos 1.50.

Excerpts from the speeches and writings of Communist leaders and publicists, with uncomplimentary comments by the compiler, a parish priest in Argentina.

THE DANZIG DILEMMA. By John Brown Mason. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1946, 377 p. $4.00.

A first-rate history of the Free City of Danzig and of the international problems it created, with extensive bibliography.

POLAND'S RIGHTS TO JUSTICE. By Andrew J. Krzesinski. New York: Devin-Adair, 1946, 120 p. $2.00.

The author extols Polish heroism in the recent war and finds it poorly rewarded with the transfer of eastern Poland to Russia, as decided at Yalta.

SILENT IS THE VISTULA. By Irena Orska. New York: Longmans, 1946, 275 p. $3.00.

A lieutenant in the Polish Home Army relates the tragic story of the Warsaw rising of August 1944 and of her own subsequent imprisonment in Germany.

25 YEARS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By R. W. Seton-Watson. London: Muller, 1945, 119 p. 7/6.

This slim volume is a reprint of the concluding chapters in the author's "History of the Czechs and Slovaks" (1943). Seton-Watson is Masaryk Professor of Central European History in the University of London.

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SLEZSKO. By Leopold Peřich. Prague: Vyšehrad, 1945, 171 p. Kč. 54.
An historical survey of the nationalist movement in Silesia, from the Czech point of view.

HUNGARY — TO BE OR NOT TO BE. By Rustem Vambery. New York: Ungar, 1946, 208 p. $2.50.
A noted Hungarian scholar and liberal explodes several popular myths about his country. His last two chapters describe "The Way Out" by which a democratic Hungary can be salvaged from the wreckage of the old one.

SHADOW OVER ATHENS. By Phokion Demetriades. New York: Rinehart, 1946, 155 p. $3.00.
A collection of 77 drawings made in Athens under the Nazi occupation by a leading Greek cartoonist, together with brief text. The drawings portray, as no words can, the suffering and the will-to-resist of the Greek people.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BRITISH SECURITY. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946, 176 p. $2.50.
A searching reappraisal of Britain's place in the world after two world wars, prepared by a study group at the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

SOME PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. London: Eyre, 1946, 142 p. 7/6.
Concrete suggestions by a group of British Conservatives.

PRESS, PARLIAMENT AND PEOPLE. By Francis Williams. London: Heinemann, 1946, 254 p. 8/6.
A candid discussion of the proper rôle of the newspaper in a free society, with criticisms of the British press for its shortcomings and of the Government for its mistakes in wartime censorship. Mr. Williams was formerly editor of the *Daily Herald* and during part of the war was Controller of News and Censorship in the Ministry of Information.

SOCIALISM LOOKS FORWARD. By John Strachey. New York: Philosophical Library, 1945, 153 p. $2.00.
Mr. Strachey, erstwhile *enfant terrible* of the Labor Party and now Minister of Food, answers a lot of questions about the aims and tactics of British Socialism.

THE MAN FROM LIMEHOUSE: CLEMENT RICHARD ATTLEE. By Cyril Clemens. Webster Groves (Mo.): International Mark Twain Society, 1946, 159 p. $3.00.
A scissors-and-paste job on the Labor Premier.

THE STORY OF THE JEWISH LEGION. By Vladimir Jabotinsky. New York: Ackerman, 1946, 191 p. $3.00.
A first-hand history of the organization and the activities of a remarkable military body that fought as part of the British Army in World War I, by the man who more than anyone else was responsible for its formation.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OBJECTIVES. Edited by Sir Harry Lindsay. London: Michael Joseph, 1946, 288 p. 10/6.
A dozen papers by various hands covering a wide gamut of imperial problems — political, economic, social and cultural.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1606-1945. By Martin Wight. London: Faber, 1946, 187 p. 10/6.
This is the opening volume in a projected series of "Studies in Colonial Legislatures" edited by Miss Margery Perham under the auspices of Nuffield College at Oxford. Mr.

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Wight has admirably succeeded in summarizing the constitutional development of the colonial empire.

FREEDOM FROM FEAR: CAN IT BE ACHIEVED IN CANADA? By Ernest Landon Russell Williamson. Montreal: Provincial Publishing Co., 1945, 119 p. $1.50.

Proposals for social and economic reforms in Canada.

ESKIMO SUMMER. By Douglas Leechman. Boston: Humphries, 1946, 247 p. $3.50.

Sidelights on native life in northern Labrador, by a Canadian anthropologist.

STONY GROUND. By John Norwood. London: Crisp, 1946, 158 p. 6/6.

The author believes that the future military safety of the British Commonwealth lies in the closer association of its parts, and towards this end makes several suggestions. Most of his text is given over to an analysis of Australian problems.

NEW HORIZONS. By Bertram Stevens. Sydney: Huston (for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, N.S.W. Branch), 1946, 201 p. 10/6.

An analysis of the relations, chiefly economic, between India and Australia, by a onetime Prime Minister of New South Wales and Australian Representative on the Eastern Group Supply Council.

THE STORY OF NEW ZEALAND. By A. H. Reed. Wellington: Reed, 1945, 535 p. 20/.

A popular review.

NEW ZEALAND: PACIFIC PIONEER. By Philip L. Soljak. New York: Macmillan, 1946, 197 p. $2.50.

A readable introduction to the country, its people, their institutions and their recent history.

THE DISCOVERY OF INDIA. By Jawaharlal Nehru. New York: Day, 1946, 595 p. $5.00.

Like the Indian leader's other great books, "The Discovery of India" was written in prison — in this case during 1944. Nehru does not pretend to profound scholarship; his purpose is rather to satisfy his own curiosity concerning India's historical development. Some of his most interesting passages are those in which he discusses recent events, notably as they touch the Congress Party and the nationalist movement.

INDIA AT THE THRESHOLD. By L. Winifred Bryce. New York: Friendship Press, 1946, 177 p. $1.00.

A readable introduction to India's current social and religious problems.

OUR COUNTRY IS INDIA. Compiled by Rebecca Wells Loeffler. New York: Friendship Press, 1946, 180 p. $1.00.

Some 30 short contributions on social and political problems by young Indian Christians.

INDIA TODAY. By Raleigh Parkin. New York: Day, 1946, 387 p. $3.75.

A considerably revised and enlarged version of a volume originally published in 1942. It is well organized and crammed with facts. There is a documentary appendix and selected bibliography.

INDIA'S POPULATION: FACT AND POLICY. By S. Chandrasekhar. New York: Day, 1946, 117 p. $2.00.

An expert and factual analysis of a pressing problem, with suggestions for a national Indian population policy.

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The Near East

SYRIA AND LEBANON. By A. H. Hourani. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 402 p. $5.00.

A sound, scholarly review of the modern history of the Levant states, with particular attention to the problems created by the process of westernization. The story is carried down to the spring of 1945, thus missing the crucial events of recent months. There are documentary appendices, a bibliographical note and several maps. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

THE STORY OF ZIONISM. By J. Mitchell Rosenberg. New York: Bloch, 1946, 272 p. $2.50.

A brief and somewhat episodic history.

THE ANGLO-PALESTINE YEAR BOOK, 1946. Edited by F. J. Jacoby and I. A. Abbady. London: Anglo-Palestine Publications, 1946, 384 p. 25/.

This compendium of useful information includes maps, charts, diagrams and tables as well as text.

The Far East

SOVIET ASIA MISSION. By Henry A. Wallace and Andrew J. Steiger. New York: Reynal, 1946, 254 p. $3.00.

Mr. Wallace made an official visit to China, Mongolia and Soviet Asia in the summer of 1944. These are his impressions, colored perhaps by the wartime necessity of thinking and saying the best of one's allies. Several of Mr. Wallace's speeches and press releases are included.

RECONQUEST: ITS RESULTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. By Hallett Abend. Garden City: Doubleday, 1946, 305 p. $2.75.

Some of this is the chatty report of an air trip to India and China made under U.S. Army auspices in the summer of 1945. The rest consists of various *obiter dicta* on the Far East, where Mr. Abend was for many years a correspondent of *The New York Times*.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE FAR EAST. By Kenneth Scott Latourette. New York: Macmillan, 1946, 665 p. $6.00.

This comprehensive survey covers the full sweep of history in India, southeast Asia, the Indies and the Philippines as well as China, Korea and Japan.

THE FAR EAST MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. By H. Van Straelen. London: Luzac, 1945, 151 p. 10/6.

The author, for many years a resident in the Orient, stresses the importance, especially for western diplomatic officials, of acquiring a sound knowledge of oriental peoples and ways. In a concluding chapter — "Towards a Bibliography" — he discusses critically a number of books on the Far East.

CHINA. By Y. L. Liang and Neville Whymant. London: Macdonald, 1946, 192 p. 5/.

This introduction to Chinese history and affairs is scholarly without being pretentious. Unhappily it does not include the most recent period.

THE CHINESE MIND. By Gung-Hsing Wang. New York: Day, 1946, 192 p. $2.50.

The development of successive schools of thought in China during the last 2,500 years is briefly set forth by a consular official. Besides the limitations of space, the author is apparently handicapped by his government connection — hence his Kuomintang interpretation of such current phenomena as "Sunyatsenism."

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OUR NEIGHBORS, THE CHINESE. By Vaughan White. New York: Rinehart, 1946, 267 p. $2.75.

Miss White is more trustworthy in her personal observations concerning the Chinese and their way of life than she is in her treatment of political and economic affairs.

CHINA: HER LIFE AND HER PEOPLE. By Mildred Cable and Francesca French. London: University of London Press, 1946, 160 p. 5/.

A popular, illustrated treatment.

THE COLLECTED WARTIME MESSAGES OF GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK 1937–1945. Compiled by Chinese Ministry of Information. New York: Day, 1946, 2 v. $7.50.

Some eightscore messages arranged in chronological order from July 1937 to September 1945.

POPULATION IN MODERN CHINA. By Ta Chen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946, 126 p. $2.50.

Unlike India, China has no reliable census statistics. However, Professor Ta Chen of Tsing Hua University, a leading authority on Chinese population problems, conducted a limited census in the Kunming Lake region, and this monograph embodies his findings.

DRAGON IN THE DUST. By Post Wheeler. Hollywood: Rodd, 1946, 253 p. $2.75.

A diagnosis of what is wrong with the Japanese people and suggestions for reform, by one who has known them for over 40 years. Among other things the author regards the retention of the Emperor as a grave error for which we shall have to pay in the long run.

WHAT IT TAKES TO RULE JAPAN. By Major Harold J. Noble. New York: U. S. Camera, 1946, 96 p. $1.50.

A popular treatment of the military, psychological and other factors involved in the government of defeated Japan. The text, which first appeared in the *Saturday Evening Post*, is amplified with four dozen photographs.

BRITISH RULE IN BURMA: 1824–1942. By G. E. Harvey. London: Faber, 1946, 100 p. 10/6.

A former member of the Indian Civil Service reviews the political and economic development of Burma during the last 100 years.

MALAY FISHERMEN. By Raymond Firth. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1946, 354 p. $4.50.

A careful case study in peasant economy undertaken just before the war by a professor of anthropology in the University of London.

LABOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY. By Kenneth K. Kurihara. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1946, 97 p. $2.00.

An objective exposition of the economic and social problems created by the advance of industrialization in the Islands. Published for the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

FROM A SOUTH SEAS DIARY, 1938–1942. By Sir Harry Luke. London: Nicholson, 1945, 255 p. 12/6.

The author, already known for his books on the Mediterranean area, served as Governor of Fiji and High Commissioner for the Western Pacific at a very critical time. This diary throws some light on what then happened, and more on some of the little-known islands of the South Pacific.

Africa

NORTH AFRICA SPEAKS. By Guido Rosa. New York: Day, 1946, 247 p. $3.50.

The author moves about French North Africa conversing with the natives and taking their pictures.

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THE ETHIOPIAN PEOPLE: THEIR RIGHTS AND PROGRESS. By E. Sylvia Pankhurst. Essex (Eng.): *New Times and Ethiopia News*, 1946, 64 p. 2/6.

An historical résumé of Ethiopian progress in recent decades and of her rights to such border areas as Eritrea.

DE COLONIZACIÓN Y ECONOMÍA EN LA GUINEA ESPAÑOLA. By Román Perpiñá Grau. Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1945, 422 p. Ptas. 160.

This monograph contains a wealth of textual and statistical information about Spain's most promising colony. The volume is lavishly printed in quarto and is illustrated with numerous photographs.

THE CHURCH IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA. By H. St. John T. Evans. London: S.P.G. and S.P.C.K., 1945, 80 p. 5/.

The accomplishments of the Church of England in this colony briefly told.

Latin America

THE EPIC OF LATIN AMERICA. By John A. Crow. Garden City: Doubleday, 1946, 756 p. $5.00.

This readable pageant of Latin American history is stronger on the early period than it is on the modern era.

OPPORTUNITIES IN LATIN AMERICA. By Ralph Hancock. New York: Essential Books, 1946, 278 p. $3.00.

Persons acquainted with the realities of Latin American geography and economics will doubtless find that the author has erred on the side of optimism in his statement of the opportunities awaiting Americans in those countries.

AIR TRAVEL GUIDE TO LATIN AMERICA. By Ivan Bullot. New York: Franklin Watts, 1946, 369 p. $5.00.

Information and maps, useful for traveller and student.

LOS PRINCIPIOS SOCIALES DE LA CONFERENCIA DE CHAPULTEPEC. By Rafael Vehils. Montevideo: Consejo Interamericano de Comercio y Producción, 1945, 73 p.

A systematic analysis of the social principles enunciated at the Chapultepec Conference in March 1945 and of the means for putting them into effect.

EL ACTA DE CHAPULTEPEC. By Alfonso de Rosenzweig-Diaz A. Mexico: The Author, 1946, 96 p.

An annotated analysis of the background, provisions and significance of the Act.

POR LA UNIDAD AMERICANA. By Rafael Larco Herrera. Trujillo (Peru): Jacobs, 1945, 249 p.

A panoramic miscellany of impressions and ideas based principally on the author's travels through the American Republics.

¿LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN LA AMÉRICA LATINA? By Jorge P. Howard. Buenos Aires: La Aurora, 1945, 249 p. Pesos 2.50.

An effort to demonstrate the value of Protestant church and missionary activities in Latin America.

CUATRO CONSTITUCIONES FEDERALES DE CENTRO AMERICA Y LAS CONSTITUCIONES POLÍTICAS DE EL SALVADOR. Compiled by Miguel Angel Gallardo. San Salvador: Tip. La Unión, 1945, 380 p. Colones 4.

This useful reference work contains the texts of the various federal constitutions drawn up for Central America since 1824 and of the constitutions of Salvador (ten in number) for the same period. The author includes an interesting comparative analysis.

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ESCRITOS POLÍTICOS. By Juan José Arévalo. Guatemala City: Tipografía Nacional, 1945, 205 p.

Occasional pieces and addresses dealing with Guatemalan affairs during the last decade.

THROUGH UNKNOWN NICARAGUA. By Mervyn G. Palmer. London: Jarrolds, 1945, 150 p. 21/.

This account of a scientific expedition throws light on the little-known region and its people, lying along the Honduran-Nicaraguan frontier.

LECCIONES DE CIENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL Y CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA. By Marco Tulio Zeledón. San José: Imprenta Nacional, 1945, 137 p.

A practical explanation of Costa Rican constitutional law.

SOBRE POLÍTICA EXTERNA ECUATORIANA EN LA POST-GUERRA. By Antonio Quevedo. Quito: Universidad, 1945, 112 p.

Ecuador's international position as seen from Quito early in 1944.

LA INCÓGNITA DEL PARAGUAY. By Arnaldo Valdovinos. Buenos Aires: Atlántida, 1945, 159 p. Pesos 3.

The author muses on the problems created by the mixture of two civilizations, European and Indian.

AMAZÔNIA. A TERRA E O HOMEM. By Araújo Lima. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1945, 271 p.

Somewhat random reflections on the human geography and social history of the Amazon hinterland.

ARGENTINA — BRAZIL. By Homero Baptista de Magalhães. Buenos Aires: Losada, 1945, 148 p. Pesos 4.

A factual survey of trade relations between the two countries.

BLUE BOOK ON ARGENTINA. New York: Greenberg, 1946, 58 p. $1.00.

This is the "official indictment of the Fascist Régime in Argentina" drawn up by the State Department on the basis of documents and other information obtained from Axis sources. This memorandum was first made public by the Department on February 11, 1946.

HOMBRES Y PROBLEMAS ARGENTINOS. By Nicolás Repetto. Buenos Aires: La Vanguardia, 1945, 271 p. Pesos 3.

Essays by an Argentine democrat.

¿ES EL CORONEL PERÓN NAZI-FASCISTA? By Sven Cristensen. Tucumán: Editorial La Raza, 1945, 101 p. 1 Peso.

The answer here given is No.

DOS FECHAS: 4 DE JUNIO – 24 DE FEBRERO. By Americo Ghioldi. Buenos Aires: La Vanguardia, 1946, 148 p. Pesos 2.50.

Essays on the political events of recent years in Argentina, by a Socialist writer who is naturally critical of dictatorial tendencies.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, League of Nations, Perm. Court of Int. Justice, Int. Institute of Intellectual Coöperation:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 734 Jackson Pl., Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

Aeronautics

Convention on international civil aviation. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., on Executive A. May 29 and June 14, 1946. Washington, 1946. Pt.2.

International commercial aviation. Washington, 1946. 12 p. (79th Cong., 2nd Sess., S. Doc. 173.) 5¢.

Commercial Policy and Trade

Anglo-American financial agreement. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. J. Res. 138. March 5–20, 1946. Washington, 1946. 533 p. 70¢.

International trade and the British loan. Washington, 1946. 10 p. (Dept. of State Publication 2595. Commercial Policy Series 91.) 10¢.

Suggested charter for an International Trade Organization of the United Nations. Washington, 1946. 47 p. (Dept. of State Publication 2598. Commercial Policy Series 93.)

New horizons for world trade. Washington, 1946. 12 p. (Dept. of State Publication 2591. Commercial Policy Series 90.)

Mesa redonda sobre propuestas del gobierno de los Estados Unidos para la expansion del comercio y del empleo (Feb. 18–22, 1946). Havana, Junta de Economia de Guerra, 1946. 2 pts.

Cultural Relations

Interchange of persons; knowledge, and skills between the people of the United States and peoples of other countries. Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany S. 2432. July 17, 1946. Washington, 1946. 2 p. (S. Rept. 1730.)

Inter-American Conference of Experts on Copyright, Pan American Union, June 1–22, 1946. Proceedings. Washington, Pan American Union, 1946. 180 p. (Congress and Conference Series no. 51.)

——. Final act. Washington, Pan American Union, 1946. 42 p.

Inter-American convention on the rights of the author in literary, scientific and artistic works, signed at the Inter-American Conference of Experts on Copyright, Pan American Union, June 1–22, 1946. Washington, Pan American Union, 1946. 28 p.

Financial Policy and Exchange

Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity for the settlement of outstanding financial questions, London, 24th June, 1946. London, 1946. 4 p. (Cmd. 6864.) 1d.

International bank for reconstruction and development. Washington, 1946. 33 p. (Dept. of State Publication 2511. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1502.) 10¢.

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India

India; statement by the cabinet mission and his excellency the Viceroy. London, 1946. 9 p. (Cmd. 6821.) 2d.

India; correspondence and documents connected with the conference between the cabinet mission and his excellency the Viceroy and representatives of the Congress and the Muslim League, May, 1946. London, 1946. 19 p. (Cmd. 6829.) 4d.

India; statement by the mission dated 25th May in reply to pronouncements by the Indian Parties and memorandum by the mission on states' treaties and paramountcy. London, 1946. 12 p. (Cmd. 6835.) 2d.

India. Cabinet Mission. Correspondence with the Congress Party and the Muslim League, 20th May–29th June, 1946. London, 1946. 35 p. (Cmd. 6861.) 6d.

India. Cabinet Mission. Papers relating to (a) the Sikhs, (b) the Indian States, and (c) the European Community. May–June, 1946. London, 1946. 8 p. (Cmd. 6862.) 2d.

Wartime labour conditions and reconstruction planning in India. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1946. 113 p. (Studies and Reports. New Series no. 2.) 50¢.

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Labor

International Labour Conference, 27th session, Paris, 1945. Record of proceedings. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1946. 507 p.

International Labour Conference, 29th session, 1946. Reports. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1946.

1. Directors' report. 2. Constitutional questions. 2 pts. 3. Protection of children and young workers. Supplement. 4. (2) Proposed international labour obligations in respect of non-self-governing territories. 53 p.

International Labour Conference. 29th session, 1946. Financial and budgetary matters. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1946. 69 p.

International Labour Conference, 30th session, Geneva, 1947. The organisation of labour inspection in industrial and commercial undertakings. Montreal, International Labour Office 1946. 29 p.

Latin America

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